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ABSTRACT
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the developments that took
place in the Greek economy, in the period after the end of World War II,
within a Kaldorian framework.
The mainstream Kaldorian theory of growth views the manufacturing
sector as the "engine" of economic growth.
Evidence suggests that it is very unlikely that manufacturing has
ever played this role in the case of Greece and even more so where
future evolutions are concerned. Given this, the question rises as to
which sector(s) has operated, and will continue to do so in the future,
as an alternative or complementary to manufacturing, engine of growth in
Greece.
The thesis will, first of all, provide a survey of the Kaldorian
theory of growth. It will then proceed to an analysis of the Greek
economy as well as to an empirical test of the theory, in the case of
Greece, with tourism as an alternative to manufacturing, in the role of
leading economic sector. An examination of the conditions under which
tourism could operate as an engine of economic growth, both
theoretically and in the particular case of Greece will finally follow.
VIII
PREFACE
When I first started working on my D.Phil thesis, about three
years ago, my initial idea was, basically, to investigate the widely
accepted notion of manufacturing' s role as an engine of growth in
economic development, for the particular case of Greece.
The theory that manufacturing represents the key leading sector
in all types of national economies, irrespective of the
particularities of each one, was initially formulated, theoretically,
in relation to industrially developed countries, in order to explain,
on one hand, the rapid growth of the 1950s-1960s as well as the
observed differences in growth rates among countries and, on the other
hand, the generalised slow-down in economic growth of the 1970s-1980s.
My main objective was to see whether the above theory, was also
equally applicable to less developed countries with particular
structural characteristics, such as Greece.
My intuition, even long before I started to work on the present
thesis, was that, at least in the particular case of the Greek
economy, testing this manufacturing driven development type of theory
would probably run into a number of difficulties; that, furthermore,
it would yield rather different results from those corresponding to
most developed economies, mainly because I thought that, for a number
of reasons, the Greek manufacturing industry could not be considered
as an engine of economic growth, at any point in time, past, present
and, possibly future, despite wishful thinking and numerous efforts
for the contrary.
From the beginning, the Kaldorian theory of economic growth
held a great attraction for me, as I believed that it represented an
adequate framework for what I had in mind; on the one hand, the
theoretical arguments as to the reasons why manufacturing, in
particular among all other sectors and branches of economic activity,
was the unquestionable engine of economic growth were summarised and
explained very concisely and persuasively. On the other hand, the
theory allowed itself to be easily tested empirically, as long as it
was conveniently summarised in three simple equations. My initial
idea, therefore, was to test the validity of the three Kaldorian
growth laws in the particular case of Greece and possibly, to derive
certain conclusions as to the role of the manufacturing sector for the
development of the country in question. In the process, however, and
especially after the first empirical results, I took this train of
thought a little further, as I realised that if manufacturing in
Greece did not support the Kaldorian view of an engine of growth, then
perhaps, some other economic activity could be considered for this
role.
After an application of the three laws to the other two
economic sectors (agriculture and services) and considering the role,
historical development, size and diversity of the Greek service
sector, following some thoughts on comparative advantage related
issues and quite a lot of intuition, the Greek tourism sector appeared
as a rather promising potential candidate. There was one problem
however. Most of the literature dealing with the possibility of
tourism playing the role of an engine of growth, either clearly stated
or implied that, this applied to the very first or, alternatively, the
very advanced stages of economic growth, that is, either before
manufacturing took off, or after it started to decline, relatively to
previous years and other sectors, while some other economic activity
(presumably manufacturing) would have to take over during the
intermediate stages of a country's development process. Given that
Greece cannot be considered an underdeveloped country any more than an
advanced industrial one, this major drawback prompted me to turn to
the literature on service economies, post- industrial societies etc
(see final conclusions in chapter six for the meaning of these terms),
especially with that part of the relevant literature dealing with
service economy characteristics in less developed countries and the
possibility that certain types of services could act as an alternative
(to manufacturing) engine of economic growth, at any level of
development. This further reading was, I believe, particularly
fruitful and interesting and, to a large extent, its result was the
final, concluding chapter of the present thesis. The structure of
contents as well as the general line of thought underlying the
analysis is described in the short introductory chapter which follows.
INTRODUCTION
For a very long time, economic thought has revolved around the
question of which one of the three economic sectors (primary,
secondary or tertiary) represents the leading sector in economic
development (Eltis, 1988). While Quesnay viewed agriculture as the
most productive sector in this role, this is rather the exception,
since most other theories (beginning with classical economists like
Adam Smith, the Marxian analysis, Rostow, in his stages of economic
development and ending with Keynesian and neo-Keynesian economists
like Kaldor), consider the progress of the secondary sector and of
manufacturing, in particular, as representative of the economic
progress of a certain country. In general, these theories define and
measure economic development, to a large extent, in terms of the
development of the manufacturing sector. In a comparative way of
thinking, the preponderance of manufacturing was also defined in terms
of its superiority relatively to the other two economic sectors. For
many years, the notion of economic development was, in essence
identified with the transition of a peasant society to an industrial
one, the expansion of the latter being, in many cases, carried out at
the expense of the former. Industrial expansion was largely based on
the ability of the particular sector to attract and absorb resources
from the other (less productive) sectors of the economy and use them
more productively, to the benefit of the national economies. Finally,
with the introduction of new methods of production, technological
innovations, learning by doing, greater specialisation, expanding
markets strong forward and backward linkages etc, industrial expansion
seemed to be an ever lasting process which, under conditions of rapid
adaptability of this sector to these changes, could keep the economy
on a dynamic path, moving upwards from one equilibrium point to
another.
There seems to be a certain amount of confusion and
uncertainty, however, as to the role of the third sector of the
economy in this framework, namely services. On one hand, the tertiary
was seen as homogeneous, labour intensive, low productivity sector,
unable to absorb technical innovations in order to raise productivity,
which could serve as an alternative (to agriculture) or complementary
pool of surplus labour for the requirements of the manufacturing
sector of production. On the other hand, it soon became clear that the
development of the industrial sector was accompanied and, in fact, in
certain cases, was enabled by the parallel development of certain
branches of the service sector, such as transport, communications,
insurance, banks, and at a later stage, information, computer services
etc. Some of these activities were characterised by relatively high
productivity growth and and an increased ability to absorb technical
know-how (eg. information services), in comparison to undeniably low
productivity (parasitic one could argue), traditional service
activities, such as domestic services, street peddlers etc. This came
as somewhat of a contradiction with the traditional view of the
service sector as homogeneously unproductive, non-innovating, in
relation to manufacturing and growing only in a complementary way to
the latter.
After a certain point, industrial expansion is closely
linked with an even faster, in some cases, expansion of certain
service activities. These activities grow either because they
constitute, in a sense, intermediate services, necessary for
industrial expansion and are directly "pulled" by manufacturing to
which they are closely related (e.g. transport, banks etc), or for
other reasons, to be found in comparative advantage considerations or
to the benefits of general economic prosperity, largely attributable
to industrial development. Consequently, the answer to the question of
whether the expansion of manufacturing and services should or actually
do move in the same or in opposite directions is not as clear-cut as
in the relationship between agriculture and manufacturing which is
clearly negative.
The Kaldorian theory of growth was initially developed in
the early 1960s, that is, in the prosperous part of what is considered
by some authors as "...the most interesting period in economic
history" (the period after World War II), (Scammel, 1983, pp. 1-3), in
terms of the speed and nature of the structural changes taking place
in the international economy.
Kaldor, like other authors in the same, more or less,
period, (e.g. Denison, Maddison) observed that, in a framework of a
world-wide and unprecedented, in speed, economic growth, the
performance of different national economies differed to a large
extent, and he attempted to find an explanation for these observed
differences.
Unlike other authors whose analysis was largely based on
the Keynesian models and demand factors or on a production function
and the importance of supply factors, Kaldor developed a rather more
complex analysis, based on the interaction of supply and demand and on
the different characteristics of each of the three economic sectors of
production.
Using the U.K, in particular, and the developed Western
European countries, in general, as a reference point, Kaldor attempted
to explain the postwar economic performance of the 0.E.C.D countries,
in terms of the performance of their manufacturing sectors. The
theoretical base of his argument relatively to the leading role of
manufacturing, is accompanied by three easily testable equations (the
mathematical form of the so called "three growth laws"), which
indicate that countries with rapidly growing manufacturing sectors
present both higher growth rates of GDP and higher total productivity,
thanks to the particular characteristics prevailing in manufacturing
(dynamic economies of scale, high productivity, the operation of the
Verdoorn's law etc). A more extensive analysis of the Kaldorian theory
of growth may be found in the relevant chapter (Ch. I) of the present
thesis. What one should keep in mind, though, is that all economic
theories, even the most comprehensive ones, are meant to explain
phenomena that occur at certain points in time and under specific
circumstances. When these circumstances change and especially at times
characterised by rapid and unforeseen changes, all theories can very
easily become obsolete.
The emergence of the economic recession in the 1970s was
accompanied by a prolonged relative decline of the manufacturing
sector, which progressively decreased in importance, in many Western
European economies, especially as far as its share in total employment
was concerned (Ch. II, section D). The tertiary sector, on the other
hand, seemed to be tougher, in that respect, during the recession
period. This was due, to a large extent, to the dynamism and
resilience of certain service activities, e.g. international tourism.
One should note, in that respect, that according to Eurostat
estimations, in 1990 tourism produced 5% of the EC-12 GDP and employed
6% of the labour force. For some of the individual member states the
corresponding figures were much higher (9.4% and 9.3% respectively in
Spain, 9% and 6.9% in France, 7.3% and 7.2% in Greece, 4.5% and 6.4%
in Italy and 6.2% and 6.3% Ireland.
This relative decline of the manufacturing sector, mainly
in terms of its employment share, and to a lesser extent, in terms of
its share in total output, named "de-industrialisation" (as opposed to
industrialisation) started to be obvious in a number of West European
countries, quite early in the post-war period (in the middle to late
70s). In general, it was seen as a transitional problem of the
manufacturing sector which needed restructuring and adjustment in an
environment where rapid changes were taking place, mainly in the
technological field. Furthermore, one could argue that this relative
decline was due, to a large extent, to the decline of several
traditional industrial branches, e.g. coal, steel, shipbuilding,
textiles, as well as to a shift from mass to specialised production
patterns. In any case, few authors would go as far as stating that the
"industrial era" was approaching the end, just as the end of the
"agricultural era" had come decades earlier and that the time had come
to tackle the notion of industry as an engine of growth and open the
way for some other economic sector (the third one, perhaps) to assume
this role. Whether the optimism of the mainstream view, that the
manufacturing sector of the industrially developed Western European
countries will flourish again is justified, is a question which, in
spite of being very interesting, lies, however, beyond the scope of
this thesis.
The present thesis concentrates on the issue of the
economic development of Greece, a country which, just as other Western
European countries, witnessed the phenomenon of de-industrialisation,
in the sense that its manufacturing sector has been shrinking, in
recent years, both in terms of its share in total employment as well
as in total output, while its service sector has been expanding for a
long time. However, the main difference between Greece and the other
W. European countries, in that respect, is that Greece is
de-industrialising without having ever really developed its
manufacturing sector (especially intermediate and heavy industrial
branches).
This phenomenon of "de-industrialisation without previous
industrialisation" is probably one of the most interesting
characteristics of the Greek economy, in the postwar period. Analysing
and trying to find an explanation for it is a quite an interesting
exercise which has already been undertaken by a number of authors. The
main distinguishing feature between this thesis and the existing
literature on the Greek economy, is that in this case, the Kaldorian
theory of growth, as described in the first chapter, will serve as the
main analytical tool. At first sight, it seems surprising that, as
far as I know, there has not yet been a comprehensive and convincing
attempt to test the Kaldorian theory for Greece 1 has never been
applied and tested before (as far as I know), in the case of the Greek
economy. This is probably due to the fact that the main element of the
Kaldorian theory, manufacturing, never displayed, in Greece, the
features attributed to it by Kaldor.
The two main questions around which the analysis of the
present thesis will revolve, therefore, could be defined as follows:
a) Having shown that the industrial sector in Greece was not the
dynamic engine of economic growth, the leading sector, in the
Kaldorian sense, was there some other sector or specific economic
activity which could be said to have played or to have come close to
playing that role, in the period of rapid growth (two digit growth
rates for certain years in the 1960s)?
b) Furthermore and perspectively speaking, could this or some other
sector or specific economic activity be seen as a potential engine of
growth or leading sector which could, under certain conditions, pull
the Greek economy out of the swamp of economic stagnation and
recession it has been in, since the mid 1970s?
Answering the first question implies an analysis of the
Greek economy and of its main particularities, in general, a survey of
the past and present performance of its industrial sector, and could
also include a test of the applicability of the three Kaldorian growth
laws in the case of Greece, in the postwar period. Giving a definitive
answer to the second question, though, is much harder; fitting any
other sector or activity in the place which the Kaldorian theory
reserves specifically and solely for manufacturing, is quite difficult
1
In a recent paper in Applied Economics by Drakopoulos and Theodossiou
(1991), an attempt was made to apply the Kaldorian theory to Greece.
The paper is subject to a number of theoretical and statistical
problems however, as I have already explained in a comment sent to the
above Journal to be considered for publication.
as well as dangerous.
- In the first place, it would require a theoretical framework which
would limit the analysis so that it remain within the Kaldorian idea
of one sector, among others, assuming the role of leader or growth
engine in economic development, while leaving room for other economic
activities besides manufacturing to be viewed in this role. This task
is most difficult, given that the existing literature on alternative
to manufacturing leading sectors is both recent and limited.
- In the second place, being conscious of the step I was about to
take, I had to take full advantage of the empirical investigations, in
addition to the conclusions derived from the theoretical part of the
thesis, in order to help support my argumentation. For a country like
Greece, characterised by a high unreliability as well as lack, in many
cases, of the necessary data, this was quite a task. In addition to
the analysis of the Greek economy, on the theoretical level, the
empirical investigation proceeded from the simple regression equations
in which Kaldor, initially, summarised his theory, to an application
of the laws using a pooling technique with both time-series and
cross-section data for Greece and three other (similar in terms of
development and general economic structure) Mediterranean countries,
namely Italy, Spain and Portugal; finally, for the first time, as far
as I know, causality tests were applied to various sectors and
sub-sectors of the Greek economy in order to test for the existence
and direction of the linkages between them.
The structure of the thesis, largely follows the evolution
of my analysis of the subject, as described in both the preface and
this short introduction.
Chapter I starts with a general survey of the Kaldorian
theory of growth. Chapter II provides a short description of the
historical development of the Greek economy, with an emphasis on some
particular points and structural characteristics which are believed
necessary in order to gain an understanding of the main idea of the
thesis and some of its conclusions. Chapter III is devoted to the
various empirical investigations of the three Kaldorian growth laws,
in relation to three economic sectors of the Greek economy and it also
includes some comparisons, as to the applicability of the laws,
between Greece and other Mediterranean countries with similar economic
structures. Chapter IV deals with the issue of tourism and its
potential role as a leading sector in economic development while,
Chapter V deals with the particular issue of the characteristics and
the role (both actual and potential) of the tourism sector in Greece.
Finally, Chapter VI, the concluding chapter of the thesis, begins with
a reminder of the central features of Greek economic development and
of what the prevailing situation is like today, followed by a short
discussion on service economy related issues, on the basis of which
some final ideas and suggested general policy measures for the future
are derived.
CHAPTER I
THE KALDORIAN THEORY OF GROWTH
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Annual growth rate of GDP	 Total Gross Domestic
Investment as % of GDP
Fr. Ger. It. U.K Fr. Ger. It. U.
1922-29 5.8 5.7 2.3 4.0 1914-49 - 14.3 13.5 7.
1951-73 5.0 5.7 5.1 5.0 1961-72 24.6 26.0 20.4 18.
1974-89 2.3 1.9 2.6 1.8 1974-89 21.6 20.6 22.5 18.
Transformation of Output: Annual average growth
A
1955-73
I	 S A
1974-89
I S
France 1.5 6.6 5.1 1.0 1.6 3.2
Germany 1.9 6.0 3.8 1.7 1.5 2.7
Italy 2.2 6.4 6.2 1.0 2.8 2.3
U.K. 2.9 2.7 2.4 3.7 0.9 2.7
A. INTRODUCTION
The postwar period, especially up to 1973, was marked by
very high, relative to pre-war standards, rates of growth in Western
Europe (and world-wide). Most of the macroeconomic indicators of the
European economies rose to unprecedented levels in comparison to the
prewar period. This transformation of the growth process of the West
European countries was indicated, in the first place, by a very fast
growth rate of GDP, a sharp rise of investment rates and rapidly
increasing capital stock, increasing exports and labour productivity
and very low rates of unemployment. It was also indicated by a
transformation of both output and sectoral employment patterns where
the rapidly rising importance of the industrial sector was obvious.
Some of these evolutions that took place in the Western European
economies for selected years and countries, may be seen in the
following tables:
TABLE I. Al: The Evolution of GDP and Investment 1922-1989
TABLE I. A2: The transformation of output 1955-1989
TABLE I.A3: The Composition of Employment 1957-1989
Transformation and % composition of employment
1957 1965 1973 1989
AISAISAISA I S
France 24.6 37.5 37.9 17.7 39.4 42.9 12.2 39.3 48.5 6.77 29.20 64.1
Germany 16.3 48.0 35.7 10.9 50.4 38.7 7.5 49.5 43.0 5.23 39.35 55.4
Italy 35.6 35.3 29.1 25.6 41.6 32.8 17.4 44.0 38.6 10.25 30.86 58.89
U.K. 4.4 49.2 46.4 3.3 48.1 48.7 2.9 42.6 54.5 3.20 28.98 67.82
A=Agricultur:e, I=Industry, S=Services
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Labour productivity	 (GDP per employee)
Annual average	 % changes
1953-61 1961-73 1974-79 1980-85 1986-1989
France 5.0 4.6 2.8 2.4 2.2
Germany 5.2 4.5 3.2 2.0 1.6
Italy 5.5 5.6 1.5 1.2 1.7
U.K 2.0 2.9 1.2 1.9 2.4
Annual Average Growth of exports (volume)
1900-13	 1913-50	 1950-73	 1983-89
France	 2.8	 1.1	 8.2	 7.8
Germany	 4.1	 -2.8	 12.4	 6.2
Italy	 2.2	 2.6	 11.7	 8.9
U.K	 2.8	 0.0	 3.9	 7.7
TABLE I.A4: The Evolution of Labour Productivity 1953-1989
TABLE I.A5: The Evolution of Unemployment Rates 1950-1989
Average Annual Unemployment Rates
1950-60 1961-73 1974-80 1981-85 1986-89
France 1.3 2.2 4.4 6.8 10.1
Germany 4.1 0.6 3.6 7.2 7.9
Italy 7.9 3.6 6.4 9.6 11.6
U.K 2.5 3.6 5.0 11.1 9.2
TABLE I.A6: The Growth of Exports 1900-1989
Sources Tables I.A1-I.A6
1) Cornwall, 1977.
2) Maddison, 1982.
3) OECD, Economic Outlook, various Issues.
4) OECD, Country Surveys, various Issues.
5) ILO, Labour Statistics, various Issues.
6) EUROSTAT, various Issues.
7) Own calculations.
These rapid rates of economic growth, however, gave way to
the beginning of an overall prolonged decline, since the early to mid
70s, indicated by a fall of growth rates and much higher levels of
unemployment. This was followed by a falling share of manufacturing in
GDP and employment, a decreasing rate of growth of exports and a loss
of international competitiveness relatively to the emerging Newly
Industrializing Countries (NICs), not to mention the U.S.A and Japan.
While in some countries, this recession only lasted for a few years or
a decade, (up to the mid 1980s), for other countries, such as Greece,
it proved to be more persistent, in terms of slow growth, high
inflation and unemployment rates, large balance of payment deficits
etc.
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The existing theories of economic growth, especially the
neoclassical or supply determined ones seemed no longer able to give
plausible explanations of these evolutions, compatible with the
observed facts. These theories, sticking obstinately to their doctrine
of full employment and efficient use of resources (either at any point
in time or through slow adjustments to full employment etc), viewed
the growth process as determined by the natural rate of increase of
economic resources and factors of production, such as labour, capital,
technical knowledge etc, which effectively constrained the rate of
growth of total output. A fundamental weakness of these theories was
their inability to explain observed differences in growth rates among
countries, not to mention differences in development levels. In
particular, empirical observations suggested that differences in the
supply of factors of production, in the postwar period, were simply
not substantial enough to explain the remarkable differences in the
observed growth rates and levels of development of various European
countries (Boltho, 1982, p. 11-23). The growing anxiety during the
prosperous years as to the duration of the boom was intensified with
the prolonged economic recession, which, in conjunction with the
aforementioned failure of traditional theories gave rise to new
theories of economic growth; the aim of these new theories was to shed
some light on the process and the causes of development as well as to
the question of whether there is anything inevitable in the path of
rapid growth and subsequent relative decline which many countries
experience in the course of development.
Most studies on economic growth of that period seem to
suggest that supply factors did not seem to have played a decisive
role in the post war period (at least no more so than during previous
periods), in explaining differences in growth rates among countries
and over time (Boltho, 1982 and Cornwall, 1977), although their
permissive role, in economic development is certainly not to be denied
(Kindleberger, 1967, p. 14). Labour supply seemed, in effect,
plentiful; most Western European countries had large labour reserves
available in agriculture, in the sense that, due to underemployment
and consequent low productivity, a large part of the labour force
could leave agriculture without lowering the total output of the
sector (for the importance attributed, initially, to surplus labour in
agriculture, see Lewis, 1954); emigration and low productivity
personal services acted as a pool of surplus labour for countries
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where the share of agriculture in total employment was already very
low, e.g the U.K.; capital investment, on the other hand, although it
naturally adds to the supply capacity of a country, is in effect a
component of aggregate demand. It would seem, therefore, that the
explanatory role of the fast economic growth of the West European
countries over that period, would probably have to be attributed to
demand factors (naturally, taking into account their interaction with
supply factors), as stressed by the Keynesian and Neokeynesian
theories, the "prescriptions" and policy measures of which, most West
European countries adopted in the post war years. A feature of
particular interest of the theory, the culmination of which is found
in the three Kaldorian "laws" of economic growth, is that the
neoclassical view of economic resources being efficiently allocated
over time between alternative uses is rejected. Consequently, the
process of economic growth is viewed as a process of continuous
reallocation of resources (Denison, 1967), which, under certain
assumptions, leads to improvements in efficiency and the use of
available resources and knowledge (Cripps and Tarling, 1973, p. 1).
Different economic sectors are attributed a varying importance in
terms of their particular characteristics related to productivity,
demand elasticity for their products, their influence on the growth of
the economy as a whole and the timing when their expansion becomes
crucial for the potential sustained future growth of the country. Some
of these elements pre-existed in older theories of economic growth,
long before the appearance of the so called "Kaldorian" one. In
particular, some of the basic ideas, concerning, in particular, the
key role of manufacturing in economic development can be found, among
others, in the, otherwise extremely restrictive, Rostowian analysis of
the stages of economic development.
B. SOME ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF GROWTH
During the early stages of development, most countries
experience the so called "take off" stage (Rostow, 1971) which marks
the beginning of a structural transformation towards rapid
self-sustained growth. The agricultural sector which had the largest
share in GDP and total employment, gradually begins to decrease in
importance; at the same time, one or more manufacturing branches, as
indicated by the growth experience of the West European countries in
the postwar years as well as by the majority of the "late comers"
(relatively to the already industrialised countries) to the
development process countries), start to expand at a high rate of
growth and increase their share, both in total employment and total
GDP. Therefore they are progressively turning into the country's
"leading sectors" (Rostow, 1971, p. 14). A necessary precondition for
this initial expansion of the manufacturing sector, is the
availability of labour and other factor inputs required for
production. At that stage of development there are usually vast
supplies of labour still employed in agriculture, which is
characterised by high levels of "disguised" unemployment. Productivity
there, is usually, very low, so that it is believed possible for the
manufacturing sector to expand at the expense of agriculture without
facing a shortage of labour and without lowering total productivity or
output (Lewis, 1954 and Kindleberger, 1967). One exception, in
relation to this point, was the U.K., in the 18th century, where
agricultural productivity grew first, releasing labour for use in
other sectors.
There are a number of different explanations as to the
reasons which lead an economy to expand its manufacturing sector at a
certain stage of development. Some argue that the initiative is to be
found in domestic factors and, especially in the domestic structure of
demand which becomes more elastic for manufactured goods than
agricultural ones, as per capita incomes start to rise at some point
in time (Auerbach, 1988, p. 4), due for example to a rise of
productivity in agriculture or to increased exports of agricultural or
primary goods in general. Others argue that the preconditions for
industrialisation rarely arise endogenously, but usually take the form
of intrusions from more advanced countries, with the result that the
idea of growth through industrialisation as a path to economic
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development, becomes in itself a must for the less developed society
(Rostow, 1971, pp. 7 and 36). Others still believe,that the stimulus
for industrial development is to be found outside the country, as a
result of international trade in an open economy (Rowthorn and Wells,
1987, p. 60). In particular, at a certain stage of development the
country undergoes the so called "gastronomical transition" (Houthaker,
1957). Demand for food rises rapidly as per capita incomes start to
rise in the economy, but food supply is relatively inelastic. Average
productivity and technology levels are usually very low in agriculture
and with the exception of a very small number of extremely well
endowed countries, imports of primary goods must inevitably rise to
satisfy increased demand. The country faces a deficit in its balance
of trade (Rowthorn and Wells, 1987, p. 39) and one of the ways to pay
for its imports is to industrialise rapidly and try to keep its
external balance by either exporting manufactured goods (export led
growth), or by substituting home production for imported manufactured
goods (import substitution, op. cit., p. 60), which is usually the
policy adopted by developing countries during the early stages of
development. Both export promotion and import substitution may imply a
switching process of production from non-tradeable goods to tradeable
ones.
While it would be quite natural to ask whether it is
absolutely inevitable for a developing country to start by expanding
its industrial (especially manufacturing) sector, it is argued by most
authors that even in the rare case where countries do not face such
intense balance of payment constraints, they will have to
industrialize sooner or later, if their objective is continued rapid
growth, because of certain specific structural characteristics (e.g.
scale economies, backward and forward linkages, elasticity of supply
in relation to demand etc) which, it is believed, are particularly
attached to the industrial sector and especially to manufacturing
(Rowthorn and Wells, 1987, p. 62). These are supposed to offer great
potential for a cumulative and self sustained growth of output and
productivity as well as demand, which feeds back on itself to generate
further growth of output and productivity and of the economy as a
whole. If, at the same time, the country can also manage to be
efficient as far as international trade is concerned and faces a
growing demand for its exports, the virtuous circle continues
indefinitely as both foreign and domestic demand interact to generate
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a continuous growth of output and productivity.
"An Efficient Manufacturing sector is one which
currently and potentially, not only satisfies the demand
of consumers at home, but is also able to sell enough of
its products abroad to pay for the nation's import
requirements" (Singh, 1977, p. 128)
Empirical observations of the development of the European
countries, have shown that a country witnesses extremely rapid rates
of growth of GDP at intermediate stages of development and per capita
incomes. This trend is confirmed by the following graph, which was
computed on the basis of data from some EC countries. The vertical
axis represents GDP growth rates while the horizontal one measures
levels of per capita income.
Graph 1.1
-11- Greece	 4E- Portugal -0- Spain	 -F Italy -5' France	 Germany
Sources: 1) OECD, National Accounts, 1960-1987.
2) The Greek Economy in Figures.
3) Own Calculations.
It is suggested by the graph and numerous empirical
studies (e.g. Chenery and Tailor, 1968, Chenery et. al., 1986), that
high rates of GDP growth (above 6%) coincide with low and intermediate
levels of per capita incomes, that is, between 1,500$-4,500$, at 1980
prices and exchange rates. The theoretical explanation of this lies in
the belief that when per capita incomes rise past the point of the
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gastronomical transition, demand for manufactured goods which is very
income elastic at this stage of development, also starts to rise
rapidly. One of the characteristics particular to the manufacturing
sector is that supply is very elastic to changes in demand, provided
that the growth of output is not constrained by shortages of inputs.
These could either take the form of relative shortages of labour or of
relative shortages of intermediate goods (Kaldor, 1966, p. 22). At
that particular stage of development, however, shortages of labour
should not be a serious problem, as long as industry can always
attract "unlimited supplies of labour" from the non-manufacturing
sectors or the unemployed, in order to increase production. Shortages
of intermediate goods could be a problem at any stage of development,
if the country faces a shortage of foreign exchange and cannot finance
its imports of such goods. For this reason, it is particularly
important for a country, at the early stages of development, to
concentrate in the production of goods which have a high elasticity of
demand (both domestic and export) (Kaldor, 1966, p. 19), or to have
recourse to policies of protection of the home industry (see infant
industry arguments, e.g. in SOdersten, 1980, pp. 196-200), so as to
enable the industrial sector to grow past the early stages protected
from foreign competition. One of the ways this could be done
(especially in developing countries), is for the government to follow
such import substituting policies of protection through tariffs etc,
or take upon itself the process of industrialisation through specific
organisations for that purpose (such as IRI in Italy or INI in Spain).
The crucial importance of the manufacturing sector for
sustained economic growth has been put into a nutshell by Kaldor in
his much criticised theory of growth.
C. THE KALDORIAN THEORY OF GROWTH
The Kaldorian theory of growth has its roots in
Keynesianism, in the sense that it stresses the importance of the role
of demand, rather than supply factors, in economic development and is,
furthermore, based on the assumption that industry and, especially the
manufacturing sector constitutes the "engine of growth" of the
economy.
The role attributed to demand is crucial. Its magnitude
and structure are the sole factors which both initiate and constrain
industrial development. In the early stages of economic growth, rising
demand for manufactured goods from the agricultural sector due to
rising per capita incomes, (which are due, in turn, to rising
productivity in agriculture), result in a drop of the income
elasticity of demand for agricultural goods and a rise in the
corresponding elasticity for manufactured goods, since a smaller
proportion of the increased incomes is spent on food; depending on the
supply response, of the manufacturing sector, this may initiate
industrialisation. On the other hand, the fact that more food must be
provided because of rising demand may initiate technological
innovations in agriculture in order to raise productivity and output,
which also stimulates industrial expansion and represents another
condition for economic development. As incomes per capita continue to
rise in the economy and domestic demand for manufactured goods begins
to decline, at higher income levels (when income elasticity of demand
rises proportionally more for services), sustained economic growth
crucially depends on the elasticity of demand for the country's
exports of manufactured goods.
Demand for manufacturing output is the major factor
inducing industrial growth and determining employment growth which is
considered endogenous, in the sense that it responds to and is
determined by changes in demand. There is a fundamental precondition,
however, which must be fulfilled for the model to work and for the
manufacturing sector to start its initial expansion as well as sustain
its rapid growth in the future: While demand is the driving force of
the economic system, a flexibility and mobility of the factor inputs
necessary to industrial production forms the permissive factor (rather
than the cause) of growth (Cornwall, 1977, p. 40). The Kaldorian
theory is based on the Lewis model of a dual economy (Lewis, 1954)
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consisting of two sectors. One of them (manufacturing) is considered
as a potentially rapidly expanding, high productivity, high wage
sector with a growing demand for its products. The second one
(agriculture and some service activities) is seen as a low
productivity, low wage sector with a declining share of demand for its
products and a large labour surplus which would be willing to move
into the manufacturing sector without expecting a change in the wage
differentials between the two sectors. Actually, this is precisely
Kaldor's definition of the existence of surplus labour which is
indicated if the following three conditions are true (they also
correspond to the definition of a dual economy) (Cornwall, 1977, pp.
41-6).
1. The existence of a substantial number of workers willing to
undertake mobility patterns between economic sectors (because of
productivity and demand interacting to cause an absolute decline in
the demand for agricultural labour).
2. A rather rigid inter-industry wage structure that persists in spite
of the fact that members of the labour force are willing (and able) to
move. This has partly to do with productivity growth and elasticities
of demand for the output of the low wage sector. A narrowing of these
differences would indicate the gradual exhaustion of surplus labour
and, consequently, would predict a slowing down of the growth of the
manufacturing sector, due to relative labour shortages, and the
transition to maturity in the Kaldorian sense.
3. The existence of an allocative mechanism in the labour market that
does not reflect some sort of equalisation of net benefits for workers
(i.e. equalisation of wages or job opportunities). The latter
condition is, in a sense, derived from the first two, especially the
second one which stresses the importance of demand factors as far as
the sectoral allocation of the labour force is concerned.
The Kaldorian theory is, therefore, based on the
assumption of different sectoral characteristics and different rates
of productivity growth by economic sector. The whole process of
sustained economic growth depends on the transfer of factors of
production, especially labour, from less productive to more productive
uses. Capital formation is not considered so fundamental to growth, as
long as with demand for output the driving force and availability of
labour to manufacturing, capital accumulation will come rather as a
consequence than a cause of growth (Kaldor,1968, p. 390). Output
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growth in manufacturing causes a cumulative growth of employment and
productivity because the manufacturing sector is subject to strong
dynamic economies of scale (learning by doing). This, in turn will
cause a faster transfer of labour from the surplus sectors to
manufacturing and lead to a rise in productivity and output in
manufacturing as well as the whole of the economy. Thus, the
neoclassical growth theory where resources are considered to be
efficiently allocated so that any transfers will cause no rise in
productivity or output, since growth is balanced in all sectors and
the vision of a world where decreasing or constant returns to scale
prevail, is not compatible with the Kaldorian theory. Its basic
points, i.e. that manufacturing is the engine of growth of the
economy, that the growth of output, through dynamic increasing
economies of scale, causes cumulative increases of both employment and
productivity and the importance of surplus labour in the sense that
the faster the transfer of labour from agriculture or other surplus
labour sectors 1 to manufacturing, the faster the growth of the economy
as a whole, can be very concisely summarised in Kaldor's three growth
laws:
1. Kaldor's First Law
1.1 The Law
Kaldor's first law states that the rate of growth of
manufacturing is positively related to the rate of growth of GDP, a
proposition whose explanation does not just lie in the fact that, in
the developed countries at least, manufacturing output constitutes a
large proportion of total output, but in the existence of "fundamental
economic reasons connected with induced productivity growth inside and
outside the manufacturing sector" (Thirlwall, 1983, p. 345, and
Kaldor, 1966, p. 3, 1968, p. 386). There are two main reasons behind
the close correlation of the rates of growth of manufacturing output
1 According to Cornwall (1977, ch. 5), apart from agriculture, some
forms of low productivity service activities (which are usually quite
significant during the early stages of industrialisation) or migrant
labour force, can also act as a pool of surplus labour. A measure of
surplus labour is given by the growth of total employment plus the
growth of agricultural employment (which is always negative). He
concludes that most West European economies in the post war period had
surplus labour reserves, which corresponds to the definition of the
dual economy.
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and GDP.
The first one is related to the fact that during the first
stages of economic development when the industrial sector starts to
expand, it is able to draw labour from the non-manufacturing sectors
and especially from agriculture which is characterised by high levels
of open or disguised unemployment, so that labour may be taken away
from these sectors without leading to a drop of output and
productivity in them (Lewis, 1954). This transfer of labour from
agriculture to industry will be the faster, according to Kaldor, the
faster is the growth of manufacturing output and the greater the gap
between its rate of growth and that of the rest of the economy
(Thirlwall, 1983, p. 346). Moreover, the greater the excess of the
growth of manufacturing over non-manufacturing output, the faster is
the rate of growth of the economy as a whole (Thirlwall, 1983 and
Kaldor, 1966, p. 4).
The second reason is related to the existence of
increasing returns to scale in the manufacturing sector, which are
both static (related to the size of production plants) and dynamic.
The dynamic ones are considered to be of greater importance by Kaldor,
especially as far as his interpretation of the second law (Verdoorn's
law) is concerned. The fast growth of manufacturing output leads to a
faster expansion of technical innovations through investment and
embodied technical progress (because normally, a fast growth of output
will lead to favourable expectations concerning the growth of demand)
(Cornwal1,1977, p. 128). Furthermore, past levels of output and
investment and fast growth will develop a "learning by doing" process
and, consequently, greater efficiency in production.
1.2. Empirical Investigations of the First Law
The first law is usually expressed as the regression of
total GDP growth on manufacturing output growth. Kaldor's estimates
using a cross country sample 2 of twelve OECD economies, over the
period 1952-1954 to 1963-1964, gave the following results:
GDP = 1.153 + 0.614QM	 R2=0.96
(0.040)
2
Kaldor chose his sample among twelve advanced OECD economies. These
are: Japan, West Germany, Italy, France, Netherlands, Denmark,
Austria, Canada, Norway, Belgium, United States, U.K.
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where GDP=growth rate of GDP
QM=growth rate of manufacturing output and figures in parenthesis
represent	 the	 standard errors of	 the coefficients.
The above estimates show a high correlation between the two
variables. The coefficient of manufacturing output, indicates that an
increase of 1% in the growth of manufacturing output will "cause" an
increase of 0.6% in the growth of GDP, which is much higher, according
to Kaldor, than would be explained by the fact that manufacturing
output sometimes represents a proportion of total output as high as
40%, in certain developed countries (Cripps and Tarling, 1973, p. 21).
The fact that the coefficient of the growth rate of output (QM) is
less than unity in the above regression led Kaldor to assert that the
faster the overall rate of growth of the economy, the greater is the
excess of the rate of growth of manufacturing output over that of the
economy as a whole (Thirlwall, 1983, p. 348, Cripps and Tarling, 1973,
p. 21). In particular, growth rates above 3% characterise economies
whose growth rate of manufacturing output exceeds the overall growth
of the economy, while slow growing countries are characterised by a
rate of growth of manufacturing output lower than that of the economy
as a whole, as one may see from the graph of manufacturing output
growth and GDP growth based on the regressions results (Cornwall,
1977, p. 125). According to others, however, this is not confirmed by
the data, as long as the growth of manufacturing output exceeded the
growth of the economy as a whole even in the slowest growing
countries, over the period 1950-69 (Vaciago, 1975, p. 235). The
correlation between the growth rate of total GDP and that of the
excess of the growth of manufacturing over non-manufacturing output is
tested in a regression equation of the following form, giving the
following results (Thirlwall, 1983) which confirm Kaldor's views: (The
same sample of countries is used).
R
2
=0.562.GDP= 3.351 + 0.954(QM-QNM)
(0.267)
where GDP= growth rate of GDP
QM =growth rate of manufacturing output
QNM=growth rate of non-manufacturing output
Kaldor interpreted these relationships as a proof of his
belief that the growth of manufacturing output is exogenously
determined by demand factors and, at least during the early stages of
economic growth, not constrained by shortages of inputs.
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According to Kaldor, such a causal relationship from
sector output to total output, is only to be found in the
manufacturing sector, which, for this reason, represents the "engine
of growth" of the economy. Kaldor found virtually no correlation
between the growth of agricultural output and GDP, and while there was
a strong correlation between the growth of output in the service
sector and the growth of GDP, he strongly argued that the direction of
causation is different, going from the growth of GDP to the growth of
output in the service sector. This is attributed to the fact that
demand for services becomes more elastic as incomes rise and as the
industrial sector expands and increases its demand for services as
intermediate goods (Kaldor, 1966, p. 10-1).
A number of other authors have attempted to re-estimate
the first of Kaldor's equations, using the same or different samples
and estimation methods (although the most commonly used one is pooling
cross section and time series data). Cripps and Tarling (1973) and
Cornwall (1977), using the same sample of 12 OECD countries and a
slightly longer estimation period, derive approximately the same
results. McCombie and Be Ridder (1983), perform a similar estimation
using U.S state data for the period 1947-63 and their results are very
similar to Kaldor's original cross-country ones. They also apply the
first law to the service sectors of the 20 largest states and find a
coefficient approximately equal to one. Gomulka (1983), estimates the
first law using a sample of seven Eastern European countries and he
ends up with a lower correlation (R 2=0.51) and a lower b coefficient
(0.42), for the manufacturing sector, over the period 1955-75. Vaciago
(1975) uses a semi-logarithmic form of the equation and estimates it
for 18 countries3 . He finds that while
"There is still a connection between rates of
growth of manufacturing output and GDP...we have an excess
of the rate of growth of manufacturing output over the
rate of growth of non manufacturing output, even for
countries with the lowest rates of economic growth
(contrary to Kaldor's findings)" (Vaciago, 1975).
Stoneman (1979) estimated Kaldor's laws using a time
series analysis of the British economy over the period 1800-1970 and
3
Kaldor's original sample plus Greece, Portugal, Spain, Yugoslavia,
Finland, Ireland and Switzerland.
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he concludes that his results are not inconsistent with Kaldor's laws
but neither do they provide strong support for them.
1.3. Criticisms and Modifications of the First Law
It is argued that econometric estimations of the first law may
lead to biased estimates because manufacturing output forms such a
large part of total output and that a more correct specification would
be to regress the growth of non-manufacturing output on that of
manufacturing output (McCombie, 1982, p. 282, and McCombie and De
Ridder, 1983, p. 374). However, both specifications lead to
approximately the same results, that is, they show a very high
correlation between GDP or non-manufacturing output and manufacturing
output, as indicated by the following estimates, with a sample of U.S
state data (McCombie and De Ridder, 1983):
QNM= 1.142 + 0.550QM
	
R
2
=0.824
(0.080)
Another explanation given for the estimated relationship
between the variables, as well as a criticism of the cross sectional
estimates used to test the first law, is related to the income
elasticity of demand which differs with a country's level of per
capita income. At relatively high levels of per capita income, demand
for services rises relative to that for manufactured goods, which
means that, from a cross country perspective, countries with lower per
capita incomes will normally witness a faster expansion of their
industrial sector in relation to their non industrial one, compared to
countries with higher levels of per capita income. It is argued,
therefore (McCombie, 1982, p. 283), that the relationship implied by
the first law may be just a reflection of the pattern of demand
between more developed and less developed countries and that it may be
generated by the two outliers included in the sample, namely Japan,
which experienced the fastest growth rates in the sample and was
rapidly industrializing over the period, and the U.K which, suffering
from "premature maturity" was experiencing the slowest growth rates in
the sample and there was evidence that it was beginning to
de-industrialise.
Another criticism against the implications of the first law,
concerns the direction of causation in the regression of total GDP on
the output of the different sectors. While Kaldor argues that the
I
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growth of manufacturing output stimulates the growth of the economy
and that the growth of output in the service sector is the result of
the overall growth of GDP, Wolfe (1968, p. 118) argues that this is by
no means certain because the regression of GDP on the service sector
output shows a very strong correlation between the two variables as
well, and one cannot conclude from the regressions about either the
direction of causation or which one of the two variables has the most
fundamental influence on the growth of total GDP.
2. Kaldor's Second Law
2.1. The Law
The positive relationship between the growth of
productivity and the growth of output in the manufacturing sector is
known as the "Verdoorn Law". The Verdoorn law was named after P.J.
Verdoorn, who, in 1949, found a positive association between •the
growth of productivity and output in manufacturing industries
(Verdoorn, 1949). In 1980, however, Verdoorn repudiated his law
because he discovered that, while the initial specification of the law
implied a constant relationship between output growth and productivity
growth, in the short term at least, this relationship was not stable
(Verdoorn, 1980). However, this repudiation of the law by Verdoorn
does not necessarily lead to the repudiation of Kaldor's second law,
also known as Verdoorn's law, because it is argued that Kaldor and
Verdoorn gave different interpretations to the same relationship
(Whiteman, 1987, p. 578). Kaldor argued that the productivity
elasticity with respect to output was not constant, but a function of
output growth. According to Kaldor, the Verdoorn relationship is
related to the behaviour of productivity growth which is dependent on
the growth rate of manufacturing production, because of the
"existence of economies of scale or increasing
returns, which cause productivity to increase in response
to, or as a byproduct of, the increase in total
output...Productivity tends to grow the faster, the faster
output expands... The level of output is a function of
cumulative output (from the beginning) rather than of the
rate of production per unit of time" (Kaldor, 1966, pp.
10-1).
and also, the Verdoorn law is a
"dynamic rather than a static relationship
between the rates of change of productivity and output,
rather than between the level of productivity and the
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scale of output - primarily because technological progress
enters into it and is not just a reflection of the
economies of large scale production...it is a phenomenon
peculiarly associated with the so called "secondary
activities" - with industrial production, including public
utilities, construction, as well, as manufacturing rather
than with the primary or tertiary sectors of the economy"
(op. cit.).
Output growth in manufacturing also causes the growth of
employment in that sector. In fact, the faster the growth of
manufacturing output, the faster the rate of growth of employment and
the faster the growth of productivity in the manufacturing sector.
Both employment and productivity are seen as resulting from the growth
of manufacturing output, not the other way around (Kaldor, 1968, p.
386 and 1966, p. 7). The presence of dynamic economies of scale
causing cumulative productivity growth, enables the manufacturing
sector to have a high elasticity of supply in relation to demand,
which leads to a further growth in employment and productivity in
manufacturing and, through this, to a further growth in demand. This
is how Kaldor understands the endogeneity of employment growth, as
determined by output growth.
There are two ways to specify the Verdoorn relationship in
Kaldor's view: One is the original Verdoorn specification, i.e. the
regression of output growth on productivity growth and the other one
is to regress output growth on employment growth. The two equations
are mirror images of each other, since the growth of output equals the
growth of employment plus the growth of productivity, and they should
give similar estimates when applied to the manufacturing sector. The
application of this empirical relationship to other sectors is indeed
limited, according to Kaldor. The manufacturing sector is the only
sector where the rate of growth of output is positively related to
both productivity growth and employment growth. For example, in
agriculture, productivity may grow faster than output and employment
and productivity growth tends to be negatively rather than positively
related to employment growth. In the tertiary sector, on the other
hand (which, again, is seen as homogeneous), economies of scale are
not so prominent and tend to be exhausted more quickly. (Kaldor, 1975,
pp. 891-92 and 1966, pp. 16-8). According to Baumol (1967, p. 416),
this has a lot to do with the role played by labour in each case, that
is, whether it is considered as an instrument, as in manufacturing, or
as the end product itself, as in the service sector. In the latter
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PM= 1.035 + 0.484QM
(0.070)
EM= -1.035 + 0.516QM
(0.070)
R
2
=0.826
R
2
=0.844
case, productivity may not grow with decreasing inputs, unless the
quality of the product is endangered (see also ch. VI for a more
extensive analysis of this argument). Productivity may grow because of
growth in consumption caused by the primary or secondary sectors,
rather than because of economies of scale or technological change.
The Verdoorn law is considered to be very useful as far as
employment implications are concerned by proponents of the Kaldorian
theory; that is, one may calculate the Verdoorn elasticity (the
elasticity of productivity growth in relation to output growth) and,
given that productivity growth equals output growth minus employment
growth, it would be possible to calculate how fast output would have
to expand in manufacturing in order to absorb a given rate of growth
of available labour (Whiteman, 1987, p. 586).
2.2. Empirical Investigations of the Second Law
The usual specification of the Verdoorn law by Kaldor is
as the regression of the rate of growth of productivity on the rate of
growth of output in manufacturing and of the rate of employment in
manufacturing on the rate of growth of manufacturing output. Kaldor's
estimates using the same cross-country sample of 12 OECD economies
gave the following results.
where PM=growth rate of productivity in manufacturing
EM=growth rate of manufacturing employment,
QM=PM+EM and the rest of the variables as previously defined.
The Verdoorn coefficient which is found to be less than
unity and around 0.5 in every case is enough, according to Kaldor, to
establish the existence of strong increasing returns to scale. If the
coefficient of the independent variable was close to one or zero in
either specification, then it will also be close to one or zero in the
other, since the coefficients of the dependent variable in the two
equations add up to one. Therefore, there would be no correlation
between the two variables in one specification and an indication of
constant returns to scale in the other (Bairam, 1987). Each percentage
addition to the growth of output is correlated with an approximate
0.5% increase in the growth of productivity and employment (Kaldor,
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1968, P. 386, Rowthorn, 1975, P. 10 and 1975b, p. 897, McCombie, 1983
and Thirlwall, 1983, p. 350). In Kaldor's mind there is certainly no
question about the direction of causation in the above regressions. It
is the growth of output which is the exogenously determined
independent variable and which causes cumulative increases in the
growth of productivity and is only constrained by employment growth in
manufacturing. Productivity and employment growth feed back to cause
faster output growth in manufacturing which will continue for as long
as the manufacturing sector faces no labour shortages. This is what
led Kaldor to his first conclusions about the slow growth of the U.K.
being caused by shortages of labour in the manufacturing sector. 4
The Kaldorian specification of Verdoorn's law, in the form
of a regression of output growth on employment growth has been subject
to strong criticisms (see section 2.3) and controversies. Probably due
to this, few authors have estimated the second law using Kaldor's
second specification of it. Following Rowthorn's interpretation of the
law, according to which manufacturing output growth is constrained by
the growth of employment, most investigators have either estimated the
original Verdoorn equation (which corresponds to Kaldor's first
regression of manufacturing output growth on productivity growth) or
Rowthorn's alternative regression of manufacturing employment growth
on productivity growth.
Cripps and Tarling, (1973, pp. 23 and 29), have estimated
Rowthorn's specification of Verdoorn's law, using cross country data
for industrialised countries, showing that while the Verdoorn law
holds until 1966, yielding a coefficient of manufacturing output equal
to 0.5, which approximates the one found by Kaldor, in his initial
regression of output growth on employment growth, after that there
seems to be virtually no correlation between productivity and
employment growth in manufacturing. The poor fit of the Verdoorn
relationship after 1966 is indicated by an increasing unexplained
variation of productivity growth in manufacturing, across countries,
compared with earlier periods. After 1966, the correlation between the
variables is reduced almost to zero. Several explanations have been
forwarded for this phenomenon: Kaldor suggested that it could be
4
Later on he seems to agree with Wolfe's comments (1968), that this
was not due to the exhaustion of surplus labour but rather to the lack
of demand for labour which was due to a lack of demand (mainly export
demand) for manufacturing output
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attributed to changes in investment behaviour, and to the possibility
that productivity increases are no longer generated by fast growth of
the manufacturing sector as a whole, but from greater international
specialisation in production. Several other explanations have been
suggested, however, the most plausible and interesting among them
being the following:
1) The Verdoorn relationship, works best when there is a stable
relationship between capital and labour inputs over the estimation
period. One of the reasons why the law might have broken down after
1966, is the instability of the capital-labour ratio, over time
(Thirlwall, 1980, p. 388).
2) In cases where the various demand elasticities are high, the
Verdoorn relationship exhibits a good fit because variations in the
growth of demand will lead to increased responses of productivity
growth and to a positive association between productivity and
employment. If, on the other hand, demand elasticities are low,
variations in the growth of output would be diminished and the result
would be a negative correlation between the growth of productivity and
employment. Therefore, the explanation for the poor fit of the
Verdoorn law after 1966 could be that demand elasticities for
manufactured goods were high until 1966 but have been decreasing since
(Cripps and Tarling, 1973, p. 31).
3) Decreasing rates of output growth may not be governed by the same
laws as increasing ones. In the short run, at least, it is possible
that falls in output may be associated with large increases in
productivity. In particular, slow or negative rates of manufacturing
output growth (as was increasingly the case after 1966-70) means that
the first firms to close down would be the less productive ones. This
could very probably have a bad effect on the association between
productivity and output (Michl, 1985, pp. 483-4).
4) There may have been a relative shortage of labour in manufacturing.
The most successful producers may have been forced to find labour
within the manufacturing sector itself, by competition in the labour
market etc, in countries where the manufacturing sector was still
achieving fast rates of growth. In this case, however, Kaldor's
contention of premature maturity in the U.K., would not be so serious
as it seemed, at the time, because the relative shortage of labour
could be circumvented by a redistribution of labour within the
manufacturing sector itself, that is, from less productive to more
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productive firms (Cripps and Tarling, 1973, p. 32).
Various authors have attempted to estimate the Verdoorn
equations and have come up with rather conflicting results. Apart from
Cripps and Tarling's (1973) estimates, using Rowthorn's specification,
which confirm Kaldor's at least up to 1966, Cornwall (1977) based on
Verdoorn's original equation (Kaldor's first equation) and McCombie
and De Ridder (1983) using U.S. state data, also came up with results
that confirm Kaldor's. The last two authors also applied the second
law to other sectors apart from manufacturing and found a poor fit. An
attempt of the same authors to estimate Verdoorn's law using time
series analysis yields satisfactory results although they seem worried
that their equations may be miss-specified. Parikh (1978) attempts to
estimate the second law using both Kaldor's and Rowthorn's
specification within a simultaneous equation system (in order to
determine, if possible, the direction of causation) and he also seems
to agree with Kaldor. Kaldor's estimates for the first equation of the
law are also substantiated by Vaciago (1975) who estimated the
original Verdoorn equation for a sample of eighteen countries over the
period 1950-69, although, as for the first law, he finds that a semi
logarithmic form of the equation has a better fit. He also found
however, that increasing returns had a tendency to "decrease" across
countries, in the sense that they were less important in less
developed as well as in rapidly growing advanced countries. Michl's
cross sectional estimates using Kaldor's original sample over a longer
period (1950-80) also substantiate Kaldor's conclusions for the first
equation, although with a progressively poorer fit over time.
Chatterji and Wickens (1982) and Stoneman (1979), the latter
estimating both Kaldor's and Rowthorn's specification, both attempt a
time series estimation of the Verdoorn law in the U.K.'s manufacturing
sector over the period 1800-1970 and 1961-77 respectively and conclude
that the relationship does not hold in the long run. Hildreth (1989),
using a cross sectional sample of U.K. regions over the period 1970-83
tests both Rowthorn's and Kaldor's specifications and concludes that
there is little support for either equation as a predicitve mechanism
of productivity growth in manufacturing.
2.3 Criticisms and Modifications of the Second Law.
The second Kaldorian growth law has attracted numerous
criticisms as to its specification and was the object of many vivid
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controversies and modifications
The first criticism which should, be mentioned is that, it
is believed wrong to regress productivity on output because Kaldor's
measure of productivity is equal to the rate of growth of output minus
the rate of growth of employment. It is argued, therefore, that if
employment growth is very low, (combined with the fact that
measurement of employment may be poor and subject to error), then the
above specification amounts to a regression of the rate of growth of
output on itself, which, clearly, may lead to biased estimates (see
for example McCombie, 1982, p. 284, Cornwall, 1977, p. 127). The
existence of a significant correlation between manufacturing
employment and productivity growth (Kaldor's second equation) is
considered (Cornwall, op.cit) to be an indication that the estimates
of the first regression (output on productivity) may not spurious.
There is a serious controversy, however, as to the specification •of
Kaldor's second equation of Verdoorn's law, concerning the endogenous
or exogenous nature of employment and output growth in manufacturing.
According to Kaldor's interpretation of the Verdoorn
estimates, the growth of productivity is only constrained by the
growth of employment and growth may continue undisturbed so long as
there are enough supplies of labour in agriculture or other less
productive sectors of the economy. However, Rowthorn argues (1975,
1975b), that if the supply of available labour for industry's
requirements is not unlimited (and in his view, this was the case in
some of the countries included in Kaldor's sample), then Kaldor's
second equation is wrong and the correct specification would be a
regression of employment on productivity growth (PM=a+bEM), instead of
Kaldor's twin specification which is correct only in the case of
unlimited supplies of labour. Cornwall argues however (1977, p. 127)
that if it is the growth of output that determines the growth of
employment in manufacturing, then Rowthorn's specification would give
even more biased estimates than Kaldor's second equation. On the other
hand, Wolfe (1968, pp. 118-22) argues that in case output growth in
manufacturing was labour constrained, it might be better to regress
the growth of manufacturing output on that of employment; he also
argues, however, that slow growth of employment in an industry does
not necessarily mean a labour shortage in that industry as it may also
mean a low demand for labour or for the products of that industry (as,
we shall see in ch. II, this observation corresponds perfectly to the
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situation prevailing in Greece). Kaldor strongly disagreed with both
Rowthorn's and Wolfe's suggestion. In the first case (1975), he argues
that it would be wrong to regress employment growth on productivity
growth, since output and not employment is the exogenously determined
variable. Furthermore, in his opinion, it is not necessary to have a
significant positive relationship between manufacturing employment and
productivity, for the Verdoorn law to hold. A sufficient condition for
the presence of economies of scale is to have a significant positive
relationship between employment and output. In relation to Wolfe's
suggestion, he argues that it is inconceivable to have output as the
dependent variable in a regression of output and employment (McCombie,
1980, p. 103), as long as it is the growth of manufacturing output
which determines the growth of employment in manufacturing during the
early and intermediate stages of development and is only constrained
(but not determined by it) at much later stages of development, when
the country approaches economic maturity (Thirlwall, 1983, p. 354).
Other criticisms of the Verdoorn law concern the fact that
it has been usually estimated using cross sectional data and that,
once Japan was omitted from the sample the fit was quite poor
(Rowthorn, 1975, pp. 14-5). The presence of an outlier such as Japan
was even accused of generating the observed relationship between
output, productivity and employment. However, in response to this
criticism, Kaldor re-estimated his equations without Japan and still
found significant relationships (Hildreth, 1989). The use of time
series data, on the other hand, may reflect short run cyclical
variation of employment, productivity and output, instead of the long
run trends (Okun's law) (McCombie, 1983, p. 421). In many cases,
pooled data (cross-section and time series) have been used, in an
attempt to get more reliable estimates. It is argued, however, that
except in the rare cases when labour supply is either perfectly
elastic (Kaldor's interpretation) or perfectly inelastic, single
equation estimates of the Verdoorn relationship are likely to be
biased, since employment and output growth rates may be jointly
determined (Bairam, 1987). It has also been argued that the Verdoorn
specification is just a mispecified Cobb-Douglas production function,
from which the contribution of capital has been omitted (McCombie,
1983, p. 418). Kaldor strongly objects to this view, on the grounds
that capital accumulation is a symptom rather than a cause of growth.
There have been a few attempts to estimate the Verdoorn relationship
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with the inclusion of a variable reflecting the growth of the capital
stock or net investment. One of them is by Parikh (1978), who
estimated the Verdoorn Law within a simultaneous equation model and
another one is by Michl (1985), who argues that market growth may
constrain technical progress and productivity growth and that the
inability of industry to exploit economies of scale reduces the rate
of productivity growth. He therefore, estimated an "augmented
technical progress function" derived from the original Verdoorn Law,
of the form: PM= a + bQM + cK, where K represents the growth rate of
the capital/labour ratio in manufacturing and the other variables are
as previously defined. Despite the fact that capital growth was found
to be significant in certain cases, in explaining part of productivity
growth in manufacturing, it did not, in general, greatly affect the
fit of the original Verdoorn Law.
Another controversy arises from the fact that when levels
of output are used to estimate the Verdoorn law, there is strong
evidence of constant returns to scale, in both Rowthorn's and Kaldor's
specification. When rates of growth are used, on the other hand, there
is evidence of increasing returns to scale only in Kaldor's
specification. This was called the Static-Dynamic Verdoorn law paradox
(McCombie, 1982, p. 285) and it gave rise to arguments as to whether
the static or the dynamic specification is more correct. Kaldor,
however, strongly argues that the relation between productivity,
employment and output is a dynamic one. The Verdoorn relationship, as
Kaldor interprets it, stresses the importance of the rate of growth of
output in determining the rate of growth of productivity rather than
the level of output determining the level of average productivity
(Cornwall, 1977, p. 126). In this sense, it might be the case that the
dynamic rather than the static Verdoorn coefficient is unbiased, as
long as the static specification may understate returns because of the
omission of the dynamic components which are argued to be so important
by Kaldor (op. cit.).
On the other hand, Rowthorn (1975, p. 11) and Gomulka
(1983, p. 395) find that productivity differences among countries when
cross sectional data are used, can best be explained by the existence
of technological gaps and the subsequent diffusion of knowledge than
by the Verdoorn relationship. Any closing of the gaps will produce an
abnormal rise of productivity in the previously backward countries and
this explains the fact that late comers to the development process
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exhibit such fast rates of growth.
In spite of the numerous criticisms, however, suggesting
that his specification of Verdoorn's law was subject to numerous
statistical and theoretical problems, Kaldor did not change his view
that his interpretation was the correct one.
3. Kaldor's Third Law
3.1 The Law
The third law which is derived from the other two, states
that total productivity growth is positively related to growth of
output and employment in manufacturing and negatively related to
employment growth outside manufacturing (Thirlwall, 1983, p. 346). The
theoretical foundation of this law lies in that as the expanding
industrial sector attracts more and more labour from agriculture or
other low productivity sectors, this leads to a rise of productivity
in: 1) the manufacturing sector through increasing returns to scale
and the Verdoorn law; 2) in agriculture as well, because as labour
whose productivity was previously very low or equal to zero leaves,
output per head rises for the rest of the labour force, which may even
be induced to work harder. This causes productivity and output to rise
for the economy as a whole (Kaldor, 1968, pp. 387-8, Cripps and
Tarling, 1973, p. 25).
3.2 Empirical Investigations of the Third Law
According to Kaldor, the argument that the faster the rate
of growth of GDP the faster the transfer of labour from surplus
sectors (agriculture and services) to industry can be proved if it can
be found that the overall rate of growth of the economy is positively
associated with the rate of increase of employment in manufacturing.
Kaldor's estimates, using the same sample, give the following results:
GDP= 2.665 + 1.066EM
	
R
2
=0.828
(0.15)
which substantiate the hypothesis, unless there is a positive
association between GDP growth rates and total employment growth.
Kaldor, however, finds no such association.
GDP= 4.421 + 0.431ET
	
R
2
=0.018
(0.994)
where ET represents the total employment growth.
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Moreover, he succeeds in showing that, while total
productivity growth is positively associated with employment growth in
manufacturing, it is negatively related to employment growth outside
manufacturing.
R
2
=0.677
R
2
=0.427
R
2
=0.842
PT= 1.868 + 0.991EM
(0.216)
PT= 4.924 - 1.800ENM
(0.660)
PT= 2.899 + 0.821EM - 1.183ENM
(0.169)	 (0.387)
where PT= total productivity growth
ENM= growth of non-manufacturing employment.
He also found that total GDP growth and total productivity
growth are negatively related to the growth of employment in the
tertiary sector in particular. Despite the fact that services grow
together with industry all along industrialisation, because as the
industrial sector expands its needs for services as intermediate goods
rise (transports, communications etc), the absorption of employment
into the tertiary sector hinders the growth of GDP by reducing the
potential supply of labour to industry.
The third law has given rise to much less controversy and
discussion than the other two (especially the Verdoorn law) and
therefore, not so many authors have taken the trouble to estimate it.
Most of those who did, however, come up with results that do not
differ much from Kaldor's original ones.
3.3 Criticisms and Modifications of the Third Law
Chatterji and Wickens (1982, p. 22) have tried to assess
to what extent the transfer of resources from the non-manufacturing to
the manufacturing sector raises the overall rate of economic growth.
They suggest that account should also be taken of the role of capital.
An alternative way to increase economic growth would be to channel new
capital expenditures from the non-manufacturing to the manufacturing
industries, as well as labour.
McCombie (1980, p. 111), on the other hand, makes the
interesting suggestion, that, under the assumption of surplus labour,
the growth of employment in the non-industrial sector is due to the
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difference in demand for industrial employment and the growth of the
labour force. He argues therefore that, as long as the growth in the
demand for labour in industry was not large enough in relation to the
growth of the labour force to cause a substantial net transfer of
labour to industry, (an observation which, again, is perfectly
compatible with the Greek case), "the key to the understanding of the
differences in productivity growth lies in explaining the large
differences between countries in the growth of the demand for output.
D. BEYOND KALDOR *** MATURITY AND DE-INDUSTRIALISATION
The Kaldorian theory of growth as summarised above, seeks
to explain the rapid rates of growth which most industrialising
countries witness at intermediate stages of development and per capita
incomes and their subsequent relative decline at higher levels of
both. It is obvious that all three laws on which the theory is based,
only apply when industry is faced with "unlimited supplies of labour",
at the prevailing wage differential. However, as the economy grows,
there comes a time when employment in agriculture, as well as in the
informal, low productivity service sector which also serves as an
alternative pool of labour, shrinks to such a low percentage of total
employment, that it can no longer serve as a pool of employment for
the industrial sector, which may start facing a shortage of labour.
Consumer demand which used to be very elastic for manufactured goods
at lower levels of development and per capita income, is assumed to
become more elastic for services than for manufactured goods. The
tertiary sector which was growing all along together with industry at
the expense of agriculture, begins to expand at the expense of the
industrial sector, absorbing the labour shed from industry into new
jobs, in order to satisfy increased demand for services. According to
Kaldor, this is an inevitable consequence of growth which comes about
at high levels of development and per capita incomes.
Economic "maturity" is defined as that stage of
development when per capita earnings are equalised in all the sectors
of the economy and it is no longer possible to raise total
productivity and output by transferring labour (and resources in
general), from less productive to more productive uses (Kaldor, 1968,
p. 385). The timing of this may vary from country to country but is
believed to be around $ 4,000 U.S. of per capita income (at 1975
prices), when agriculture employs approximately 5% of the total
employed population (Rowthorn and Wells, 1987, p. 213).
Economic maturity is usually accompanied by a process of
de- industrialisation in the country in question, which is defined as
a falling share of industry in total employment and/or output
(Blackaby, 1978). Despite the fact that, in accordance with the
reasons mentioned above referring to particular characteristics of the
manufacturing sector, a fall in the share of industry should normally
give rise to serious fears about the continuation of an economy's
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sustained growth process, the phenomenon of de-industrialisation
should be of no particular concern, for countries who have managed to
industrialize successfully. In such cases, per capita incomes will
normally continue to rise and full employment will be maintained, as
long as the expanding tertiary sector will provide new jobs to absorb
all the labour which can no longer find employment in the secondary
sector (Rowthorn and Wells, 1987, p. 213).
This shift in the employment structure has been normally
attributed to the changing structure of demand in favour of services,
at higher levels of per capita income. Empirical observations of
expenditure and output by sector across different countries and over
time however, have shown that expenditure and output of the service
sector seem to rise in relation to industry, only when measured at
current prices. When measured at constant prices, both expenditure and
output of the industrial and service sector seem to indicate a
remarkable constancy and stability through time (Fuchs, 1968, p. 37,
and Rowthorn and Wells, 1987).
The rise in demand for services as intermediate goods, on
the other hand, on the part of the industrial sector, as the latter
expands (eg. transport and distribution services, financial services
etc), is not enough to account for the impressive increase of the
share of the service sector in the total employment of most West
European countries, especially during the last two decades. This is
attributed to the difference in productivity growth between the two
sectors. Because of the Verdoorn relationship and increasing returns
to scale in industry, productivity there rises faster than in any
other economic sector. Given the observation that the ratio of the
output of the service sector to that of the industrial sector remains
approximately constant through time, when measured in constant prices
(op. cit), the service sector will have to absorb a constantly rising
share of employment in order to keep its output growth in pace with
that of the industrial sector. As a result, the price of services will
rise in relation to that of manufactured goods and if measured at
current prices, this will give the impression that both output and
expenditure shares rise for the sector of services. Despite the fact
that demand elasticity does rise for services at higher levels of
development, this substitution effect between industrial goods and
services is offset, in a way, by the income effect resulting from the
rising relative prices of services (Fuchs, 1968, p. 4). The
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consequence is constant shares of output and expenditure between the
two sectors over time.
"With differential productivity growth, the
pattern of employment will shift away from the most
dynamic sectors towards those in which productivity is
rising more slowly" (Rowthorn and Wells, 1987, p. 15).
The possibility is suggested (Gershuny and Miles, 1983, p.
42) that this productivity gap between the two sectors and the
resulting relative price rise of services will, eventually, generate
pressures for technological innovations in the tertiary sector (either
as applications of new ideas or in the form of "mechanisation" of
services by the use of new industrial products, e.g. computers.) In
the long run, this may result in a rise in the growth of productivity
in the latter and the flow of employment from industry to services
might again be reversed.
In the Kaldorian theory, maturity and de-industrialisation
(defined as a falling share of manufacturing in output and employment)
appear as logical consequences of growth, related to high levels of
economic development which, on their own, need not endanger the
further growth of the economy, even though the latter will probably be
slower than before. However, de-industrialisation may occur at any
stage of economic development, although for different reasons.
According to Rowthorn and Wells (1987, pp. 60-2), one reason may be
greater international trade specialization. A country which witnesses
autonomous improvements in certain non-manufacturing sectors of its
economy, or disposes of a comparative advantage in such sectors as
tourism or services and primary branches, in general, may decide to
concentrate most of its resources in the production of such goods,
specialize in exports of such goods and use the receipts in order to
pay for its imports of the manufactured goods it requires. Although
this, naturally, entails the deterioration of the manufacturing sector
of the country in question, it need not endanger its external balance
or its future growth (ceteris paribus). Indeed, it would seem slightly
irrational for such a country to specialise in producing and exporting
heavy industrial goods, when it would be so much easier for it to
exploit those sectors in which it has a comparative advantage over
other countries. (On the other hand, it would also be unwise for a
country to specialise in a sector that does not seem to have any
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dynamic growth potential).
De-industrialisation, however, may also occur because of a
country's economic failure (op. cit., p. 220). In this case, the
industrial sector of the economy is facing a series of serious
problems; among other things, (e.g. deficient industrial structure,
inefficient production techniques, lack of competitiveness etc), or,
to be more specific, as a consequence of these, it is unable to
maintain full employment by absorbing labour from agriculture. For a
variety of reasons, demand for labour in industry is very low;
unemployment rises as labour is shed from industry; industrial
employment may decline in absolute numbers as well as a share in total
employment; industrial output declines or remains constant, and
productivity rises very slowly or remains constant as well. A large
part of the labour force leaving agriculture, moves into the tertiary
rather than into the manufacturing sector. The service sector
increases its importance at the expense of industry as well as of
agriculture but is unable to generate enough new jobs to absorb all of
the labour shed from the other two sectors. Productivity growth in
services, usually rises at very low or even negative rates, as well
The Kaldorian theory of growth is based on the role of
manufacturing; it therefore mainly refers to countries which have
already accomplished industrialisation or are in the process of doing
so. Countries such as Greece, which have aimed at industrialisation
but have failed to achieve it, hardly fit this framework as it is.
Generally speaking, the Kaldorian theory is quite specific in terms of
the assumptions it is based on and the preconditions a certain country
should fulfill for growth to occur. Applying this theory to a country
such as Greece, whose particularities we will discuss in the following
chapter, perhaps requires several modifications and certainly further
discussion.
E. CERTAIN MAIN ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE KALDORIAN THEORY OF GROWTH
*** CONCLUSIONS
1. One of the main assumptions on which the Kaldorian approach to
economic development is based, is the existence of large supplies of
labour in the non-industrial sectors of the economy. The
non-industrial sectors, in Kaldor's view, comprise mainly agriculture
(as well as some low productivity personal services), which, as
mentioned above, is the main source of surplus labour for the
expanding manufacturing sector, during the early stages of
development, because of its high levels of disguised unemployment and
low productivity. While this assumption was probably valid as far as
the Western European countries were concerned at the start of their
industrialisation, agriculture should not be seen as the only source
of surplus labour in an economy. In many countries of varying levels
of development, large proportions of the population are either
unemployed or fully or partly employed in various sorts of low
productivity activities, generally listed under the heading of "other
activities", related to the service sector, such as for example, shoe
polishing, car windscreen washing, domestic services etc. There is
also the possibility of an increase of the labour force through the
addition of people who wouldn't work under different circumstances,
but do so due to the increase in wage levels and the existence of job
vacancies unfilled (e.g. women, teenagers, people who have retired).
These categories could serve as alternative sources of surplus labour,
as employment shifts away from agriculture, at the early and
intermediate stages of development, provided that demand for labour in
the growing industrial sector is high enough to absorb it.
2. While surplus labour will almost certainly exist in some sector or
sectors of the economy at any stage of development, it should somehow
be ensured that the newly developing industrial sector adopts methods
of production which take advantage of the existence of such resources.
If, for a variety of reasons (e.g. imitative of foreign
industrialisation patterns, legislative or others), the use of capital
appears to entrepreneurs to be relatively cheaper or more profitable
than the use of labour, demand for labour in the industrial sector may
not be enough to absorb all of the employment shed from the lower
productivity sectors.
3. The Kaldorian approach to growth is mainly demand oriented and as
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such tends in certain cases to over stress the role of demand factors
for economic development and partly ignore the role of supply factors.
Investment expenditure, for example, is seen as the basic channel
through which technological changes enter the economy and enable the
industrial sector, in particular, to exploit increasing returns to
scale. It is usually seen, however, as responding passively to changes
in demand for output, as long as
...if demand is effective, there will be an augmentation
of resources, both labour and investable resources,...the
growth of the labour force, capital accumulation and
technical progress must be regarded as largely endogenous
to an economic system, dependent on the strength of demand
for a country's products" (Thirlwall, 1983, p. 343).
While it may be true that supply adjusts to changes in demand and that
investment rises automatically to enable increased production, one
must not forget that the supply of production factors is necessary,
even though permissive, for growth to occur and that, therefore,
investment supply must also be forthcoming, for investment to take
place. It is argued (Boltho, 1982, pp. 11-5) that, during the postwar
period, the European countries were in an advantageous position as far
as investment was concerned, because the U.S.A. acted as a "vast
reservoir of cheap and abundant technology" which stimulated new
investment. In relation to this point, however, a question which
requires an answer is, why certain countries, systematically take
advantage of available technology to much higher degrees than others,
that is, why the diffusion of knowledge is not carried out in a
uniform way across countries. One could argue, in relation to this
point, that, in order to take advantage of available technologies, a
country must posses a minimum level of education and technological
know how. If there are large differences in this, among countries,
then some countries may not be able to exploit new technologies, even
if the latter are available. Another point, related in particular with
countries at early or intermediate stages of development, is that for
sustained investment to take place, the income distribution must have
changed in such a way as to place a large proportion of income in the
hands of people willing and able to invest it; also, a fairly
developed network of banks and financial institutions must exist, so
as to provide a channel through which the money may easily flow from
those who have it to those who wish to invest it. This, however, may
be somewhat of a problem in less developed countries, as it raises, on
the other hand, the problem of "entrepreneurship".
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4. The growth of an economy is sometimes viewed as a self perpetuating
process, once started; reality has indicated that this is hardly the
case. Among other things, the appearance and continuation of growth
requires the "existence and successful activity of a social group
prepared to accept innovations" (Rostow, 1971, p. 50). In many of the
Western European countries, this problem was mainly economic and,
"once the economic incentives for industrialisation came into
existence, commercial and banking groups moved easily into industrial
entrepreneurship" (op. cit., p. 51). In other countries, however, the
development of adequate entrepreneurship represents a deeper social
process, as long as "a group must come to perceive it as both possible
and good to undertake acts of capital investment" (op. cit.) The
question then arises as to why there are so large observed differences
in the existence and efficiency of "entrepreneurship" among countries.
Apart from the fact that favourable expectations of entrepreneurs are
crucial at any stage of economic development, an additional problem is
that of personal attitudes as well as of centrally determined
directives and goals. The fact is that individual and social welfare
do not always go hand in hand and that in certain cases there may be a
dichotomy between the profit maximising decisions of individuals and
welfare maximising goals for the economy as a whole.
The Kaldorian theory of growth, although solid and
comprehensive theoretically speaking, is in a sense self-constrained.
In particular, although certain references are made to countries at
lower levels of development compared to the Western European ones, in
the Kaldorian approach to growth, no specific attempt is made to
modify the analysis so as to take into account the particular
structural differences and characteristics of these economies. In a
sense, the fact that the theory is based on specific characteristics,
related, among others to the structure of demand for goods as well as
for labour, to periods of fast rather than slow growth, and to a
particular view of the pattern and sequence at which the growth
process takes place, which applied to the now industrially developed
Western European countries in the 1960s but may not necessarily apply
to different countries at different points in time, may invalidate the
general applicability of the theory as it was initially developed.
Whether this should be seen as a sign that the context of this theory
is not applicable to countries such as Greece, will be examined in the
following chapters.
44
CHAPTER II
A BRIEF ECONOMIC HISTORY OF GREECE
A. INTRODUCTION
Having discussed the Kaldorian theory of growth in the
previous chapter, we shall now proceed with a brief analysis of the
Greek economy, with particular emphasis on the period after the Second
World War. Since the Kaldorian growth theory refers, mainly, to
industrially developed countries and, furthermore, since Greece hardly
qualifies as such, a few theoretical points should be made clear before
further proceeding with the analysis.
Economic growth and development is a long, continuous,
painful and uncertain, as to the final outcome, process for the
countries involved. It should not be seen as a compact, rigid and
predetermined succession of events but as consisting of a series of
"turning points" or "periods". This, at least, is the concept generally
used in economic theory, for analytical purposes, that is, in order to
define so called "patterns of development". The most important of these
analytical stages is, probably the "take-off stage". The importance of
this stage may be justified by the fact that it represents the point of
transition of a certain economy from the underdeveloped agricultural
society it used to be to the group of the so called developed and
industrialised nations.
During the take-off stage, traditional and old fashioned
economic and social structures (Rostow, 1971, pp. 7-9) are gradually
abolished and their place is taken by new and dynamic ones. Take-off is
the stage during which the bases for further economic development are
set and the structural characteristics of any such further development
begin to stand out. The take-off stage is a point of crucial choices
for policy makers as well as the economic agents involved, as far as
the future economic performance of the country is concerned; whether
these choices are conscious or unconscious, they will greatly
contribute to determining whether the country in question will finally
be able to "make it" or not. It is at this particular stage of
development that the potential future "leading sectors" of the economy
start to emerge, that is, those sectors which will be expected to act
as the "engine of growth" of the economy and pull the vehicle of
economic development.
The take-off stage is, therefore, crucial because the whole
economic future of the country depends on certain decisions concerning
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the choice of those potential leading sectors. A wise choice of the
latter (either by the government or by private economic agents) is
immensely important because a country making its first steps towards
economic development, usually faces limited funds and productive
resources and cannot afford to waste them in uses that contain limited
or no growth potential. On the contrary, it should be careful to
channel and concentrate them, as much as possible, into those sectors
and branches of economic activity where it already has or believes that
it might have, in the near future, a comparative advantage. Naturally,
this would be much easier to implement in a planned rather than in a
market economy. Furthermore, because it is believed that all leading
sectors eventually reach a point of saturation where they can no longer
act as "engines of growth" and must give their way to new and more
dynamic ones if the process of economic development is to continue
undisturbed (Rostow, 1971, and 1978), the original sectors in which a
country concentrates its resources must possess, besides other
characteristics which establish them as leading sectors, strong
backward and forward linkages with other sectors (Chenery et.al , 1986,
p. 240, Cornwall, 1977, p. 130), which will enable them to pull along
other parts of the economy as well; they will, thus, prepare the ground
for new leading sectors to succeed them when the time comes. If these
linkages are absent, however, the "leading" sector will grow for a time
on its own, isolated from the rest of the economy and when, as it
eventually must, it reaches its saturation point, there will be no
other sector ready to take its place as an engine of economic growth.
The time at which a country finds itself at the point of
take-off into self-sustained industrial development, depends on a
variety of endogenous and exogenous factors. For most of the countries
of W. Europe this stage was reached before World War II. For the U.K.
it was triggered off by the industrial revolution and the use of steam
power; for Germany it was marked by the middle of the 19th century. In
the case of Greece, the relevant literature unanimously suggests that
the take-off period coincided with the years after the end of World War
II. The logic of this argument is that, if take-off was reached at some
time, this could only have been when, after a long period of
economically and politically turbulent years, the nature of economic
progress and the structural characteristics of the Greek economy became
clear. Therefore, if one is interested in analysing the present
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situation of the Greek economy as a result of events that took place
during the take-off period, one should concentrate mainly in the
postwar years. This would facilitate the task of answering certain
questions as to how and why economic development took the forms it did
and how and why Greece came to present today a series of structural
particularities from which it seems unable to escape and which seem
peculiar, to say the least, given its stage of development and per
capita income.
However, as already mentioned, economic growth is not
something compact that happens overnight, but depends on a series of
interrelated events. Despite the fact that the take-off stage is of
particular importance, it does not represent the beginning of economic
growth, but an intermediate stage, as long as its nature depends on the
characteristics of previous stages during which the preconditions for
take-off were set. Therefore, in order to understand the post war
take-off and the economic evolutions following it in Greece, a short
background survey of the prewar period would first be helpful.
B. The PREWAR PERIOD
1. Turkish Occupation and Liberation
The Turkish occupation, lasted almost four centuries
(15th-19th), and effectively isolated Greece from the evolutions taking
place in the rest of Europe, especially the transition from feudalism
to capitalism and the industrial revolution marking the beginning of
capital formation in industry for most Western European countries.
The 15th century represents the "golden century" of the
Ottoman Empire (Mouzelis, 1978, p. 18). The strong central authority of
the Sultan prevented the development of a powerful class of land
aristocrats by establishing an extremely limited control of their part
over the small producers (a fact which naturally favoured the latter).
Ownership of the land was organized on a different basis, in comparison
to the Western European countries, according to which all land was
theoretically in the possession of the Turkish government but, in
reality belonged to the peasants provided that they systematically
cultivated it (Vergopoulos, 1975, Mouzelis, 1978, p. 19).
The first capital formation in Greece took place during the
16th century and was mainly achieved because of the trade developed by
the Greek merchant fleet; this facilitated a very modest development of
the handicraft activities which, by the early 19th century contributed
around 30% of GDP (Nikolinakos, 1976, p. 26).
After the revolution of 1821 and the liberation of the
country, Greece continued, at least for the first fifty years of its
independence (1830-1880) to be an intensively agricultural country with
insignificant capital formation and a nonexistent industry. Any light
industries which had been partly developed during the Turkish
occupation had, in the mean time, lost all competitiveness after the
industrial revolution in Britain and the use of capitalistic methods of
production in industry. The secondary sector consisted mainly of
handicraft. Until 1900, Greek exports consisted of agricultural
products, especially grapes, figs, lemons and wine, while imports
consisted of food and other light consumer goods (Lambos, 1983). Even
at the time, the Greek balance of payments was constantly in deficit,
as long as exports only managed to cover around 40-50% of imports
(Nikolinakos, 1976, p. 34), and the resulting debt was covered by
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international borrowing. The resulting inability of the country to pay
its debts led it to a declaration of bankruptcy. The main powers of
that era (France and Great Britain) where Greece was mainly borrowing
from, imposed the "International Economic Control" to the country
(mainly referring to the exploitation of state monopolies such as salt
and matches) in order to ensure repayment of the loans.
The gradual expansion of the Greek state with the addition
of Northern Thessaly, Epirus, Macedonia and Thrace, in the period
1870-1915, following the liberating wars against, mainly, Turkey,
almost doubled the Greek territory and population. The impact of this
expansion, though, on the structure of the Greek economy was minimal,
if any. Most of these new territories were almost exclusively
agricultural areas with no industrial base (Vergopoulos, 1975).
The large land properties created during the Turkish
occupation were in the first place sold to Greek landowners and after a
long and bloody struggle of the peasants were finally distributed to
them. This agricultural reform resulted in very small lots because of
the large number of claimants (peasants plus refugees from Asia Minor)
which led to very low agricultural incomes, over-borrowing on the part
of the farmers from the banks (the National Bank of Greece at first and
the Agricultural Bank later on), and finally to the loss of the land
properties and to internal and external migration (Vergopoulos, 1985,
p. 279).
Despite the gradual integration of the Greek economy into
world markets, which is indicated in Table II.B1, pre-capitalistic
methods of production continued to prevail both in agriculture and
industry.
The great bulk of the existing wealth was in the hands of
tradesmen who preferred to channel it into trade and commercial
activities to which they were used and where profits were safer, rather
than go for the risk and unsafe returns of industrial investment.
The end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century
were marked by a doubling of both the area and the population of the
country, as a consequence of the Balkan Wars and the First World War.
Together with a relative development of transport networks this led
for the first time to the integration and expansion of the domestic
market, which represents a basic precondition for the development of
either agriculture or industry. At the same time though, the
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liberalisation of certain areas and the consequent detachment from the
other Balkan markets (especially the Turkish one) simply meant a very
difficult and quite uncertain integration.
Table II.81: Greece's trade with other countries (in % shares).
1913
I	 X
1921
I	 X
1922
I	 X
1925
I	 X
1936-38
I	 X
U.S.A
	 1.6 7.8 22.8 18.4 21.9 26.6 23.2 26.6 6.2 15.9
U.K	 23.9 23.9 17.0 21.2 14.4 17.0 15.6 7.0 13.3 10.0
ITALY	 3.6 3.2 9.0 5.6 8.9 8.3 9.6 16.8 2.2 4.4
GERMAN	 7.5 10.2 4.9 14.8 6.0 21.1 7.2 16.4 26.2 35.3
FRANCE	 5.9 11.4 7.8 3.1 6.5 5.0 8.0 5.4 1.7 2.9
BELGIUM	 1.2 4.3 3.1 1.4 3.3 1.0 3.4 2.0 1.0 1.4
gETHERLANDS2.5 8.0 2.6 6.8 1.8 6.0 2.4 3.6 2.2 2.8
RUSSIA	 19.9 2.4 0.3 --- --- --- 0.8 -- 2.9 0.6
1 = Imports
X=Exports
Source: Nikolinakos, 1976, p. 59.
At about the same time, the government started playing a
more active role as far as the economy of the country was concerned and
took the crucial decision that Greece must industrialise. Agriculture
was seen as the supplier of both primary products and surplus labour to
industry, a process which was ensured by policies of low agricultural
prices which would at the same time create cheap living conditions for
the workers in the cities and would thus lead to low labour costs
(Lambos, 1983). A desperate struggle began to acquire foreign capital
in order to aid industrial development, mainly through loans and the
encouragement of foreign investment (especially from France and the
U.K.). This marks the beginning of Greece's gradual integration to W.
Europe, as well as a long story of economic and political dependence
from abroad (Fotopoulos, 1985).
2. Industrialization During the First Half of the 20th Century
In the first years of the 20th century, the situation in
Greece appeared as follows:
The agricultural sector was still the most important one
(raisins being the main export). On the other hand, the increase of the
Greek territory and population which continued into the 1920s with the
destruction of Asia Minor and the crossing over to Greece of a large
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number of refugees, coinciding with the final definition of the Greek
national borders, after the addition of W. Thrace, the development of
the railways and the enlargement of the population in the cities as the
result of internal migration, had resulted in a relative expansion of
the domestic market. Some of the earnings through trade and commerce as
well as part of the foreign capital already flowing into the country
began to be timidly invested in industry (Delivanis, 1965, pp. 121-5).
However, due to the fact that industrialisation was slow and, in the
meantime, the problems faced by the peasants in the countryside were
intensified, a large number of them started to migrate abroad, mainly
to the U.S.A.
In 1923, after the war and defeat in Asia Minor, the
Agricultural Issue was finally solved with the Second Agrarian
Transformation (Christodoulou, 1987). The vicious circle (small lots,
low incomes, emigration) continued though, despite the modest
development of agricultural cooperatives.
With the arrival of the refugees from Asia Minor, the
peasant Greek population was enriched with elements of entrepreneurship
and some managerial skills, despite the fact that most of them were
merchants and demand for capital to be invested in industry began to
rise. A number of small local banks was created whose main function was
to finance investment for the creation of new small labour intensive,
light consumer goods industries (Nikolinakos, 1976, p. 49). Although
this led to an initial development of the financial and banking system
and resulted in a relative expansion of industry, it also led to the
beginning of a long term dependence of the latter on the former. On the
other hand, despite the relative progress of industrial development,
most of the industrial production continued to be realised in
handicraft type industries using outdated production methods.
In the meantime, the Greek government was actively taking
part in the attempt at industrialisation, both directly and indirectly.
In the first place, from 1830 onwards, it followed a policy of strong
tariff protection of the economy from foreign competition, both in
order to increase its revenues as well as to protect the development of
agriculture and of the infant Greek industry (Babanasis, 1985, p. 44).
Until World War II Greece was trying to follow a policy of
self-sufficiency, relative import substitution and orientation of the
Greek industry towards the home market. This policy was followed, more
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or less, all through the period but especially after the outbreak of
the economic world crisis of the 1930s . Another source of revenue for
the Greek government was taxation, especially indirect taxes which, for
a variety of reasons (institutional inefficiency of the tax
authorities, tax evasion e.t.c.) seem to be more easily applied and
accepted in underdeveloped countries than direct taxes. The ratio of
indirect to direct taxes rose through the whole of the interwar period.
Whatever industry was developed in Greece in those early
years after World War I, consisted solely of light industry, mainly
food processing and production of other consumer goods such as
textiles, leather and tobacco (Delivanis, 1965, pp. 121-5, Vergopoulos,
1975). Between 1913 and 1924, capital formation in Greece became quite
significant and originated mainly in emigrant remittances and high
profits which were mainly invested in industry. The constant
devaluation of the drachma (in real terms) after 1920, the governmental
policy of tariff protection and the increasing number of entrepreneurs
boosted Greek industrialisation whose rates of growth kept increasing
until 1939, when domestic industrial production covered about 81% of
the domestic demand for industrial consumer goods.
(1938=100)
Increase	 of	 secondary	 sector's	 production	 (1924-39).
1924	 48	 1932	 61
1925	 50	 1933	 66
1926	 50	 1934	 76
1927
	 56	 1935	 76
1928	 59	 1936	 84
1929	 61	 1937	 91
1930	 63	 1938	 100
1931	 65	 1939	 106
Source:	 Nikolinakos,	 1976, p.	 54.
During the 1910s and over the whole intra war period, Greece
evolved from an agricultural country to one in which industry was quite
important and accounted for 18% of GDP and 15% of the total active
population, in 1940. Between 1880 and 1930, the growth rate of the
manufacturing sector was the fastest in the economy, probably because
of the very low starting point of the Greek manufacturing sector
(Vergopoulos, 1975, Fotopoulos, 1985). However, Greece was proving
II.B2
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unable to develop its heavy industry. Foreign capital continued to flow
into the country and was invested mainly in works of infrastructure,
quarrying, banking and trade. Tobacco trade, which was by then the
first export sector of the country, was over 80% under the control of
foreign capital which is indicative of the measure of dependence of the
Greek economy from abroad (Delivanis, 1965, Nikolinakos, 1976, p. 56).
Any loans that the Greek government managed to secure from abroad at
unfavourable conditions were not productively invested but served to
pay off previous loans or for military purposes.
Greek trade was heavily dependent on agricultural products,
mainly tobacco and grapes, although the world-wide crisis of the 1930s
was a hard blow to agricultural exports. Because of the very restricted
type of Greek exports as well as the low price elasticity of export
demand for agricultural products, the Greek balance of trade was very
vulnerable to external shocks and continued to be in deficit (which got
progressively worse) over the whole of the period, due to a growing
difference between imports and exports, while industrial exports
continued to be insignificant until well into the 20th century. Greek
imports consisted mainly of food, textile yarns (because of the
development of the Greek textile industries), basic metals and
chemicals, which Greece exported, in part, as primary products and
reimported them transformed to intermediate goods (Triantis, 1965).
Although the distribution of imports seems to be indicative of
industrial development, it also indicates that Greek industrialisation
was solely confined to light industry, while heavy industry was too
underdeveloped to cover domestic needs. This was, in broad terms, the
situation of the Greek economy before the outbreak of World War II.
3. The War and the Reconstruction Period
The second World War left Greece literally in ruins.
Industrial production fell to almost one third of its prewar levels,
the transport network was almost completely destroyed, unemployment
rose and inflation was so high that the quantity of money rose by
5,000,000 times! (Babanasis, 1976, p. 74). The civil war which broke
out immediately after the end of World War II multiplied the
destructions and prolonged the war period for Greece up to 1949, thus
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delaying its reconstruction. Only in 1951 did Greece manage to reach
the development level it enjoyed in 1939 (Ellis, 1965, p. 230).
After the end of the war, Greece's major economic target
(both as far as the government was concerned, as well as a general
public consensus) continued to be its industrialisation, although other
pressing problems included the provision of the Greek population with
food and housing as well as the reconstruction of the transport
network. The capital needed for the implementation of these plans was
partly provided by the Marshall plan.
In the meantime, the rural exodus, accelerated because of
the war, continued and the peasants arriving into the cities were
absorbed at satisfactory rates, in the beginning, by industry,
handicraft, commerce and some service activities. This also resulted in
a fast growth of the tertiary sector, whose average growth rate rose to
4.7%, in the period 1950-1960.
Investment rates in the Greek economy rose during the first
post war years and reached 13% of GDP in 1948, 17% in 1950 and 26% in
1960, thus approximating investment shares in more developed countries
(Nikolinakos, 1976, p. 73). However, what was slightly unsettling was
not the level of investment but its distribution among the various
economic sectors. While investment did not rise in agriculture, it fell
in manufacturing and more than 50% of total investment was absorbed in
the sectors of constructions-housing and transport (Negreponti-
Delivani, 1985, pp. 74-83).
Despite the fact that investment in housing was certainly
necessary after the war destructions, it was nevertheless abnormally
high compared to that corresponding to other European countries as well
as Greek industry. Given the limited resources which are almost always
faced by a developing country, this excessive investment in housing
proved to be a negative factor for the necessary investments in
infrastructure and transport which would facilitate the preparation of
the Greek industry for the high rates of growth it enjoyed after 1960.
One could say, therefore, that investment in housing slowed down the
industrialisation process.
Fixed capital investment in manufacturing increased from
about 10% of total investment in the period 1948-1952 to 12.3% in
1953-57 and decreased to 11.1% in 1958-1961 (Nikolinakos, 1976, p.
80). This resulted in the inability of the manufacturing sector to
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increase its absorption of labour and as long as peasants kept leaving
the countryside because of the unfavourable conditions they faced
there, the result was an increase in overseas migration and the
further enlargement of the service sector.
Table II.B3 Distribution of investment (%) among sectors 1950, 1955
1950	 1955
Agriculture	 11.0	 11.5
Manufacturing	 15.2	 13.8
Transport	 24.5	 22.0
Housing	 31.9	 31.8
Source: Nikolinakos, 1976, p. 73.
In 1953 the government proceeded to a 50% devaluation of the
drachma with respect to the dollar. At the same time a new legislative
framework encouraging foreign industrial investment in the country was
adopted (Roumeliotis, 1978). Greece suddenly shifted from a policy of
partial import substitution to one of export orientation and was faced
with harsh foreign competition. While exports increased in the short
term, domestic industry, which was unprepared for such a competition,
lost the chance to set the bases for self sustained growth and avoid
foreign dependency. Greek investors still continued to prefer branches
of consumer goods and light capital goods and domestic industry was
still orientated to the production of such goods for the covering of
domestic needs. It, therefore, left the heavy industrial branches to
the exploitation of foreign investors who, encouraged by the new
favourable laws concerning foreign investment, started inserting
themselves and progressively controlling vital sectors for the further
development of the country. Tariffs and other barriers to imports only
covered the goods which could be produced in Greece at the time. This
resulted in imports of intermediate goods to rise, increasing the
structural deficit of the balance of payments. In this way, despite
the fact that, in a sense, the war could have acted as a catalyst for
the abolition of traditional and old fashioned industrial structures,
the post war Greek economy proved unable to set the right bases for its
take-off and for a subsequent self sustained growth.
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C. THE GREEK ECONOMY IN THE YEARS OF ECONOMIC PROSPERITY
1. The Characteristics of the Postwar Economic Growth in W. Europe 
The years after the end of World War II, especially the
period 1953-73 were marked, for all the countries of Western Europe, by
impressive rates of growth of GDP in relation to previous years, as
shown in table I.A1.
These fast rates of growth came as a result of two factors
mainly, the first one being the sharp increase of demand for
consumption and investment, as a consequence of the needs not satisfied
during the long war period and the second one consisting of a process
of structural change within the Western European economies. A main
characteristic of this change was the rapidly rising importance of the
secondary sector of production, especially manufacturing, both as a
share of total employment as well as GDP of the economies concerned,
while, at the same time, the corresponding shares of agriculture in
total employment and GDP were rapidly decreasing. The changing
percentage shares of the three economic sectors in GDP and employment
in the EC-9 over the period 1950-1980 may be seen in the following
tables:
Table II.C1: Percentage shares of employment per economic sector in the
EC (1950-1988).
1950 1960 1970 1980 1988
Agriculture 25.00 16.49 9.69 7.43 6.47
Industry 41.50 45.34 45.79 38.55 30.96
Services 33.50 38.17 44.52 54.02 62.57
Source: ILO, Annual Labour Statistics, various issues.
Table II.C2:	 Percentage shares of GDP per economic sector in the EC
(1950-1988).
1950 1960 1970 1980 1988
EEC-9
Agriculture 16.8 12.4 5.5 4.1 3.8
Industry 41.3 44.8 48.00 43.8 41.2
Services 41.9 42.8 46.5 52.00 55.0
Source:1) Donges, 1982.
2) OECD, country surveys, various issues.
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These evolutions in the secondary sector were made possible
by the permissive operation of two supply factors. The first one was
that the developing industrial sector had large supplies of labour at
its disposition from agriculturel , where unemployment and
underemployment were high and productivity was relatively low. The
expanding secondary sector could, therefore, draw on these supplies of
cheap labour for its development without lowering productivity or
production in agriculture and without raising labour wages. An
indication that this was actually happening after the war is that
while agricultural employment was decreasing, employment in
manufacturing was rising by an average rate of 0.6% over the period
1953-73, while in the years before that it never rose above 0.4%
(Boltho, 1982, p. 11-2). The second factor was that, besides the
increase in the demand for investment in manufacturing, the
availability of capital was also forthcoming as long as through the
military aid on the part of the U.S.A (Marshall plan etc.), the
Western European countries had access to cheap capital and embodied
technical progress which they proceeded to invest in manufacturing
(Nikas, 1991). Gross fixed capital investment rates rose rapidly as a
whole and especially for the manufacturing sector over the whole
period. This, combined with the rapid transfer of labour from the
primary to the secondary sector of production, as well as with the
economies of scale characterising this sector, resulted in an increase
of labour productivity in manufacturing and in the economy as a whole.
This increased entrepreneurial profits and led to an increase in
production and employment which, through the Verdoorn Law (which, up
to 1966, appears to have operated in most Western European countries),
resulted in even higher productivity. In the meantime, the rising
competitiveness of the Western European countries in world markets,
increased their exports of industrial goods. Therefore, in the post
war years and until the first oil shock, both domestic and export
demand interacted with sufficient supplies of productive resources to
1
Although surplus labour existed in other sectors of the economy as
well, especially in some low productivity service activities such as
domestic services etc., agriculture which still employs approximately
29% of total employment in Greece, constituted the main source of
available labour.
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create rapid rates of economic growth.
2. Greece: Impressive growth and structural changes 
The period 1953-1973 of rapid economic growth in the Western
European countries roughly corresponds to the period 1960-1975 in the
case of Greece. This delay was largely a consequence of the exogenous
factors partly described in the first part of this chapter, as well as
of the time lag with which the Greek economy usually responds to
changes in the rest of Europe.
During the period 1960-75 the progress of the Greek economy
was quite impressive. A casual observer looking at the rates of growth
of the main macro economic indicators of the country over a period
during which Greece also seemed to be achieving all of the goals
usually set by economic policy, (low rates of inflation as well as of
unemployment, price stability and no serious balance of payments
constraints), would certainly derive the conclusion that Greece was
performing an "economic miracle",proceeding with great leaps towards
industrial development.
Over the whole period the annual rate of growth of GDP was
extremely high for Greece, higher than that of the OECD countries for
the same years, with the exception of Japan, as seen in the following
table.
Table II.C3 Average annual rates of growth of GDP (1960-1989).
country \period 1960-5 1965-70 1970-3 1973-8 1979-89
Greece 7.9 7.3 7.8 3.6 1.7
Portugal 6.3 6.2 8.6 2.2 3.0
Spain 8.6 6.4 7.2 3.0 2.4
EEC(6) 4.8 4.7 4.5 2.1 1.6
Sources: 1) OECD, Main Economic Indicators,	 (various issues)
2) Own calculations
Despite the fact that these rapid rates of growth of GDP could be
attributed to the fact that Greece's starting point was a much lower
development level than that of the Western European countries, they are
also higher than the corresponding ones in countries of approximately
the same development level, such as Spain or Portugal.
Apart from these impressive rates of overall growth of the economy,
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the structural changes which the country undergoes over the period are
also indicative of rapid industrialisation. The rapid postwar growth in
Greece in particular was characterised by three main elements:
a) The rising importance of the secondary sector of production.
Over the whole period 1960-1978, the secondary sector
represented the most dynamic sector of the economy. Manufacturing
output rates rose faster than GDP and for the first time in 1962, the
share of the secondary sector in GDP was higher than that of the
primary sector (although not higher than that of the tertiary).
The secondary sector as a whole, also came first as far as
its absorption of investment is concerned, followed by the tertiary
sector, while the primary sector seemed unable to absorb new
investment. This was probably due to the fact that industrialisation
was progressing at the expense of agriculture where low incomes and
small size and parcellation of the lots make investment difficult and
unprofitable.
Structural changes were also taking place within the
secondary sector. While the Greek industry was oriented towards the
production of consumer goods and traditional branches, in general,
after 1960 it shows a tendency of shifting towards more capital
intensive branches of production, while the contribution of labour
intensive ones in GDP drops in relation to previous years (Fotopoulos,
1985, pp. 120-7 and 166).
Over the whole period 1960-1975 (especially 1961-65), there
seems to be a substitution of capital for labour in Greece (Negreponti
-Delivani, 1985, p. 100). While this reduced the rate at which labour
was absorbed in the secondary sector, it ought to be considered as a
positive evolution as long as it would seem that the economy was
shifting to more capital intensive methods of production and setting up
the bases for self sustained growth. Despite this slight drop in the
labour absorptiveness of industry however, while there were still large
reserves of labour in agriculture, unemployment rates did not rise in
the country (probably because of already high migration rates). Still
another evidence of the rising importance of the secondary sector is
the fact that, in the period 1967-71, manufactured products came first
in Greek exports rising for the first time above agricultural ones.
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b) The evolution of investment rates
In the postwar period investment rates rose fast in the
Greek economy. Although domestic savings only managed to cover half of
realized investment in 1953, their share in GDP rose fast. It is
believed that shortages of savings never represented a binding
constraint for investment in Greece . An indication of this is that
Greece, presents a quite high propensity (both marginal and average) to
save, in spite of its relatively low level of development (Ellis, 1965,
p. 33). Savings are largely financed through high invisible earnings
and made possible by the adoption of a very conservative consumption
pattern, that is, a proportionally low level of consumption, as well as
by the of inflow of foreign capital.
Table II.C4: Percentage structure of industrial GDP in Greece in the
period 1948-1973 (constant 1954 prices).
1948 1952 1955 1958 1960 1965 1970 1973
1.Food,Drinks,Tobacco 25.3 22.9 23.3 23.7 21.2 20.8 18.9 16.4
2. Textiles 17.5 18.1 16.0 15.2 13.6 14.1 14.5 16.3
3.Shoes,Clothing,Leather 19.7 18.6 19.6 15.4 14.3 14.2 9.0 8.7
4.Wood products 8.0 7.7 7.6 7.8 7.4 6.9 6.3 6.6
5.Paper products 2.8 3.4 3.9 4.5 5.4 5.8 5.2 4.1
6. Chemicals 10.8 11.8 11.2 10.8 13.6 12.1 11.2 12.5
7.Non metallic minerals 3.6 3.8 5.2 5.6 5.4 6.1 8.5 6.4
8.Basic metals 0.6 1.1 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 7.2 6.9
9.Metal products,electric
appliances
9.4 8.7 9.5 10.1 11.4 12.6 12.7 14.0
10. Transport equipment ... 1.0 2.2 2.6 3.0 3.0 3.9 5.6
11 .Miscellaneous 2.3 2.9 2.6 2.5 2.7 2.2 2.6 2.7
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Sources: 1) Koutsoumaris, 1963.
2) Tsoukalis, 1981.
Private investment constituted the largest part of total
investment (see table II D-4) which was greater than domestic savings
for most of the period. The financing of investment was mainly based on
three sources a) self-financing, b) financing through the Banking
system and c) foreign investment funds. In fact, Greece finds itself
among the countries enjoying high investment shares. The rate of growth
of investment was rather satisfactory as a whole in the postwar period,
in the sense that it approximated conditions prevailing in more
developed countries, rising from 13% of GDP in 1948 to 23% of GDP in
1967 (Nikolinakos, 1976, p. 73 and Negreponti-Delivani, 1985, p. 66).
61
Apart from domestic investment, foreign investment also
flowed in large amounts in the country over the whole period and,
especially after 1973, mainly as a consequence of the laws encouraging
it, as well as the devaluation of the drachma, over that period, in
order to accelerate industrial development and was especially high in
1962.
Table II.C5: Percentage share of Gross Fixed Capital Investment in GDP
(current prices) 1961-1989.
Countries 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-89
EEC-9 23.3 23.3 23.6 21.8 19.8
Greece 20.4 22.6 24.8 23.6 19.1
Sources: 1) Negreponti-Delivani, 1982, p. 306.
2) OECD, Country Surveys, various issues.
Table II.C6: Percentage share of the secondary sector in total
investment 1961-1988.
1961 48.4 1980 52.7
1965 54.7 1985 47.06
1970 51.4 1988 54.3
1975 55.3
Source:	 1) The Greek Economy in figures.
2) Own calculations.
This increasing share of the secondary sector in total
investment could be explained on the ground of the expansion of
investment in constructions (rather than manufacturing) which was
increasing in importance. In 1960 the contribution of constructions in
manufacturing investment was 33.8%; by 1974 the corresponding share was
64.1% (Negreponti-Delivani, 1985, p. 79).
c) External Relations.
In 1961 Greece signed the Athens Treaty of association with
the EC, which marked the country's shift from strong tariff protection
to an opening towards external trade. The main characteristic of this
treaty was that it provided a faster gradual tariff disarnment for the
industrial goods not yet produced in Greece, than for those already
domestically produced. The evolutions as far as external trade is
concerned followed the corresponding ones of Western Europe, although
with a certain time lag. However, the importance of primary products,
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agricultural products and food was declining constantly in the post war
period, while manufacturing products increased their importance in
Greek exports. The percentage of industrial production which was being
exported increased from 2% in 1960-61 to 10% in 1975, (Babanasis, 1985,
p. 65) while the rate of increase of industrial exports rose from 14.5%
in the period 1954-1961 to 30.1% in the period 1962-1975. Industry
became the main exporting sector of the Greek economy (Papantoniou,
1979).
The distribution of imports is also indicative of industrial
development as long as the importance of food and consumer goods has a
falling tendency while the share of capital goods and equipment rises
in importance. It would seem, therefore, that in the latter part of the
postwar period, imports served as an aid for the industrial development
of the country.
Despite the fact that imports were much higher than exports
over the whole period and that the balance of trade was constantly in
deficit, it seemed that Greece faced little balance of payments
constraints (in the sense that it did not have to balance trade) and
was always able to import more than what it exported thanks to the
prodigious development of its invisibles (earnings especially from
remittances and shipping and, later, after 1974, tourism: Tsoukalis,
1981, p. 37), which resulted in the deficit of the balance of current
accounts to be much smaller than that of the trade balance.
The balance of invisibles was always in surplus in Greece, which is a
characteristic of other southern European countries as well, such as
Spain, Portugal and Italy (Glytsos, 1988, pp. 524-5). The most
important invisible earning for Greece consisted of emigrant
remittances and transport in the beginning of the period, although
after 1978 the importance of remittances as a share of invisibles drops
(probably because of repatriation) while that of tourism rises.
Having discussed the above three main characteristics of the
rapid growth period for the Greek economy, we should now critically
assess Greece's performance in that period. The country seemed to be
doing really well from all points of view. It was industrialising
rapidly as indicated by the rising share of the manufacturing sector
and its high rate of growth as well as by the changing structure and
the level of exports. Moreover, the country had easy access to foreign
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capital equipment as long as its high share of invisible earnings made
up for any deficits in the balance of trade. Investment rates were
rising rapidly, profits in the manufacturing sector were high, the
economy was achieving low rates of unemployment combined with low rates
of inflation after the devaluation of the drachma in 1953 and seemed to
be proceeding with no serious problems towards economic development.
Such indices are often misleading, however, and in the case of Greece,
underlying structures and evolutions beneath the smooth surface were
much less brilliant than they seemed at first sight.
Table II.C7: Balance of current accounts of Greece 1960-1988
(millions of $ U.S.).
Year Trade
Balance
Balance	 of
Invisibles
Balance	 of	 Balance	 of
Current Accounts Current accoun-
ts as % of GDP
1960 -288.5 207.7 -80.8 2.60
1961 -326.9 243.5 -83.4 2.40
1962 -365.9 292.0 -73.9 2.00
1963 -412.5 355.3 -57.2 1.40
1964 -522.9 350.2 -172.7 3.75
1965 -645.4 412.6 -232.8 4.43
1966 -745.4 481.3 -264.1 4.54
1967 -696.7 475.0 -221.7 3.54
1968 -771.9 524.4 -247.5 3.68
1969 -888.2 545.3 -342.9 4.50
1970 -1083.9 673.5 -410.4 4.80
1971 -1302.2 940.6 -361.6 3.79
1972 -1571.6 1203.8 -367.8 3.35
1973 -2800.3 1625.1 -1175.2 8.26
1974 -2821.1 1642.6 -1218.5 7.23
1975 -2916.1 1906.9 -1009.2 5.50
1976 -3328.5 2237.0 -1091.5 5.61
1977 -3887.4 2620.0 -1267.0 4.74
1978 -3007.7 2807.6 -954.8 3.02
1979 -4148.5 3557.6 -1881.4 4.82
1980 -3078.7 3695.9 -2216.1 5.40
1981 -3991.3 3632.9 -2407.7 6.34
1982 -5926.9 4041.8 -1885.1
1983 -5385.9 3510.0 -1875.9
1984 -5350.8 3220.7 -2130.1
1985 -6267.9 2992.2 -3275.7
1986 -5685.8 3913.7 -1772.1
1987 -6942.5 5723.3 -1219.2
1988 -7631.1 6674.0 -957.1
Sources: 1) Babanasis, 1985, p. 171
2) National Accounts, various issues.
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Table II.C8:	 Share of Transport
	 (mostly shipping),	 Emigrant
Remittances and Tourism in Invisibles 1960-1988.
Remittances Transport Tourism
1960 33.1 27.8 18.0
1965 37.6 29.8 19.5
1970 36.2 29.1 20.3
1975 27.6 32.1 23.4
1980 17.5 29.4 28.1
1985 15.2 19.7 27.1
1988 17.1 13.6 23.7
Sources: 1) The Greek Economy in Figures.
2) Own calculations.
While it is true that the secondary sector was increasing
its importance, this was not mainly due to the growth of manufacturing,
as in the case of the Western European countries, in the postwar
period, but to the growth of constructions and housing, in the
secondary sector, as well as of the tertiary sector, as a whole. In
fact, over the period 1960-78, the branch of housing and constructions
absorbed more than 50% of total investment while the corresponding
shares in manufacturing were much lower with a tendency to fall after
1976. As a percentage of GDP, Greek manufacturing investment was among
the lowest in the OECD countries, even during the 1960-75 "boom" period
(3% in Greece, corresponding to 4.5% in the OECD and 5% in the E.C.).
Furthermore, since the 1970s Greece's export share of industrial
products has fallen by approximately 10% (the lowest among the OECD
countries) while industrial imports as a percentage of the total supply
of industrial products in the country rose from 46.5% in 1964 to 60% in
1987 (Fotopoulos, 1991, p. 45).
Table II.C9: Percentage distribution of Gross Fixed Capital Investment
in the Secondary sector of Production (1970 prices) 1960-89
Quarrying-Mining Manufacturing Energy Housing Total
1960-65 1.74 23.46 15.97 58.82 100
1966-71 3.10 24.4 16.68 56.36 100
1972-76 3.67 30.40 15.93 50.27 100
1977-82 7.38 27.05 12.83 52.73 100
1983-89 6.35 30.20 17.70 45.74 100
Source: National Accounts of Greece, (various issues).
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Greece presents the highest share of investment in housing
among the European countries. In the period after the war, this could
be justified, in part, by the reconstruction process and the need to
house an increasing population. However, such a high percentage of
investment in a branch that has little forward and backward linkages
and cannot really act as an engine of growth is quite dangerous in a
developing country, especially over such a long period of time.
Moreover, in the case of Greece it reflects certain structural
problems. In fact, seen from this point of view, the previous analysis
concerning high rates of total investment indicates that demand for
investment is not small in general, but that the reluctance to invest
only concerns the manufacturing sector, while there is a marked
preference to invest in sectors, such as housing or the tertiary as a
whole.
This preference for the housing sector could be explained
first of all, by the fact that it represents safe and fast profits and
is, moreover, a type of investment that does not need any degree of
entrepreneurial or management skill as in the case of industry where
production of new goods is involved (Ellis, 1965, p. 216). Given that
Greece never really possessed a true class of entrepreneurs but that
this role was played by previous tradesmen (Mouzelis, 1978, p. 54),
this would seem a plausible explanation. Another explanation is that
investment in housing is relatively independent of imports and import
restrictions as it is mainly based on domestic products (Ellis, 1965,
p. 219). In addition to that, one has to take into account that in the
case of Greece, the strong preference for investment in housing could
be explained by the fact that emigrants remittances financed investment
in dwellings to a very large extent (Nikas, 1991).
A third explanation is related to the reluctance of
entrepreneurs to invest in the manufacturing sector, the restricted
alternatives for productive investment in Greece, the inefficiencies of
the Greek banking sector and the prevalence of a large number of small
sized firms. The latter results from the fact that the domestic
industry is still largely orientated to the production of consumer
goods and originates in handicraftmanship, therefore, is still
organized on a family basis, with approximately 95% of Greek firms
employing the owner/employer and only one other person (ELKEPA, 1985).
Despite the fact that the banking system in Greece was originally
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developed in order to finance industrial development, the initial
number of small banks on which industry was heavily dependent, were
later organized on an oligopolistic basis and largely owned by the
government (Nikolinakos, 1976).
Investment was not constrained by a shortage of savings in
the sense that the propensity to save, in Greece, is higher than the
propensity to invest. Indicatively, while in 1962 private gross fixed
capital investment represented 12.2% of GDP, private domestic savings
represented 17.6% of GDP (Ellis, 1965, p. 35). Loans to small firms
(which represent the majority) were, however, very difficult to obtain.
Banks tended to favour large and already established firms, making
industrial investment difficult for the smaller ones and, at the same
time, extending the existence of a large number of small and low
productivity ones (Donges, 1982, p. 46). Small private (family type)
capital found the housing sector as an outlet and this was combined
with the social conditions also prevailing in Greece, where the
possession of a house or houses automatically raises social status
(Ellis, 1965, p. 216).
The reluctance of the private sector to invest in the
manufacturing sector can be justified in more than one way. In the
first place, the small size of the domestic market, in many cases makes
the existence of large firms unproductive and not worth while. This is
still another justification for the prevalence of small firms, while
most of the large ones operate at less than full capacity because of
low domestic (and export) demand for their products
(Negreponti-Delivani, 1985, p. 263). The percentage of consumption of
domestic manufactured goods in total private domestic consumption was
18% in 1966, went to 26.5% in 1973 and fell to 16.3% in 1978 and to
15.% in 1980 (Negreponti-Delivani 1986b, p. 117). The gap between
spending for consumption purposes and production has risen from 15% to
20% of GDP (constant prices) between 1960 and 1989. Furthermore, the
average propensity to import in Greece is estimated to be almost
double than in the advanced capitalist countries (0.29 vs 0.15, in
1988) and has doubled since the 1950s, while the proportion of imports
covered by exports represents one of the lowest worldwide, being 66%
in 1938 and dropping to 37% in 1989-90 (Fotopoulos, 1991).
However, it should be noted that the naturally small size of
the domestic market is being constantly restricted by governmental tax
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policy which due to the high tax evasion has to rely more and more on
indirect rather than direct taxes, thus raising the corresponding
ratio, all through the post-war period (KEPE, 1990, pp. 68-9). The
result is that a disproportionately large part of the tax burden falls
on wage-earners, thus, limiting significantly their purchasing power.
While this restricts effective demand for the lower income classes, it
also serves to shift a large part of it abroad, as the higher income
classes usually try to imitate foreign consumption patterns and
consume mainly imported goods. On the other hand, Greek entrepreneurs
were always orientated towards the production of consumer goods, light
capital goods and traditional industrial branches. While the domestic
industry was being heavily protected from foreign competition and
import restrictions were in force, it was still possible for them to
operate with the expanding domestic market in mind.
Policy measures in relation to industry were usually
implemented in a short-sighted fashion, independently of a general
framework of policy guidelines, and rarely had a set of clear cut goals
or directives. This kind of economic policy, which was by all means the
product of incompetence rather than a liberal approach to policy
making, contributed to prevent domestic industry from becoming
competitive, as long as it enabled a large number of non-viable,
unproductive firms to be created in the "greenhouse" protected
atmosphere of the 1950s. It is argued in the theory of development,
that import substitution of light manufactured consumers goods is
probably the best development policy alternative during the first
stages. However, the subsequent stages which are a must for the future
self sustained economic growth of the country involve either the
continuation of an import substituting policy orientated towards
capital goods and the building of an intermediate goods industry, or
the shift to an export led growth, perhaps, based on some comparative
advantage (Power, in Singh, 1978, p. 310). Neither of these subsequent
alternative policies were efficiently followed in the Greek economy. In
1961 with the EC association agreement and the gradual abolition of
tariff protection (Tsoukalis, 1981), the Greek entrepreneurs began to
realise that the demand elasticity for their products, largely due to
the rising relative price of Greek/Foreign manufacturing products, was
small both abroad and at home. Consumers preferred imported goods
(Newly Industrialised Countries NICs such as Korea and Taiwan proved to
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Growth of available
labour force
Growth in manufacturing
employment
	
1961-1965	 2.3
	
1966-1970
	 2.3
	
1971-1973	 2.7
	
1974-1980	 2.0
	
1981-1986	 1.2
	
1987-1989	 0.7
1.0
0.8
5.5
1.2
0.0
-0.1
be very successful in supplying these goods) which were generally
cheaper and of better quality (Negreponti-Delivani, 1985, p. 263). In
addition to other emerging problems, Greece was beginning to lose its
one comparative advantage, that of cheap and abundant supply of
(unskilled) labour. Industrialisation was being based on the
importation of capital equipment from abroad, which embodied capital
intensive (or at least, labour saving) production techniques. The
result was that, despite the fact that the country was not facing
labour shortages at the time, Greece shifted to relatively labour
saving methods of production; had this adoption of labour saving
methods caused an increase in investment, the final impact would
probably have been an increased demand for labour in the long run and
the introduction of technology even in the short and medium run.
However, decreasing investment in the manufacturing sector greatly
reduced industry's labour absorptiveness,as we may see in the following
table2 .
Table II.C10: Growth of available labour force and manufacturing
employment 1961-1989.
Sources: 1) Eurostat, various issues.
2) Own calculations.
The fact that late comers to the development process have
the possibility of importing advanced technology from the already
industrialised countries can be both an advantage and a disadvantage,
as long as it means the adoption of production techniques not suitable
to their factor endowment. While certain countries like Japan managed
2
The growth of the availability of labour is measured according to
Cornwall (growth of total employment plus growth of agricultural
labour force).
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to consciously solve this problem by adapting imported capital
equipment to their surplus labour economy (Ranis, in Singh 1978, pp.
219-23.) and thus increasing the industrial sector's labour
absorptiveness, no such effort was made in Greece. The only reason why
Greece managed to achieve low rates of unemployment 3 , was that masses
of Greek population were migrating abroad over the whole period, helped
by the Greek government which signed bilateral agreements with many
Western European countries (especially Germany), seeing migration as a
"safety valve for unemployment" (Nikas, 1991), as long as Greek
industry seemed unable to create more job opportunities at a fast
enough rate and did not realize that, by doing so, it was voluntarily
sending away valuable human capital. After 1960, Greek industry
continued with this shift to capital intensive methods, as long as
migration had already produced relative shortages of labour and was
pushing wages upward (Negreponti-Delivani, 1985, p. 263), because of an
increasing bargaining power on the part of the workers. Therefore,
apart from the naturally low demand elasticity of the traditional goods
Greece was producing, the country lost its competitiveness because it
could not even produce them at lower prices than other less developed
countries producing similar goods.
In view of the above, the reactions of the Greek
entrepreneurs and their decision not to invest in the manufacturing
sector, no matter how large the funds which the banks (through the
government) were pressing on them in order to stimulate industrial
investment, seem very rational. Despite the high returns of investment
in the manufacturing sector (higher than in any other sector as we may
see in the following table), Greek investors preferred to invest in
housing, tourism and commercial activities (Ellis, 1965, p. 223). Also,
despite the fact that profits in industry are higher than what demand
for industrial products would justify (mainly because of the
3
Before 1981, Greek statistics defined unemployment as all those who
declared being out of work and were eligible for unemployment
benefits. The result was a considerable underestimation of
unemployment in official figures, since underemployment, part time
employment, unemployment of young people with no previous employment
etc. were not accounted for.Since 1981 (and after the accession of
Greece to the EC), the definition of unemployment includes all those
who declare unemployed.
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TOTAL
	
AGRICULTURE MANUFACTURING	 HOUSING
gross	 net
1961-65 3.64 2.99 4.60 2.31 16.10
1966-70 3.71 3.09 6.80 1.60 15.18
1971-75 5.56 4.62 5.76 3.14 15.18
substantial tax evasion and tax erosion), these are not reinvested but
hoarded or used for consumption of imported goods.
Table II.C11: Marginal Capital-output ratio per production sector.
Source: Negreponti-Delivani , 1985, p. 44.
A serious consequence of the development and consumption
pattern prevailing in the Greek economy is the structural deficit of
its trade balance. Even in the periods when Greece enjoyed high rates
of growth of exports, imports followed closely so that the gap between
the former and the latter remained the same or widened. One reason for
the high share of imports in Greece is the one just mentioned, that is,
the unequal income distribution, the low propensity to invest in
productive sectors (i.e. manufacturing) and the high profits of the
entrepreneurs, as well as high levels of hidden economic activities,
the combination of which leads to an increased propensity to import for
consumption purposes (Negreponti-Delivani, 1985). The other reason is
that Greece never managed to set the bases for heavy industry but left
it to the exploitation of foreign capital, orientating itself to light
industry, a few medium to large size manufacturing firms (mainly in
labour intensive sectors) being the exception. This resulted in the
long term dependence of Greek industrialisation on foreign capital and
explains why imports rise fast in the "golden decade" of Greek
industrialisation. In fact, Greece is a striking combination of an
exporter of consumer goods and importer of capital goods (Babanasis,
1985, p. 167). The fact that Greece, although running a structural
balance of trade deficit, never had any serious problems of financing
it (because of its invisible earnings) contributed to the dependence of
the economy from abroad and to the lack of any serious industrial
bases. Greece never tried to break its strong dependence on invisible
earnings which are considered to be a rather unstable and vulnerable to
exogenous shocks element of the balance of payments. Another indication
of Greece's dependence from abroad, is its dependence on foreign
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investment (Negreponti- Delivani, 1991).
In view of the reluctance of Greek entrepreneurs to invest
in branches of heavy industry, the encouragement of foreign industrial
investment which concentrates itself in the most dynamic sectors of the
economy, robbed Greek industry of any further chance for self sustained
growth. Domestic capital remained in the traditional and less
productive branches of the economy and when after 1973, foreign
investment declined in Greece, so did the growth rates of the economy
as a whole (Fotopoulos, 1985, p. 161).
The general conclusion is that, although in the post war
period, Greece seemed to follow the evolutions and structural changes
taking place in the Western European countries with only a slight time
lag, reality was quite different, in its case, because under the
surface of most of these changes, traditional and old fashioned
structures prevailed which prevented the economy from ever setting
strong bases for future growth. Economic policy which consisted mainly
of emergency measures and never seemed to have clear directives as to
the way the economic and industrial development of the country should
proceed (Tsoukalis, 1981, Fotopoulos, 1991), although it usually had a
correct grasp of the goals it was aiming at, certainly contributed to
this development. The heavy tariff protection of the 1950s was not
followed by any sort of decision as to the sectors and particular
industries and goods in the production of which the country should
concentrate in order to become competitive. Under the justification
that it was protecting the infant home industry, it permitted the
creation of a large number of non-viable industries and, giving way to
the pressures of big established firms, it enabled the development of
monopolistic elements which decreased the degree of competition in the
market and aided the prevalence of firms with high production costs.
This import substitution policy, based on heavy protection, suddenly
changed in 1961 with the EC agreement (after being initiated with the
devaluation of the drachma in 1953), which resulted in the country
facing strong foreign competition for which it had never been prepared.
The fact that remaining tariff protections mainly concerned
goods which were already being produced in Greece at the time, while
immediately abolished for any other goods, (tariffs for the former had
to be abolished at half the rate tariffs for the latter, according to
the Association agreement), in fact deprived the country of the chance
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to increase and expand its production possibilities under tariff
protection in the future and sent it deeper into dependence from
abroad. Apart from that, the fact that full employment had never
represented a primary goal of Greek economic policy contributed to the
massive migration of Greek population abroad and to the low labour
adsorptiveness of Greek industry. The non attainment of full employment
went hand in hand with high inflation rates, especially after 1974,
high degree of foreign dependence and inability for self sustained
growth.
D. THE PERIOD OF ECONOMIC RECESSION
1. The Characteristics of the Recession in Western Europe 
After 1973, the growth rates of Western European countries
started to decline, in relation to previous years. GDP growth rates
dropped to almost half of their post war values (from nearly 5% per
year in the period 1960-70 to 2.5% in the period 1973-79). Productivity
growth decelerated sharply and gave rise to high inflation rates or,
where drops in productivity and pressure for higher wages could not be
transmitted into higher prices, the share of profits declined
accordingly (Boltho, 1982, pp. 21-4). This resulted in unfavourable
expectations of entrepreneurs who proceeded to cut down on investment.
In fact, investment shares in GDP declined sharply after 1973, all over
Europe.
Table II.D1 Investment Ratios (%) in OECD countries 1950-1989
1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-73 1974-79 1980-89
Germany 20.5 23.4 24.5 23.6 24.4 21.2 20.4
Italy 20.2 24.1 27.0 23.8 23.3 20.0 21.3
U.K 13.2 15.3 17.7 20.3 20.3 18.8 17.2
Spain - 15.9 17.6 22.6 23.0 21.9 21.0
Netherlands 18.7 21.1 22.2 25.2 24.3 20.8 19.8
Sweden 17.5 19.1 21.4 22. 21.8 20.2 21.2
Switzerland 18.7 21.6 26.3 25.3 26.8 23.3 26.2
Greece - - 20.3 26.8 29.4 22.9 19.6
OECD EUROPE 17.3 19.9 22.3 23.2 23.7 21.5 20.8
Sources: 1) OECD, Main Economic Indicators, various issues.
2) The Greek Economy in Figures
The overall drop in productivity which characterises the
period after 1973, also resulted in a loss of competitiveness as far as
the external trade of the Western European countries was concerned.
Export growth rates declined leading to even lower investment rates,
especially in the manufacturing sector. In fact, in about the same way
as the manufacturing sector acted as an "engine of growth" of the
European economies in the post war period, it was to a large extent
responsible for the generalized structural recession which spread after
1973. The drop of investment rates in the manufacturing sector led to a
reduced demand for labour compared to the previous period and resulted
in a lower labour absorptiveness of the sector. Expansionary budget
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deficit Keynesian economic policies which were pursued by the
governments of the West European countries in an effort to prevent a
generalized recession could do little to stop inflation rates rising
together with unemployment rates and to solve the problem of the
resulting stagflation. Labour shed from the other two sectors drifted
into the tertiary, whose labour absorptiveness, although high, was
unable to cope with the rising labour supply, thus raising unemployment
rates.
Table D-2 Demand and Supply of Labour in the E.C.-12, 1950-1989
(Average Annual Percentage Changes)
1950-55 1955-65 1965-73 1973-79 1980-85 1986-89
Population of working age 0.6	 0.6	 0.4	 0.6	 0.7	 0.1
Labour Force	 0.7	 0.4	 0.2	 0.6	 0.7	 0.7
Total Employment	 1.0	 0.6	 0.1	 0.1	 -0.6	 1.4
Source: 1) Boltho, 1982, p.163
2) ILO, Annual Labour Statistics, various issues
This long term recession which characterizes the Western
European countries since 1973, seems to be related with the constantly
falling importance of the manufacturing sector both in terms of output
and employment. It is possible that the Kaldorian explanation of the
economic crisis, that is, that many Western European countries have
reached the point of "maturity", where further expansion of the
traditional manufacturing sector can only be achieved at the expense of
the rest of the economy, or that income elasticities of demand shift
consumer preferences away from manufactured goods and towards services,
may account for this stagnation of the manufacturing sector.
Furthermore, in terms of the strong backward and forward linkages of
the sector in question, which, for this reason is considered as the
"engine of growth" of a developing economy, this would account for the
general economic stagnation, after 1973, as far as many Western
European countries are concerned (Kaldor, 1966, Negreponti-Delivani,
1986).
Since the early 1980s, however, there have been some
indications that many European economies may be about to come out of
the crisis (the growth rates of GDP and investment are faster for the
period 1982-89 than for previous periods after 1973, as indicated by
the OECD country surveys). On the basis of the assumption that the
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economic recession was a recession of the manufacturing sector in
particular and that the "industrial era" may have come to an end, there
have been moves to enter a "post industrial stage", based on high
technology and services, which could help raise the competitiveness of
the Western European countries on the international level. It is
probably too soon, however, to comment on the success of this
enterprise.
2. The Symptoms of the Economic Recession in the Greek Economy
At first sight Greece seems in this case as well to follow
with a short time lag the evolutions in Western Europe. The economic
recession which came upon most of Western Europe after 1973 hit Greece
in 1974-1975. The symptoms of the crisis in Greece were not very
different from those in the Western European countries, although the
causes probably differ considerably. In any case, after 1974, the
growth rate of GDP and exports dropped sharply, although less than in
the E.C. countries over the same period, investment rates declined,
especially in the manufacturing sector, inflation rose and so did
unemployment, although for a variety of reasons, in the beginning at
least, it was lower both in terms of growth rates as well as levels,
than those prevailing in Western Europe. In the following table we may
see some of these evolutions:
Table II.D3 Evolution of GDP and Investment rates in Greece and
the EC countries(average annual % changes), 1966-1989.
GDP	 Gross Fixed Capital Investment
Greece EEC	 Greece	 EEC
	
1966-1973	 6.84	 4.33	 5.87	 3.42
	
1974-1989	 2.41	 2.21	 -0.4	 1.44
Sources: 1) The Greek Economy in Figures
2) Own calculations
There was also a marked worsening of the country's external
relations and current account deficit. One should keep in mind, though,
that while the economic crisis seems to have hit the Greek economy with
full force after 1974, this may be misleading. In fact, the
manifestation of the crisis in Greece coincides with the fall of the
military junta and the restoration of democracy in the country.
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The Western European economies attempted to deal with the
crisis by following the Keynesian recipes (although some governments
stated exactly the opposite) of strong governmental intervention in
order to boost effective demand, and for a long time, tried to achieve
a balance between an "acceptable" unemployment level and an
"acceptable" inflation level (Phillips, 1966). When governments,
however, were called upon to abandon their role of "night watchmen" and
intervene actively into the economies of the Western European countries
in order to circumvent a crisis, they apparently failed to do so. The
result was a slight shift, during recent years, on the part of some
West European countries to conservative governments, following
supply-side approaches for the economic issues and giving emphasis on
the role of the private sector as a means out of the continuing crisis.
In Greece, however, exactly the opposite evolutions took place. The
government which took over in 1974, after the restoration of democracy,
was a conservative one. It nevertheless, followed Keynesian demand
management policies (although it would be more correct to say that it
did not follow any kind of policy systematically, Roumeliotis, 1980,
pp. 71-6) and intervened strongly in important sectors of the economy.
The deceleration of the growth rates of GDP witnessed in 1974, was not
particularly alarming in itself. While it fell sharply (by 3.6%) in
1974 and rose by an average of 5.5% between 1975 and 1978, dropping
again to a rate of 3% in 1979, which is considerably lower than that
enjoyed by the economy in the years of economic prosperity (an average
of approximately 7.7%), it still rose faster than the GDP of the E.C.
countries over the same period. The latter rose by an approximate
average rate of 3% in the period 1975-78 and 2% in 1979 (op. cit., pp.
12 and 67). In the beginning, at least, official unemployment did not
represent a very severe problem either. The latter did not take on
alarming proportions, in the first place because of emigration and in
the second place, because even when repatriation started, the returning
migrants usually did not go into paid employment but preferred to go
into self-employment or services. In any case, while official figures
presented the unemployed as being 2.5% of the total active population
it is believed that the true figure was closer to 5% of the latter
Roumeliotis, 1980, p. 71). This discrepancy is largely due to the fact
that the method used to estimate unemployment (see footnote on page 70)
resulted in an underestimation of the latter (Dretakis, 1985,
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Negreponti-Delivani, 1991).
What was alarming, however, was the state of the private
sector and private investment in particular, after the manifestation of
the economic recession Especially after 1975, while total investment
continued to rise at satisfactory rates, investment in the
manufacturing sector witnessed a very sharp drop. Moreover, while the
ratio of private to public investment does not change much over the
period, as we may see from the following table, the share of private
investment going to the manufacturing sector drops constantly after
1974, while approximately 40% of total private investment was channeled
into housing.
The sharp drop of manufacturing investment resulted in an
even lower labour absorptiveness of the Greek industry. While in the
period 1973-85, the manufacturing sectors of most E.C. countries
managed to absorb approximately 45.3% of the total active population
and 46.7% of the wage earners, the Greek manufacturing sector barely
managed to absorb 26.3% of the total active population and 45.3% of the
wage earners (Roumeliotis, 1980, p. 99 and Fotopoulos, 1985). As
already mentioned, the causes of this extremely low absorptiveness in
labour of the Greek industry, may be found, apart from the low rates of
industrial investment, in the high dependency of the Greek economy in
general and Greek industry in particular on imported technology and
foreign patterns and methods of production, on the unequal income
distribution and structure of demand which favours mainly capital
intensive products and the lack of entrepreneurship among Greek
investors. In any case, it resulted in rising unemployment figures and
a fast expanding tertiary sector, as well as to a ratio of wage earners
to self employed which is the lowest in Europe (the share of
wage-earners in total civilian employment in Greece, was 45.4%, in
1988, compared to an EEC-12 average equal to 54.4%). The tertiary
sector managed to increase its share in output from 49.7% to 57%
between 1973 and 1988 and its share in employment from 35.6% to 46%
over the same period (National Accounts of Greece). While the various
Greek governments still officially declared to take a strong interest
in the country's industrialisation process, no effective measures were
taken to either suppress the emerging service character of the Greek
economy	 and	 efficiently	 promote	 industrial
	
development	 or
alternatively, to consciously promote a service-led growth alternative.
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Public investment was still largely channeled to infrastructure
projects while productive investment and economic restructuring was
largely left to the private sector whose unwillingness in this respect
has already been mentioned.
Table II.D4 private and public investment shares within total
investment, manufacturing and housing, 1965-88 (%)
TOTAL I
priv.	 pub.
Share
pub.	 I
Total
of priv.
in man.
priv.
and
pub
Share	 of	 priv.and
pub.	 I in housing
Total	 priv.	 pub
1965 71.5 28.5 14.29 19.6 0.78 31.5 43.5 1.4
1966 72.3 27.7 13.17 17.8 0.78 30.9 41.6 2.7
1967 68.9 31.1 12.16 17.3 0.54 28.0 39.6 2.2
1968 72.6 27.4 11.99 16.3 0.44 32.1 43.5 2.0
1969 71.3 28.7 11.75 16.4 0.17 32.3 44.7 1.8
1970 71.8 28.2 14.21 19.7 0.11 27.9 38.3 1.4
1971 68.4 31.6 13.90 20.0 0.50 29.3 41.6 2.7
1972 68.9 31.1 14.23 20.5 0.21 32.2 45.6 2.3
1973 72.1 27.9 14.44 19.9 0.32 30.5 41.8 1.2
1974 70.0 29.9 20.02 28.4 0.29 21.3 30.0 0.8
1975 71.9 28.1 17.58 24.2 0.47 27.4 37.5 1.4
1976 73.2 26.8 16.66 21.9 2.31 27.4 36.9 1.4
1977 77.6 22.4 14.65 18.5 1.07 30.7 39.1 1.3
1978 77.4 22.6 13.44 15.7 5.41 33.0 42.2 1.1
1979 77.0 23.0 13.94 17.0 3.47 31.8 40.9 1.4
1980 76.0 24.0 16.07 20.1 3.05 29.4 38.2 1.6
1981 74.0 26.0 16.29 19.8 3.28 25.0 32.7 2.8
1982 71.7 28.3 15.60 20.9 2.07 24.2 33.8 3.2
1983 67.4 32.6 14.70 21.9 1.33 25.4 36.6 2.2
1984 62.0 38.0 15.45 23.1 2.22 21.8 33.9 2.0
1985 60.0 39.8 13.43 19.9 3.60 20.7 33.0 2.1
1986 66.5 33.5 16.03 19.0 9.98 25.4 36.9 2.5
1987 73.4 26.6 18.9 22.5 3.24 28.1 37.1 3.3
1988 74.8 25.2 19.6 25.0 3.76 28.4 36.6 3.9
Sources: 1) The Greek Economy in Figures,
2) Own calculations.
In view of these unfavourable and uncertain evolutions as
far as, the industrial sector was concerned, the Greek government
proceeded, especially after 1975, to take over what is considered the
most important sector of a developing economy, in an attempt to set it
back on its feet.
Having, in the first place, acquired the control of the
largest part of the banking system through the ownership of the two
largest banks of the country, the National Bank and the Commercial Bank
of Greece (which in turn own a number of smaller banks), it followed a
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policy of continuous grants and loans towards the manufacturing sector
which, in the first place, made the already unequal income distribution
in Greece even more so, by shifting it in favour of profits (which, of
course, would have been all right if profits were re-invested). The
reason was that control of what finally became of them was not rigorous
enough, thus enabling entrepreneurs to cheat by not investing the whole
amount of money granted to them.
Through this policy towards the manufacturing sector, a
large number of firms (95% of which were characterised as small and
medium size establishments, that is, employing less than fifty
workers,in 1981) which were in permanent deficit and would certainly
not have been viable otherwise, were artificially sustained. While the
private sector was hastily retreating from investment in manufacturing,
as we may see from the falling share of private investment in
manufacturing within total private investment in table II.D-4, public
investment in manufacturing as a share in total public investment rose
from 1975 onwards, to three times its initial value of 1965 in 1976 and
to more than six times that value by 1978. Instead of closing down,
most low productivity, permanent deficit firms, passed into the
ownership of banks, as a result of their inability to pay back their
debts to them. This results in some of the larger banks acting as
investors and owners of firms and effectively controlling a large part
of the industrial sector, within the framework of a policy aiming at
restructuring the problematic firms. By intervening strongly with the
above policy measures, the government was trying to act as a substitute
for the private sector in manufacturing and was attempting, with
artificial means, to keep going a sector which had never put down
adequate means for a self sustained growth, let alone act as a leading
sector of the developing Greek economy. This policy, however, of
covering the deficits of non viable industrial firms with loans and
grants led to the acquisition of an enormous public debt, let alone
the fact that the strongly expansionary public policies led to high
inflationary pressures in the economy.
Between 1975 and 1978, the average annual rate of growth of
the consumer's price index was approximately 13% in Greece (against a
7-12% in the E.C. countries) (Roumeliotis, 1980, p. 14). Greece at the
time was both generating high inflation rates through the expansionary
economic policies it was following, as well as importing inflation from
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abroad by being so very dependent on imports, at a time when the rest
of Europe was also suffering from inflationary pressures. The inelastic
demand for imported goods is also indicated by the continuous
depreciation of the drachma vis a vis the dollar, all through that
period. In 1979, the economic situation in Greece deteriorated to such
an extent that the government was forced to, officially, abandon
expansionary economic policies and, for the first time, follow
restrictive ones, in an attempt to deal with both rising inflation and
a growing public debt. The problem of unemployment continued not to be
too serious, as long as the public sector managed to keep the figures
down by hiring more labour than absolutely necessary.
3. The Greek Economy in the 1980s 
The expansionary policies followed by the conservative
government, since 1975, were interrupted, in 1979, after the second oil
shock; in fact, the impact of the second oil shock, on the Greek
economy, was harder than that of the first one. By 1980, the
conservative government, therefore, officially, had to come up with a
very strict policy of austerity. This policy facilitated the Greek
Socialist party (Pasok) coming into power in 1981.
Pasok's economic policy was an expansionary one, at least
during the first years. In fact, this period was marked by an effort to
increase aggregate demand through incomes policies and by a rapid
expansion of the role of the public sector and government intervention,
in an attempt to restructure the country. The government had to cope
with the issue (already mentioned) of the "problematic firms"; in fact,
it went as far as nationalizing a number of them in (an unsuccessful,
as it proved to be) effort to make them profitable and competitive,
mainly in order to avoid the rise in unemployment which would result if
the latter were forced to close down. These firms though, persisted in
witnessing growing deficits, accelerating, therefore, the size of the
public debt. Productivity in the manufacturing sector was greatly
reduced, as long as excess labour was employed as a means of keeping
unemployment down. It is enough to note that the manufacturing sector
reduced its share in output from 21% in 1973 to 18.7% in 1988, while it
only reduced its share in employment from 18.9% in 1973 to 18.8% in
1988, which in itself implies that relative labour productivity must
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have fallen in the manufacturing sector over that period.
The aggressive policy of the new government as far as the
"reconstruction" of the manufacturing sector was concerned, resulted in
the private sector further retreating from investment in industry,
despite generous grants and incentives by the government (which, in
many cases offered to cover up to 60% of new investments) as well as by
the E.C. (e.g. the Integrated Mediterranean Programs).
Apart from the declared strong interest in the manufacturing
sector, although this was never followed by a sound development plan
for this sector, there were also some attempts to reconstruct the
agricultural sector, raise productivity and agricultural incomes and
help create some backward links for industry through the development of
agro-industrial cooperatives as well as restrict the role of middlemen
in the distribution of agricultural products. However, due in part to
the underdevelopment of cooperative movements in Greece, this was
another attempt not crowned by success.
As far as the external relations of the country, over the
period, were concerned, one should take into account the relatively
recent developments in the international division of labour and the
increasing role of the NICs (Hitiris, 1991, pp. 291-317). In this
respect,the situation was no better, because of the falling
competitiveness of Greek exports abroad and to rising imports, as well
as to a drop in invisible earnings caused, on one hand because of the
beginning of repatriation and on the other, because of the crisis in
the shipping industry. Despite the fact that tourist receipts kept
rising, this was not enough to prevent the surplus in the invisibles
account to cover a constantly smaller portion of the trade balance
deficit, as we may see from the current account deficit which grows
after 1973 (Table II.C-7).
The expansionary economic policies followed by the socialist
government during the first two years, coupled with the lack of the
necessary changes in the tax system (which, due to extremely high rates
of tax evasion, limits, by itself the main source of public revenue),
and in the country's production base, resulted in high rates of
inflation and the blowing of the public debt (both internal and
external) out of all proportion by 1985, as we may see in Graph D-1. It
has been argued (Fotopoulos, 1991) that the expansionary policy
followed by Pasok contributed to a sort of "debt led growth" which was
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mainly used to finance the maintenance and expansion of the consumption
standards, of a "consumer service society with no industrial base"
without doing anything to expand the productive capacity of the
country.
These negative evolutions forced the government to slow down
on the pursuit of its expansionary policies; a slight improvement of
the economy's main aggregates, around the end of 1983 allowed for a
repetition of the previously followed expansionary policies, until the
end of 1985. Generally speaking, one could say that there was a "stop
and go" economic policy pattern, in the early 1980s, determined by
economic, as well as non-economic, (e.g. elections) considerations.
1985, is a turning point for the Greek economy, since, it
marks the end of the strong "expansionary policy era". The 25% official
inflation rate followed by a sharp deterioration of the balance of
payments (partly due to the increase in imports caused by the increases
in disposable income as well as the drop in foreign exchange earnings
from tourism, following President Reagan's travel directive, in 1986)
was interpreted by the government as a sign that strict restrictive
policy should be employed. In relation to this point, one may note that
the implementation of the governmental decision was followed by a large
loan on the part of the EC, granted in the late 80s, on the condition
that the restrictive policy would be adhered to.
Although it is very difficult to distinguish the net effects
which the implementation of this decision had on the basic economic
aggregates of the country, it, nevertheless, resulted in a reduction of
the real income of wage earners and, consequently, in a drop of
effective demand for goods and services. It also seemed to temporarily
succeed in slightly reducing the public debt which, however, is still
enormously large, both as an absolute number as well as a share in GDP,
amounting to 7.9% of the latter in 1979, 42.4% in 1985 and 33.3% in
1989.
A temporary drop of imports was also observed, although a
large part of the devaluation of the drachma was outweighed by the
constant depreciation of the dollar in relation to most foreign
currencies over that period. Furthermore, from 1986 until 1989, a
declining inflation rate has been observed (the inflation rate measured
as the growth rate of the general consumer price index, was 19% in
1985, 23% in 1986 compared to an average of 3-4% in the other E.C.
83
Graph D-1:
REVENUE, EXPENDITURE AND
DEFICIT OF THE BUDGET
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
REVENUE
EXPENDITURE
•	
__
DEFICIT
countries and fell to around 12% in 1989, in Greece), although it is
hard to tell whether this was achieved because of the restrictive
policy and the relative drop in effective demand, as long as, for one
thing, it is not at all certain whether inflation, in Greece, is demand
pull or structural in nature. In any case, inflation rates, in 1988 had
dropped to almost half of what they were in 1985, although the
governmental aims at a one digit inflation rate have not been achieved
yet.
Apart from these evolutions, the country does not have to
face any serious balance of payments constraints or currency reserve
problems. This, however, is not due to an improvement of any of the
balances constituting the balance of current accounts, but to large
autonomous inflows of capital observe since 1985 in the country. In
fact, during the last few years, many among the most prosperous Greek
firms have been bought by foreign ones (mainly large Western European
multinationals), a fact contributing to the above evolution.
Further developments after 1989, will be examined in the
concluding chapter of the thesis.
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E. CONCLUSIONS
While it would seem at first sight that the economic
recession which came upon the countries of Western Europe after 1973
manifested itself in Greece with the same symptoms and the same causes
and explanations, the truth is quite different. Although the symptoms
of the recession were similar in both cases, i.e. declining importance
of the manufacturing sector, falling rates of investment, rising
unemployment, limited competitiveness on the international level, etc,
the causes for their appearance is totally different. The Western
European countries had all followed a similar pattern of growth at
about the same time, passing from agriculture to industry as leading
economic sectors, and from industry to high technology and services
when the growth potential of traditional industry, as such, had been
exhausted. The recession in Western Europe, therefore, could be
considered a recession of transition from one phase of capitalistic
expansion to another. It was a recession of "maturity" of one leading
sector giving its place to another. The recession was, in a way,
inevitable, as long as, for a variety of reasons which have already
been discussed, it was no longer possible to keep up the fast rates of
growth enjoyed in the 1960s on the basis of the expansion of industry.
The case of Greece, however, is very different. One cannot
possibly talk of "maturity" and "exhaustion of the growth potential of
industry" in the case of a country which never managed to industrialise
properly and based whatever industrialisation it was able to achieve on
strong protective measures, foreign capital, heavy dependency on
imports and strong governmental intervention, and in which, moreover,
the secondary sector was, at no point in time, larger than the
tertiary. The recession in Greece and the expansion of the tertiary
sector does not represent a recession of transition from one leading
sector to another, for apart from anything else, Greece never really
possessed any truly leading sectors. The ingredients of the economic
recession in Greece, existed even during the years of economic
prosperity of the country. They could be found in its non integrated
economic structure, the absence of significant linkages between
sectors, the distorted structure of demand and income distribution, the
heavy dependency from abroad which resulted in any industrial expansion
and export growth to cause a corresponding rise in imports and a crash
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of the balance of payments, etc. The fact that these pre-existing
elements only became apparent at about the same time when Western
Europe was plunged into a economic recession for entirely different
reasons, is the result of the combination of a set of domestic (the
fall of the junta and the restoration of democracy, the beginning of
repatriation etc.) and international (membership in the E.C., rising
importance of the NICs, etc.) coincidences. Furthermore, the acceptance
of the fact that the economic recession in Greece is caused by a
totally different set of factors than in Western Europe, easily leads
to the conclusion that any policy aimed at recovering from the
recession should be based on entirely different directives in each
case.
It should have become obvious from the above analysis that
many of the particular characteristics of manufacturing industry taken
for granted by Kaldor and which appear to be necessary for the
applicability of the Kaldorian theory, were absent from the Greek
manufacturing sector, during both the period of fast economic growth of
the country as well as that of economic recession, until today. In
particular:
1) Domestic demand for domestic manufactured goods was always
characterised by a relatively low elasticity, since:
-wage earners, who represent the group with the most elastic demand
for manufacturing products, constitute a very small percentage of total
employment, in relation to self-employed, compared to the other Western
European countries;
-the prevailing tax-system limits the purchasing power of even this
small percentage of wage-earners;
-the prevailing consumption pattern (as well as relative prices)
results in a marked preference for imported rather than domestic
manufactured goods.
2) For reasons already mentioned, both domestic and export demand for
Greek manufactured products was also characterised by a low elasticity.
3) For a variety of reasons, the Greek manufacturing sector was
characterised by a low demand and absorptiveness of labour, even in a
period when the latter was plentiful (and when, therefore, the
Kaldorian "scenario" of the second law, based on availability of
labour, could be applicable).
4) As a consequence of 3), which resulted in mass migration abroad, the
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pool of available labour to manufacturing shrank, with the result that
the Greek manufacturing sector was faced with relative shortages (this
case implying a possible shift from Kaldor's to Rowthorn's-labour
constrained specification of the second law, see chapter I). These
labour shortages led to a further substitution of capital for labour,
especially obvious after 1973, when the returning migrants preferred to
seek employment in the tertiary sector rather than get a job in
manufacturing, for which they were perhaps not even suited any longer,
since they had been trained to the different requirements of Western
European manufacturing industries.
5) As a consequence of the above, the capital/labour ratio in the Greek
manufacturing sector was not stable, over the period 1960-1988. On the
contrary, the production process was characterised by either relatively.
more labour intensive or more capital intensive methods, for different
time periods.
On the basis of these observations, therefore, one could
argue that the Greek manufacturing sector could not have been an engine
of growth for the economy, in any sense of the word, let alone the
Kaldorian meaning attributed to it and that, therefore, the application
of the Kaldorian theory to it would run into some difficulties.
Having examined certain particular features of the economic
structure and development of Greece, we shall now, attempt to combine
the preceding two chapters, by proceeding with the empirical
investigation of the applicability of the Kaldorian growth theory, in
the case of Greece.
CHAPTER III
AN ECONOMETRIC INVESTIGATION OF THE
APPLICABILITY OF KALDOR'S GROWTH
LAWS TO THE GREEK ECONOMY
88
A. METHODOLOGY
Following the presentation of Chapter I, dealing with the
Kaldorian growth theory and Chapter II, consisting of an analysis of
the Greek economy and its particularities, it would, be rather
interesting, now, to combine them both, in an empirical application of
the theory to the particular case of Greece.
Our attempt at investigating empirically what happened and
what could happen to the Greek economy and the Greek industry in
particular, in the future, proceeds in a series of steps. The first
step is to assess how far the three Kaldorian laws are applicable to
the Greek case, and whether manufacturing did represent an engine. of
economic growth, at least to the extent it did for other countries.
If the answer to the above question was found to be
negative or ambiguous, the second step would be to see whether the
laws could be applicable to some other sector, with, possibly, the
potential to behave as a leading sector, on its own or in a
complementary way to manufacturing industry.
The Kaldorian theory was built on the importance of the
manufacturing sector, based on certain features very particular to the
latter which, it was believed that no other sector could posses. A
possible non applicability (absolute or partial) of the Kaldorian laws
to the Greek industry could not serve as a basis for substituting some
other sector for industry and proceed to derive the same results that
Kaldor derived for the manufacturing sector. However, an
ambiguous or doubtful applicability of the laws and of the first one
in particular (this being, mainly, due to data availability and
reliability, as well to the particular importance of the first law
as far as engine of growth considerations are concerned), to the Greek
case, could serve as an indication of the relative failure of
industrialisation, when, moreover, it represented the primary goal set
by economic policy over the whole post war period.
One should also take into account the possibility that the
application of the Kaldorian theory, in Greece, may not yield the
expected results (that is, results corresponding to those found in
other countries), not because of the failure of the manufacturing
sector to perform as a growth engine, but because the theory was not
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designed for countries with the particularities of Greece. It is,
nevertheless, plausible to think that if industrialisation had, in
fact, succeeded in Greece, the manufacturing sector would present
certain features (e.g. dynamic economies of scale, high labour
absorptiveness, etc) which might be apparent in the estimated results.
Furthermore, a relative non-applicability of the Kaldorian
laws to the Greek manufacturing sector, in combination with the
structural particularities of the Greek economy which were described
above, could serve as a starting point for an attempt to identify, if
possible, certain "Kaldorian" characteristics, usually attributed
solely to manufacturing, in some other sector of the economy, which
had not enjoyed the favours bestowed upon industry. The existence of
analogous features in an economic activity other than manufacturing,
could be an indication that economic policy was somewhat misguided, in
that respect. As far as future perspectives are concerned, it would,
perhaps, suggest that:
-
not all of the resources of the economy should be concentrated in
sustaining a sector that, would seem unable to stand on its own;
-
certain efforts should be undertaken to further organize and develop
a sector which would seem to have a greater growth potential, even if
(most probably) this is simply the result of the relative failure of
the manufacturing sector (negative de-industrialisation: Rowthorn and
Wells, 1987).
This does not imply that no further expansion of the
manufacturing sector should take place, but that, perhaps, it should
no longer represent the primary economic goal, especially at a time
when the country would have very little hope (in relation to the
1960s) of becoming competitive in this field, given international
evolutions.
The second section of this chapter, consists of an
application of the three Kaldorian growth laws to the manufacturing
sector of Greece. The estimation period used is 1963-88. However,
given that the world-wide economic recession of 1973-74 had strong
implications for the Greek economy, as well, a time dummy variable was
included in the regressions, where statistically significant, for the
period 1974-88, when the difficulties facing the economy, as a whole,
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started to become obvious 1.
In the third section of this chapter, the three growth
laws are extended to the other two sectors of the Greek economy,
namely agriculture, and services. The fourth section consists of an
application of the first law to the Greek tourist sector, testing the
initial intuition, in an attempt to pinpoint a potential alternative
to manufacturing, as an engine of growth, in the particular case of
Greece. The application of only the first law to tourism may be
justified on the basis of: 1) an almost complete lack of employment
data on tourism, which prevents the application of the remaining two
laws, an observation which does not apply only to the Greek tourist
sector, but, also, to the tourism sectors of many countries; 2) the
main objective of the thesis, to question the proposition that
manufacturing acted as an engine of growth in the case of Greece. It
is argued that a sufficient condition for the engine of growth
hypothesis is the validity of the first Kaldorian law (Bairam, 1991,
p. 1277).
The fifth section of this chapter consists of an
application of the three growth laws to the three economic sectors of
Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal, using pooled time series and
cross-section data, in an attempt to determine: 1) whether mainly, the
manufacturing and service sectors, of the Greek economy are in some
sense "different" from those corresponding sectors to the other three
countries and 2) whether the application of the Kaldorian theory to
less developed countries (The E.C. Mediterranean countries, in this
case) yields different estimates in relation to the original ones
found by Kaldor in his sample of industrial countries. The use of a
different estimation method than the simple time-series analysis used
in the first two sections of the present chapter, in relation to the
Kaldorian theory can also be seen as derived from some doubts on the
part of numerous authors (see chapter I, criticisms of the three
1
A recursive residuals one step Chow test scaled by critical values at
the 5% probability level was performed in order to justify the
introduction of the dummy variable at 1974. The corresponding graph
indicated that there actually was a break at observation 12 (year
1974), for most of the data series of the variables included in the
regressions of this chapter.
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laws), concerning the possible relative unreliability of the estimates
when time series data are used. The other three countries of the
sample, namely Italy, Spain and Portugal (where possible, on the basis
of data availability) were chosen because they present the greatest
resemblance to Greece, in terms of general economic structure, level
of development etc.
Section F of the present chapter consists of a series of
Sims-Granger causality tests between the various sectors and
sub-sectors of the Greek secondary and tertiary sectors, in an attempt
to determine the direction of the causal links, if any exist, between
them.
B. TESTING THE KALDORIAN THEORY
In the following equations, as well as in the whole of the
present chapter, AUTO indicates that there was an attempt to correct
the residual autocorrelation indicated by the value of the Durbin
Watson (D.W) statistic, by re-estimating the relevant equation using
Autoregressive Least Squares. In all the cases where this estimation
method (rather than OLS) was used, the R2 presented is calculated as
the square of the correlation coefficient between actual and predicted
values of the dependent variable and serves purely as a measure of the
goodness of fit of the estimated equation, since the normally used R
2
is biased and, therefore, invalid when autocorrelation is present.
The variables included in the following equations are all
expressed in average annual growth rates (constant prices) and are:
GDP=Gross National Product
GDPA=Output of the agricultural sector
GDPM=Output of the manufacturing sector
GDPS=Output of the service sector
GDPT=Output of the Tourist sector
NM=manufacturing output growth minus non-manufactring output growth
NT=tourism output growth minus non-tourism output growth
EMPA=Employment in agriculture
EMPM=Employment in manufacturing
EMPS=Employment in services
PA=Productivity in agriculture (measured as GDPA-EMPA)
PM=Productivity in manufacturing (measured as GDPM-EMPM)
PS=Productivity in services (measured as GDPS-EMPS)
T= Shift Time Dummy where: T=0 for 1963-73 and
T=1 for 1974-88
TEMPM= Slope time Dummy defined as T*EMPM (T as above).
TNM=T*NM
TNT=T*NT
TGDPT=T*GDPT
1 Kaldor's First Law
One would normally expect a rapidly growing country whose
GDP is increasing at an annual average rate of approximately 7% until
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the first oil shock in 1973, (as was the case of Greece in the decade
1960-1970) and which, furthermore is draining its economy in order to
speed up industrialisation, to present a higher correlation between
GDP growth and the growth of its manufacturing output than other,
already developed economies, especially when its starts out from a
lower development and income level (Ch. I, p. 23) and is trying to
catch up with them. In that respect, the application of, especially,
the first law in the case of Greece, would be of particular interest.
Kaldor's original cross section estimates of 12 OECD economies over
the period 1952-1965, yield an R2 of approximately 0.9 as far as the
first law is concerned. In the case of Greece, time series analysis
2
over the period 1963-1988 yields a considerably lower R, as we may see
in the following regression, which represents the estimated equation
for the Greek manufacturing sector.
GDP=a+bGDPM
Constant	 GDPM	 T
Coefficient	 3.22	 0.39	 -1.52
T-ratio	 2.50	 3.89	 1.26
R
2
=0.75
F=35.5
D.W=1.91
As we may derive from the estimated coefficients, a 1% increase
in the growth rate of manufacturing output is associated with 0.4%
increase in the growth rate of GDP, during the period 1963-88. The
size of the coefficient of manufacturing output is rather low, with
respect to estimates of the first law for other countries, although
still larger than could be explained by the share of the manufacturing
sector in GDP, as long as the latter was equal to 17% in 1960, 21% in
1973 and 18% in 1986. However, the fit of the estimated equation is
not as good as one might have expected, with a correlation coefficient
of less than 0.8. While the time dummy is not statistically
significant in the above equation, it has not been omitted in order to
enable the tests presented in the second section of the present
chapter. A similar test for the applicability of the first law can be
carried out by regressing the rate of growth the excess of
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manufacturing over non-manufacturing output on the growth rate of GDP
(see ch. I, section 1.2). The estimated coefficients may be seen in
the following Table.
GDP=a+bNM
Constant
	 NM
Coefficients
	 7.72	 0.01	 -5.25
T-ratios	 8.30	 0.09	 4.53
R
2
=0.59
F=16.87
D.W.=1.59
If the first law were true, one should notice a strong
correlation between the excess of the growth of manufacturing over
non-manufacturing output and GDP growth (Ch. I, section 1.2). In the
above case, however, the coefficient of NM is very low and
statistically non significant, at the 95% significance level.
Although testing the first law in the case of Greece
proved to be much easier. on the basis of the available statistical
data than the other two laws, both of which require the use of
sectoral employment data which are much harder to find and less
reliable than output data, the estimation of the second and third
laws, in the case of the greek manufacturing sector, gave the
following results:
2. Kaldor's Second Law
First specification: PM=a+bGDPM
Constant	 GDPM
Coefficients	 -0.04	 0.74
T-ratios	 0.07	 10.25
R
2
=0.81
F=105.09
D.W.=1.47
AUTO
Coefficients	 0.27	 0.71
T-ratios	 0.33	 7.94
R
2
=0.81
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Second specification: EMPM=a+bGDPM
Constant GDPM
Coefficients 0.04 0.25
T-ratios 0.07 3.43
R
2
=0.32
F=11.79
D.W.=1.47
AUTO
Coefficients -0.27 0.28
T-ratios 0.33 3.09
R
2
=0.36
One will notice, from the above table, that while both
productivity growth and employment growth are positively correlated
with output growth in manufacturing, the coefficient for output growth
in the second specification of the Verdoorn law is much lower than in
the first specification, that is, output growth is closer correlated
with productivity growth than with employment growth in the Greek
manufacturing industry. A rise of one unit in the growth of
manufacturing output implies a rise of 0.7 units in the growth of
productivity but of only 0.3 units in employment growth2 . One could
see this as yet another indication of manufacturing's low labour
absorptiveness in Greece, even in a period when manufacturing output
was growing rapidly. Because of the low growth of manufacturing
employment all through the period examined, one could argue that the
above regressions are spurious, as long as, in this case, as mentioned
in Chapter I, in the first specification of the law, output growth is,
in fact, regressed on itself (productivity growth being measured as
output growth minus employment growth). Furthermore, one should keep
in mind the points made on page 86 of chapter II relatively to the
applicability of the Verdoorn's law, in particular, to the Greek
2
One will notice that the coefficient for manufacturing output, in
both specifications of the Verdoorn's law is outside the limits stated
by Hildreth (1988), where 0.41<b<0.57, b being the coefficient of
manufacturing output.
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economy
3
.
3. Kaldor's Third Law
GDP=a+bEMPM
Constant	 EMPM
Coefficients	 6.41
	 0.49	 -4.28
T-ratios	 5.08	 3.06	 5.08
R
2
=0.71
F=28.44
D.W.=1.88
It seems that, according to the above estimates, the Kaldorian
line of thought, that the faster labour moves into manufacturing from
other (less productive) economic sectors, the faster is the growth of
total output, and productivity, is valid in the case of Greece. One
should keep in mind, that while the manufacturing sector, in Greece,
had large supplies of unskilled labour available, in the early to
mid-60s, it started facing relative shortages of (skilled) labour in
the 1970s, largely due to mass emigration to Western European
countries (mainly West Germany). This could, partly, serve as an
explanation for the validity of the third law over the estimation
period.
On the basis of these results, especially as far as the
first law is concerned which is of particular interest in the present
analysis, both as far as the economic history of Greece as well as
future alternatives and perspectives for the economy are concerned, it
3
In view of these reservations as to the applicability of Kaldor's
specification of the second law to the Greek manufacturing sector and
furthermore, in view of the possibility that output growth in the
Greek manufacturing industry may have been relatively labour
constrained after 1974, Rowthorn's specification of the second law was
also estimated in this case, yielding the following results:
Pm= 3.83 + 0.09empm	 R2=0.36
(1.56) (0.29)
The above regression was estimated using autoregressive least squares
to correct 1st order autocorrelation which was initially present in
the residuals. The results are rather poor, indicating no association
between productivity growth and employment growth in Greek
manufacturing, for the period 1963-88 (The dummy variables for 1974-88
were not significant in this case).
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would be interesting to compare the applicability of the three
Kaldorian laws in the Greek manufacturing sector, to that in the other
two economic sectors in Greece, before going on to comparisons with
other countries which started out at a, more or less, similar
development level such as Italy, Spain and Portugal. In fact, one
could argue that the above results may be due to the type of analysis
used or to the existing differences in development levels between
Greece and the Western European economies included in Kaldor's initial
sample.
C. BEYOND KALDOR'S LAWS: MODIFICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS -
COMPARISONS BETWEEN ECONOMIC SECTORS.
Taking into account the particular characteristics of the
Greek economy, among others:
-
the still very high importance of the agricultural sector (especially
as far as its share in total employment is concerned);
-
the low importance of the manufacturing sector both in output and
employment, despite the high rates of growth enjoyed by the economy in
the period 1960-70;
-
the "premature" overexpansion of the tertiary sector (premature, in
accordance with the belief (Clark, 1950), that the main part of the
service sector expands at a later stage, in relation to manufacturing
and in response to the latter's development and decline, at much later
stages of development);
-high levels of hidden economy and tax evasion etc,
it seemed tempting to start by investigating the applicability of the
three Kaldorian laws in other economic sectors apart from
manufacturing, such as agriculture and services.
The following Table shows the results of the application
of the three laws in the greek agricultural and service sectors.
1. Kaldor's First Law
GDP=a+bGDPsector where GDPsector=output of the agricultural, service
and manufacturing sector accordingly.
It is possible to see, in the following table that, while
the growth of both agricultural and service output are positively
correlated with total GDP growth all through the period 1963-88, the
coefficient for agriculture is rather low (0.13). One notices that the
coefficient of service sector output is rather large and that the R2
related to services is higher than for either agriculture or
manufacturing. Furthermore, as in the case of manufacturing, the
1973-74 recession does not seem to affect the impact service sector
growth has on GDP growth.
Constant
7.19
10.49
GDPA	 T
0.13	 -4.93
2.22	 5.80
Coefficient
T-ratios
R
2
=0.66
F=22.95
D.W.=1.55
Constant	 GDPS
Coefficients	 -1.69	 1.26
T-ratios	 2.40	 10.05
R
2
=0.80
F= 101.00
D.W.=2.14
The fact that the importance of services in relation to GDP
growth is not even higher than indicated, in the case of Greece, could
very possibly be due to a general problem concerning official Greek
data, and more particularly the output of the service sector which is
most probably grossly underestimated especially after 1973, because of
the rapidly rising level of the output of hidden economic activities4.
The fact that hidden economic activities are mainly related to the
service sector could be an explanation for the fact that the
correlation between GDP growth and the growth of service output is not
even greater. One should note, that the Kaldorian hypothesis that the
coefficient of service output is not statistically different from one,
is not accepted, on the basis of the above estimates. The test of the
hypothesis takes the following form:
A	 A	 A
H0:b=1,H1:b1,  b-1
= t, n-2
A
sb
1.26-1 
Consequently,	 -2.07, which is larger than the critical value of0.124
t (1.71).
4
Three studies that attempted to measure the level of the hidden
economy, in Greece, estimated its output as being 25%-40% of official
GDP (Pavlopulos, 1987 and Delivani, 1989, 1991).
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From the following table, where the estimated coefficients
of both equations of the Verdoorn law are shown, it is possible to
observe that, as far as the agricultural sector of Greece is
concerned, the growth of output seems to explain adequately, at first
sight, the growth of productivity, over the whole estimation
period, and the size of the coefficient indicates the existence of
constant returns to scale. However, as one might have expected,
agricultural output growth and employment in agriculture are
negatively correlated, as one may see from the second specification of
the law. Growth in agricultural output (and productivity) requires a
drop in agricultural employment. The time dummy is significant only as
far as the shift coefficient is concerned; apparently, after 1974,
autonomous productivity growth in agriculture as well as the
autonomous rate at which agricultural employment was dropping, were
both lower than in the period 1963-73.
2. Kaldor's Second Law
First specification: Psector=a+bGDPsector where: Psector=productivity
of each of the three sectors accordingly.
Constant	 GDPA
Coefficients	 3.61	 1.08	 -2.18
T-ratios	 4.42	 14.92	 2.15
R=
20.91
F=125.5
D.W.=2.59
Constant
	
GDPA
AUTO
Coefficients
	 3.87
	
1.02	 -2.40
T-ratios	 5.39
	
10.08	 2.80
R
2
=0.92
Constant	 GDPS
Coefficients	 -65.13	 8.70
T-ratios	 1.19	 0.90
R
2
=0.03
F=0.81
D.W.=1.15
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AUTO
Coefficients	 -20.20
	
3.70
T-ratios	 0.84
	
1.01
R
2
=0.19
Second Specification: EMPsector=a+bGDPsector
Constant
	
GDPA
Coefficients	 -3.61	 -0.08	 2.18
T-ratios	 -4.42	 -1.21	 2.15
R
2
=0.3
F=0.78
D.W.=2.59
Constant
	
GDPA
AUTO
Coefficients	 -3.87	 -0.02	 2.40
T-ratios	 5.39
	
0.28	 2.80
R
2
=0.32
Constant	 GDPS
Coefficients	 65.13	 -7.72
T-ratios	 1.19	 -0.79
R
2
=0.02
F=0.64
D.W.=1.15
Constant
	
GDPS
AUTO
Coefficients	 20.20	 -2.70
T-ratios
	
0.84	 0.74
R
2
=0.18
The Verdoorn law, on the other hand, does not seem to
apply to the Greek service sector. The coefficient of service output
growth is statistically non-significant in both specifications of the
second law and the correlation coefficients are very low in both
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cases. On the basis of the above results, it would seem that
increasing returns of scale are not present in either agriculture or
services in Greece (and are rather low in manufacturing). However,
especially were the service sector is concerned, one could argue that
the estimated coefficients of the Verdoorn law equation are highly
unreliable, for a number of reasons.
The first one (more extensively described in the
concluding chapter of the present thesis) concerns the argument that
quality considerations, which are an integral part of productivity in
services, are not taken into account, as long as only quantity
measures of productivity (in this case, output growth minus employment
growth) enter into the estimation of the second law. In the second
place, when estimating the second law, one does not take into account
the very high concentration of hidden economic activities in the
tertiary sector, in Greece, with the result that employment growth,
output growth and, consequently, productivity growth all tend to be
biased downwards, and not necessarily equally. The third, and perhaps
most important reason is that services include many kinds of
activities, many of which have a very low productivity, but
they especially include public services. In the case of public
services, employment, to a very large extent, grows independently of
output. Employment in the Greek public sector, is in a sense
"protected" from cyclical fluctuations and recessions. Especially
after the beginning of repatriation, state policies involved an
increased availability of jobs in the public sector, in order to
avoid the problem of unemployment, given the low labour
absorptiveness of manufacturing. With the public sector forming an
increasing share of GDP in the postwar years, and especially after
1973, it is probably true that when the growth rate of service output
decreased after 1973, employment kept increasing at more or less
pre-1973 rates. In fact, if one looks at the data on output and
employment growth in services, over the period 1963-88, it is possible
to see that an average growth rate of service output equal to 6.65% in
the period 1963-73 corresponded to a 2.10% rise in service employment
over the same period, while a 3.57% average growth rate of service
output in the period 1974-88 corresponds to an average growth of
service employment equal to 2.65% It would be worth while to estimate
the second law for the private service sector only. Unfortunately
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however, Greek employment data are available only for the whole of the
service sector (public plus private).
Apart from the problems mentioned above, concerning the
reliability of the estimates of the second law in all three sectors of
the Greek economy, but especially services, another reason why the
results may not be indicative, is that a time series analysis is used
while, it is suggested, that a cross section one would have been more
appropriate. It is argued that a time series analysis of the second
law may pick up the effect of Okun's law (cyclical variations in
employment and output in each country over time) rather than
Verdoorn's law, while it seems that the first and, to a certain
extent, the third law face this problem to a much lesser degree, if at
all.
3 Kaldor's Third Law.
According to the estimated coefficients in the following
table, employment growth in the Greek agricultural sector, is
negatively, although not statistically significantly, correlated with
total GDP growth. In the Greek service sector, on the other hand, the
correlation between employment and GDP growth is positive and
statistically significant, up to 1973. After that, as indicated by the
sign and significance of the slope dummy, the correlation between
employment growth in services and total GDP is reduced almost to 0.
This could be attributed, in part, to the increasing degree of hidden
economic activities and underemployment in the Greek service sector,
after 1974 largely due to the rapid increase in service employment, as
long as most returning migrants as well as those who could not find
employment in manufacturing ended up in the tertiary sector. In fact,
the apparent breakdown of the third law after 1973, in services may be
an indication of the "parasitic" nature of a large part of the service
sector, in Greece, whose large employment share is, in great part, the
consequence of the low labour absorptiveness of the manufacturing
sector rather than the result of the service sector's large labour
requirements. Also, the points mentioned in relation to the second
law, concerning the high concentration of employment in public
services (a large part of which is, consequently, underemployed) apply
in this case as well.
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GDP=a+bEMPsector
Constant EMPA T
Coefficients
T-ratios
R
2
=0.61
F=18.08
D.W.=1.67
7.05
7.05
-0.18
0.99
-4.88
4.87
Constant EMPS TEMPS
Coefficients
T-ratios
R2=0.59
F=17.56
D.W.=1.46
2.36
3.80
2.54
5.75
-2.53
5.75
Constant EMPS TEMPS
AUTO
Coefficients
T-ratios
2.23
2.98
2.57
4.65
-2.56
4.65
R
2
=0.62
D.W.=1.50
105
D. KALDOR'S FIRST GROWTH LAW AND THE GREEK TOURISM SECTOR
The estimates of the three Kaldorian laws presented in the
previous section, indicate a particular behaviour of the Greek service
sector; especially on the basis of the first law estimates, since the
application of the other two laws to services run into a series of
problems, already mentioned above which cast doubt on their
reliability, the Greek service sector appears to be of particular
importance for the economy, during a period when great efforts were
undertaken in order to sustain the industrial sector. It would be
worth while, therefore, to take a closer look at the Greek tertiary
sector in comparison to the other two economic sectors.
In the first place it would be interesting, to break down
the service sector to the activities composing it and look at their
relation with the growth of the economy as a whole. In fact, if one
were to argue that services could act as an alternative (or
complementary) engine of growth to manufacturing, it would be useful
to try and specify the kind of services which could have the potential
to take on this role, as it is well known that a lot of very different
activities are included under the heading of "services".
Due to serious difficulties in breaking down the service
sector and finding reliable data over a relatively long time period,
for the time being only tourism is included in the analysis and only
with respect to the first Kaldorian law, because of a lack of
employment data on tourism. The results, however, proved to be very
interesting and worth doing some further work on the importance of the
tourist sector for Greece, among other things, constructing some
proxies or indices of its importance where data are not available, not
to mention improving the data collection system for the sector in
question.
Tourism certainly represents an activity where Greece has
a comparative advantage over other countries. Among other features
which will be more extensively discussed in chapters IV and V, it
constitutes a special kind of export activity where demand factors are
particularly important (demand for tourism is believed to be highly
income and price elastic). It also has the advantage of bringing fast
and large earnings in foreign currency, thus alleviating the problem
of balance of payments constraints and freeing economic resources for
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other uses.
One could also say that it is an activity more suited to
the habits and way of life of the Greek people who are put off by the
hard and restrictive working conditions of paid industrial employment
and seem to prefer self employment and employment in services. One
problem with seeing tourism as a potential leading sector would be the
weakness of any backward and forward linkages between this sector and
the rest of the economy. It has been argued, however, that tourism's
absorptiveness in labour is quite high (see Ch. IV, section 2). On the
other hand, one could argue that the particular development pattern of
the Greek manufacturing sector was unable to create strong
linkages between it and the rest of the economy anyway, as indicates
the absence of any significant intermediate goods industry. One could
then argue that the matter amounts to a choice between the relative
comparative advantages of the two sectors. In any case, the
application of Kaldor's original first equation to the tourist
industry, gives impressive results, especially in the second period
1974-1988, when the importance of tourism for GDP growth rises above
that of the manufacturing sector, as we may see in the following
regressions.
GDP=a+bGDPT
Constant	 GDPT	 T	 TGDPT
Coefficients 8.71 -0.10 -7.31 0.60
T-ratios 6.51 0.74 5.16 3.42
R
2
 =0.81
F=32.12
D.W.=1.72
In the above estimates one notices that the application of
the first Kaldorian equation to the Greek tourism sector appears to
have a very good fit. Both shift and slope time dummies are
significant, indicating that the importance of tourism for GDP growth
increases significantly after 1974. In fact, the coefficient for
output growth in the tourism sector rises from -0.10 in the period
1963-1973, to 0.5 in the period 1974-1988, while the proportion of GDP
growth not explained by tourism drops from 8.71, in the first period,
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to 1.4, in the second one. This is perfectly in line with the fact
that, as we shall see in Chapter V, the Greek tourism sector only
started to grow into one of particular importance for the economy, in
the late 60s, early 70s. It would appear that the regression on
tourism has, in fact, a better fit than the one corresponding to the
Greek manufacturing sector s . The fit of the first law applied to the
Greek tourist sector, in relation to the corresponding one related to
manufacturing, seems even more interesting and impressive if one keeps
in mind that during the period 1974-88, the manufacturing sector
represented, on average, approximately 17%-18% of GDP while the
tourist sector only 4%-5%.
5
It has been argued in a recent paper (Bairam, 1991, pp. 1277-80)
that the regression of sector output on total output may be spurious
because sector output is a part of total output. In order to
counteract this, Bairam regresses manufacturing output growth on the
growth of 1) agricultural output and 2) service output, in his
application of the first law to Turkey, and concludes that
manufacturing did play the role of growth engine. The specification by
Bairam, applied to Greece, for the period 1963-88, gave the following
results:
GDPA= 1.82 + 0.14GDPM R
2
=0.01	 F=0.38	 D.W.=2.5
(0.91)	 (0.61)
	
GDPS= 4.48 + 0.25GDPM - 1.6T 	 R
2
=0.83	 F=58.07	 D.W.=1.48
(5.94)	 (4.33)	 (2.31)
However, in the above, the implicit assumption that the direction of
causality runs from manufacturing to the other economic sectors is
rather arbitrary. If one regresses eg. service output growth on
manufacturing output growth and extends the above specification of the
first law to tourism, one gets the following results:
GDPM= -4.97 + 2.15GDPS
	
R2=0.79	 F=93.7	 D.W.=2.01
(3.96) (9.67)
GDPM= 12.32 - 0.09GDPT -11.98T +CATTGDPT R 2=0.81 F=32.4 D.W.=1.93
(5.36)	 (0.37)	 (4.92)	 (2.75)
GDPA= 1.96 + 0.15GDPT
	
R
2
=0.01	 F=0.29	 D.W.=2.5
(1.00) (0.54)
GDPS= 3.31 + 0.36GDPT
	
R
2
=0.56	 F=31.08	 D.W.=1.57
(7.25) (5.57)
The above results, corroborate the conclusions drawn in this chapter,
as well as the results of the causality tests in section F.
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Model 1 vs Model 2 Form	 Test	 Form Model 2 vs model 1
-1.63
1.358
1.455
1.48
[0.236]
N(0,1)	 Cox	 N(0,1)
N(02 1) 	 Ericson IV N(02 1)
Chi (1)Sargan	 Chi (2)
F(1,21)	 Joint Model F(2,21)
Probability
-4.85
3.479
6.65
4.274
[0.0277]
The growth rate of tourism output is measured as the
growth rate of receipts from tourism in constant prices and,
therefore, the variable may be underestimated, since, among other
possible measurement errors (eg. foreign exchange transactions on the
"black market" rather than through the banking system), tourist
receipts include what tourists spend within the country but not their
cost of getting there (which is included in the transport account)
etc. (Blackaby (ed), 1978).
The superiority of tourism over manufacturing where the
regression of the first Kaldorian law is concerned, is further
confirmed by the following (encompassing) tests comparing the
performance of the two models. Model 1 represents the above
regression, that is, the application of the first law to the tourism
sector in Greece, while model 2 represents the application of the same
law to the Greek manufacturing sector.
Under the null hypothesis that Model 1 encompasses Model
2, the Cox test and the Ericsson IV test are distributed as N(0,1).
The Sargan test is a Wald test of the restricted against
the unrestricted form of the model, i.e a test of the validity of
using Model 2 instruments for estimating Model 1 (and conversely).
The F-tests test each model against the joint one (the one
including all the variables of both models).
All the coefficients relating to model 1 (the regression
on tourism) are smaller than those relating to Model 2 (the regression
on manufacturing), which confirms the superiority of Model 1 versus
Model 2.
A regression of the excess of the growth of tourist over
non-tourist output on total GDP growth, further confirms the
importance of tourism for overall growth, especially after 1974, as we
may see in the following table.
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GDP=a+bNT
Constant	 NT	 T	 TNT
Coefficients 7.97 -0.23 -5.37 0.65
T-ratios 12.67 1.66 6.51 2.62
R
2
=0.69
F=16.63
D.W.=1.79
As we may see, after 1974, there is a strong positive
correlation between the excess of tourist over non-tourist output
growth and total GDP growth, as opposed to the corresponding
regression applied to the Greek manufacturing sector, where the
coefficient of the excess of manufacturing over non-manufacturing
outputy growth was not statistically significant over the estimation
period.
It is clear that a more definite impression of the role of
tourism in Greece, in the Kaldorian sense, would, probably, require
the corresponding estimates relating to the application of the second
and third laws to the Greek tourism sector. Their estimation, however,
necessitates the use of employment data which, if unreliable for other
economic sectors, are simply non-existent for tourism. Even if a proxy
for tourism employment could be found, (which would be rather
difficult, given the nature of tourism employment, as described in
chapters IV and V, and also, the high level of hidden economic
activity concentrated in the Greek tourism sector, in particular), one
would run into problems of productivity measurement in tourism (see
chapter VI for references).
In any case, the estimation of the first law is, I
believe, sufficient to determine the impact of the growth of a
particular sector on the growth of the economy (in output terms). If
the problem of defining an engine of growth is really a question of
finding an economic sector or activity whose growth induces and is
highly and positively correlated with overall economic growth, then
the first of Kaldor's laws should be sufficient to establish this for
a particular sector or activity. The other two laws refer to specific
characteristics of the sector or activity in question, such as the
nature of employment, output and productivity growth, the existence of
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economies of scale etc. A sector performing as an engine of growth, on
the basis of the first law, should posses the characteristics
described by the other two laws. According to Kaldor, the only sector
which fulfills all three conditions, is manufacturing. The Kaldorian
theory, however, was formulated at a time when a different and,
obviously more traditional, view prevailed as to the role of the three
main economic sectors. As we shall see more extensively in the
concluding chapter of the thesis, services were seen as unproductive
and parasitic, on the whole, in relation to manufacturing which was
seen as the key sector for a developing economy.
Recently however, different views have been formulated,
concerning the structure and performance of the service sector. It has
been argued that while some traditional service activities are, in
fact, parasitic, less productive etc, there are certain categories of
service producing activities which share, or could share, depending on
the choice of the production proses, which can be very elastic in
services (chapter VI), common characteristics with the manufacturing
sector, where scale economies, introduction of new technology etc is
concerned.
While the estimation of the second and third law in the
Greek tourism sector would be helpful, for the sake of completeness,
therefore, the results, even if available, would probably be
misleading; the measurement of the variables used (e.g. productivity)
is, in fact meant for manufacturing, and does not take into account
the particular characteristics of a service activity such as tourism,
where employment and productivity growth, for example, should be
considered in a somewhat different way, in order to include, among
other things, the quality standard of the final output of the sector.
Before going onto examining the particular characteristics
of tourism and especially Greek tourism and dealing with the question
of whether this sort of economic activity has the potential to act as
an, alternative or complementary to manufacturing, engine of growth in
Greece, we shall first proceed to a comparison of the fit of the three
Kaldorian laws in Greece and three other similar (in their general
economic structure) Mediterranean countries, Italy, Spain and
Portugal.
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E. POOLING CROSS SECTION AND TIME SERIES DATA
This section consists of an application of the three
Kaldorian growth laws to the agricultural, manufacturing and service
sectors of Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal, where possible
(continuous data on agricultural employment for the whole of the
estimation period used were not available for some countries of the
sample), using a pooled cross-section and time series estimation
method. Apart from the fact that this sort of estimation procedure
will give us some information as to the applicability of the Kaldorian
theory in the E.C. countries of the Mediterranean basin which present
certain structural characteristics different from those corresponding
to the other West European economies, it is considered by certain
authors as more reliable than time series estimation for each country
(Ch. I section 2.3). The estimation method used throughout this
section takes into account that the disturbance terms are
autoregressive within each country of the sample and heteroskedastic
across countries (Kmenta, 1986) and the estimated equations are
automatically adjusted for both.
The sample consists of four countries, with 24
observations for each, and an estimation period of 1963-86, since most
of the data was not available after that for Italy, Spain and
Portugal.
Three shift country dummies are used, where:
D1=0 for Greece, Spain and Portugal and
D1=1 for Italy.
D2=0 for Greece, Italy and Portugal and
D2=1 for Spain
D3=0 for Greece, Italy and Spain and
D3=1 for Portugal.
Thirteen slope country dummies are used for the output and
employment of each sector of the countries included in the sample,
where:
A1 =D1*GDPA
	 M1=D1*GDPM	 S1=D1*GDPS	 E1=D1*EMPM
A2=D2*GDPA
	 M2=D2*GDPM
	 S2=D2*GDPS	 E2=D2*EMPM
A3=D3*GDPA
	 M3=D3*GDPM
	 S3=D3*GDPS	 L1=D1*EMPS
L2=D2*EMPS
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A recursive residuals Chow test (scaled by critical
values) showed that most of the data series of the variables included
in the regressions for the three laws, present a "break" at
observation 12 which corresponds to the year 1974 of the estimation
period, for the four countries of the samples. Therefore, when shown
to be statistically significant, a time shift and slope dummy variable
is also included in the following regressions, where:
T=0 for 1963-73	 TA=T*GDPA
	
TEM=T*EMPM
T=1 for 1974-88	 TM=T*GDPM	 TES=T*EMPS
TS=T*GDPS
Only the dummies which were found to be statistically
significant are included in the following regressions. All the
equations were initially estimated using all the relevant dummy
variables, but those which were shown to be statistically
non-significant were dropped from the final models. The R2 used in the
following regressions as a measure of the goodness of fit is the Buse
R
2
.
1. Kaldor's First Law
GDP=al+b1GDPsector
Constant	 GDPA	 Al A2
Coefficients	 6.56 0.18	 -0.21 -0.23 -4.20
T-ratios	 26.50 8.39	 2.35 3.45 12.95
R
2
= 0.71
SSE=82.52
Constant GDPM	 D1	 M1 M3 T	 TM
Coefficients	 5.08 0.27	 -4.57 0.95 -0.21 -3.47 0.16
T-ratios	 7.27 11.17	 9.09 9.90 3.95 4.72 1.84
R
2
 =0.87
SSE=93.34
Constant GDPS	 D2	 D3 S2 S3
Coefficients	 -0.58 1.20	 3.07	 4.95 -0.68 -1.03	 -1.74
T-ratios	 1.08 17.13	 6.17	 7.62 7.33 10.66	 4.61
R
2
=0.88
SSE=91.95
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As far as the above estimates are concerned, one may
notice the following points:
-
The agricultural sector of the countries included in the sample
appears to be similar, where the application of the first law is
concerned, for Greece and Portugal. The agricultural sector appears to
be of greater importance for these two countries, although the
coefficient of agricultural output growth is rather low (0.15) while
it becomes negative for Italy and Spain (-0.03 and -0.05
respectively).
-
Where the application of the first law to the manufacturing sector of
the four countries is concerned, only Greece and Spain seem to share
similarities, while the Italian manufacturing sector is very different
from the other three. Greece and Spain present a rather high constant
term (shared by Portugal) and a coefficient for the growth of
manufacturing output equal to 0.27, while for Portugal, the impact of
manufacturing output growth on GDP growth is much lower (0.06). The
manufacturing sector, on the other hand, seems to be more important
for Italy, among the countries of the sample, which presents a slope
coefficient of 1.22. These observations, however, only apply up to
1973, since both shift and slope time dummies are significant,
indicating that the importance of manufacturing output growth on GDP
growth, increases after 1974, for all the countries in the sample.
-
The importance of services for GDP growth seems to be highest for
Greece and Italy, with a slope coefficient of 1.20, while the impact
of service growth on GDP is much smaller for both Spain (0.52) and
Portugal (0.17). An important point to notice, however, is that Italy
possesses a large and highly important service sector but, at the same
time has the most important manufacturing sector among the four
countries, where its impact on GDP growth is concerned. Greece, on the
other hand, presents a similar with Italy in importance, service
sector, but a manufacturing sector which appears to be lagging behind
it in importance
2. Kaldor's Second Law
In this and the third law, only the manufacturing and
service sectors of Greece, Italy and Spain are considered because of
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lack of employment data on Portugal, and the agricultural sector of
the three Mediterranean countries.
First specification:Psector=al+b1GDPsector
Constant GDPM D1
Coefficients -2.64 0.87 2.15 3.41
T-ratios 3.83 16.20 3.82 5.26
R2=0.94
SSE=65.14
Constant GDPS D1	 D2 Si	 S2 T TS
Coefficients -1.68 0.93 2.16	 2.80 -0.56 -0.49 -2.14 0.42
T-ratios 2.62 10.44 3.37	 6.27 3.93	 4.79 2.71 2.83
R2=0.96
SSE=52.82
Second Specification:EMPsector=a1+b1GDPsector
Constant GDPM D1
Coefficients 2.64 0.12 -3.41 -2.15
T-ratios 3.83 2.23 5.26 3.82
R
2
=0.96
SSE=52.87
Constant GDPS D1	 D2 Si S2	 T TS
Coefficients 1.68 0.06 -2.16	 -2.80 0.56 0.49 2.14 -0.42
T-ratios 2.62 0.75 3.37	 6.27 3.93 4.79 2.71 2.83
R
2
=0.77
SSE=52.87
From the above estimates of the second law, one may derive
the following conclusions:
-Where the manufacturing sector is concerned, all three countries
appear to be similar in relation to the effect of output growth on
productivity growth, with a very high slope coefficient of 0.87. Italy
has a different (larger) constant term, however, an indication that a
larger part of productivity growth in manufacturing cannot be
attributed to output growth.
-The second specification of the law seems to apply to a much lesser
extent to all three countries of the sample. Output growth induces
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employment growth to a much lesser extent than it induces productivity
growth. The coefficient of manufacturing output growth is only 0.12,
in the second specification, while according to Kaldor, an indication
of strong economies of scale in the manufacturing sector corresponds
to a value of approximately 0.5 for manufacturing output growth, in
the two specifications of the Verdoorn law6.
Apart from the possibility that these estimates are
unreliable because of measurement problems as far as employment
figures are concerned, for a variety of reasons (e.g dependent
development, imported capital intensive technologies etc), the three
Mediterranean countries considered here (as well as Portugal, on
which, however, there are no comparable data on employment over the 24
years of the sample), may have developed a manufacturing sector with a
much lower labour absorptive capacity than the corresponding sectors
of the Western European economies before them. An indication of this
could be the massive emigration witnessed by all three countries at
about the same period.
-The three countries included in the sample appear to be very
different where the application of the Verdoorn law to services is
concerned. Greece presents the highest positive correlation between
output growth and productivity growth (which is also very significant,
statistically, contrary to the corresponding time-series estimation),
while both Spain and Italy have a lower coefficient for service output
growth.
-Output growth in the Greek service sector appears to be positively
related to employment growth, up to 1973, but the coefficient is not
6
Rowthorn's labour constrained specification of Verdoorn's law was
estimated for the manufacturing sector of Greece, Italy and Spain, in
addition to the Kaldorian specification of the law. The results were
the following:
PM= 4.24 - 0.2EMPM + 2.1D2 - 0.9E1 - 0.8E2 - 6.7T + 0.17TEM R
2
=0.97
(9.45) (1.06)	 (2.9)	 (5.4)	 (4.81)	 (8.3)	 (1.76)
The time dummy for the period 1974-88 was significant, in this case as
far as both shift and slope coefficients of the above regression are
concerned. Once again, the results are rather poor. The relationship
between employment and productivity growth in manufacturing, appears
to be negative in all three countries of the sample, in both periods,
although this relationship is not significant for Greece.
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statistically significant (at the 95% level). The correlation between
service output and employment growth is stronger (as well as
statistically significant) for the other two countries. The Situation
changes somewhat after 1974, however, since the coefficient of
service output, in the first specification, becomes greater that one,
for Greece, with the result that, in the second specification, the
correlation between output and employment growth turns negative. This
is certainly in line with the reservations and explanations put
forward in relation to the corresponding time-series estimation of the
second law for the Greek service sector, since it was especially after
1973 that the concentration of hidden economic activities rose
impressively in the tertiary sector; also, it it possible to say that
up to 1973, when output was growing very fast in the tertiary sector,
the fast rise in employment did not have a significantly negative
impact on service productivity growth. After 1973, however, when the
growth rate of the economy, as a whole, as well as of the tertiary
sector in particular dropped significantly, the continuous fast rise
of employment, due both to the employment policy of the public sector,
as well as to the fact that repatriation had started and the returning
migrants were massively entering the service sector, independently of
the drop in output growth, the effect was a drop in productivity, and
a negative correlation between output and employment growth in the
Greek service sector, as a whole. According to the above estimates and
with all the reservations previously mentioned concerning the
reliability of the data, measurement problems, the fact that the
service sector is taken, here, to be homogeneous while it is
constituted of a large number of different activities etc, the second
law seems to apply to Italy and Spain but not to Greece, especially
after 1974.
The following observations apply to the estimates of the
third law for the manufacturing and service sectors of Greece, Italy
and Spain:
3.Kaldor's Third Law
GDP	 =al+blEMPsector
Constant	 EMPM	 El	 E2	 T
Coefficients	 6.27	 0.67	 -0.58	 -0.65	 3.61
T-ratios	 58.96	 7.92	 6.65	 7.84	 8.16
R
2
=0.76
SSE=65.48
Constant	 EMPS D1	 D2 Li	 L2	 T
Coefficients	 8.32	 -0.44 -2.73	 -2.55 0.64	 0.57 -3.77
T-ratios	 13.07	 4.23 4.12	 4.09 5.22	 3.58	 8.03
R
2
=0.97
SSE=67.75
-
All three countries are different as far as both sectors are
concerned. In manufacturing, the correlation of employment growth and
total GDP is stronger for Greece, followed by Italy and Spain, in
turn, with coefficients of manufacturing employment equal to 0.67,
0.09 and 0.02.
-
In services, the correlation between employment growth and total GDP
growth is negative for Greece and positive for Italy and Spain. This
is in line with the time-series estimation of the second and third
laws to the Greek service sector and could probably be justified on
the same grounds as for the Verdoorn law. In fact, if the high rate of
service employment growth, which, especially after 1974, was
independent of output growth, contributed to a drop of the
productivity of the Greek service sector, as a whole, one should also
expect a negative correlation between employment growth in services
and overall growth, in Greece. It would be interesting, on the basis
of these results, to break down the service sector into sub-categories
and estimate the second and third law for each one separately.
However, continuous employment data on separate service activities are
not available for Greece. This was the reason why only the first law
was estimated for the Greek tourism sector, in particular.
The general conclusion to be derived from this section is
that, for the reasons mentioned above,the second and third of the
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Kaldorian growth laws cannot be used to derive useful conclusions as
far as the service sector of Greece, in particular, is concerned.
On the other hand, it seems to me that the first law can
serve this purpose. For one thing, the data included in the estimation
of the law are much more reliable than in the other two laws, as long
as only output data on the various sectors are necessary. Also, it
seems that in this case time series estimation may be used without
significantly biasing the estimates, while this, argue some authors
(see Ch. I, p. 33), may be the case for the second law. In the
estimation of the first law, the regression coefficients seemed, for
the most part, to be fairly stable, whether time series analysis was
used for Greece, or pooling and cross-section analysis for the four
Mediterranean countries of the sample. It would seem, therefore, that
it would not be too risky to accept, at least indicatively, the
conclusions to which the estimates of the first law lead us. The most
important of these indications for future work is that the
manufacturing sector seems to be less important as far as its
correlation with GDP growth is concerned:
1) In the E.C. Mediterranean countries, with the exception of Italy,
in comparison to the industrialised West European countries, in the
early 60s.
2) For the Greek economy, in particular, in relation to other economic
activities, eg. tourism.
Tourism, in particular, seems to be important in its own
right, for the Greek economy, as the close correlation of its growth
rate to GDP growth indicates. Given that, in my opinion, it would not
be wise for Greece to continue its policy of traditional
industrialisation "at all costs" and that it should gradually begin to
turn its resources to alternatives, with dynamic growth potential,
(which, as we shall see in chapter V, tourism seems to posses), the
above indication is important, as far as determining the direction of
this shift.
The fact that, as the estimated equations in the present
chapter seem to indicate, the first of the three Kaldorian laws seems
to apply to services and tourism in particular, just as well, if not
better than in the manufacturing sector, is possibly not sufficient to
sustain the argument that other sectors, apart from industry could be
considered as alternative leading sectors or engines of economic
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growth, in the particular case of the Greek economy. In fact, Kaldor
himself did not deny that the correlation between GDP growth and
service sector output growth could be quite high. He did argue,
however, that the one of the reasons why service activities could not
possibly be regarded in the same way as manufacturing was that the
direction of causality between the two variables ran from GDP growth
to service output growth, a feature which, naturally, is inconsistent
with the definition of a "leading" sector. The next and last section
of the present chapter consists of an attempt to see whether this
drawback also applies to the Greek service sector and tourism sector,
in particular.
F. TESTING FOR CAUSALITY
1. Introduction
One of many important points underlying the Kaldorian
theory of growth is the notion of causality, that is, the existence of
causal relationships among the macroeconomic variables involved in the
analysis. In particular, where the first growth law is concerned
(manufacturing output growth regressed on total output growth), the
direction of causality is argued to run from manufacturing output to
GDP, not vice-versa. According to the Kaldorian view, the reason for
this is to be found in that manufacturing industry, in particular, is
subject to strong dynamic economies of scale (see Chapter I) which
spread themselves through the whole of the national economy and
stimulate overall economic growth, thus, turning manufacturing
industry into the major vehicle of economic development. Kaldor is
very particular about this point, stressing repeatedly that such a
causal relationship from sectoral output growth to GDP growth is only
to be found in the manufacturing sector. While it is possible for the
output of other sectors to present a high correlation with total
output growth (possibly as high as manufacturing) as is usually the
case with output growth in the service sector, Kaldor emphasises that
the direction of causality is different, running not from sectoral
output to total output, as in the case of manufacturing, but in the
opposite direction, that is, from GDP to sectoral output growth. He
attributes this to the fact that the demand for services becomes more
elastic following the rise in incomes brought about by economic
development, and also because, the expansion of the industrial sector
causes an increase in demand for services as intermediate goods
(Kaldor 1966, pp. 10-11).
Faced with criticisms and doubts (Wolfe, 1968, p. 118)
concerning the existence and direction of these assumed causal
relationships, especially in relation to manufacturing output and
total output growth, Kaldor reacted strongly, arguing that whoever
doubted the fact that manufacturing output growth "causes" total GDP
growth, does not take into account the existence of dynamic economies
of scale in the manufacturing sector. While the theoretical framework
on which this argument is based may be true, the fact is that, as far
as I know, the latter has never been tested empirically, neither by
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Kaldor himself nor by any of the other authors involved in these
arguments, who limited themselves to extensive discussions about the
applicability or non applicability of the laws in various case
studies, without however, looking at the direction of causal relations
between economic sectors, if such relations do exist.
In the remainder of this section, an attempt will be made
to use the direct Granger test approach in order to derive, if
possible, certain conclusions about the (causal) inter-sectoral
relationships in the case of the Greek economy. The direct Granger
test takes the following form (Moore, 1984, p. 153).
X = E a .X .+E	 b .Y .+u
t j=1 j t-j j=1 j t-j t
Y = .E c. X. +.E d. Y +v
t j=1 j t-j j=1 j t
Y
t
 and X
t
 are assumed to be stationary time series variables and the
residuals are assumed to be white noise. Y
t
 is said to "cause" X
t
 if
someb.'s are significant and the c.'s as a group are not. If some
b.'s and c.'s are significant, then there is a feedback relationship
between the two variables. It is important to note, however, that the
notion of causality in this type of analysis refers mainly to the
predictive power of, say, Y where future values of X are concerned,
rather than to the intuitive notion of causality, in which sense, X
happens because of Y (Moore, 1984, p. 150). Causality in this sort of
test rather means that one of the two variables contains information
that helps to better predict the other variable. In fact, in the
Granger-Sims approach, a mere precedence in time, of one of the two
variables, implies the existence of causality. It is also important to
note that this type of test is rather vulnerable to a number of
statistical problems (eg. omitted significant lagged values of the
dependent variable, autocorrelated residuals, non-stationarity etc),
all of which can result in overstressing causal relationships where
they exist and/or create the illusion of such relationships where they
do not exist. Therefore, all these type of tests (Sims-Granger type of
approach) are considered to be rather imperfect vehicles for
disclosing causality, if any exists, between time series variables
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(Moore, 1984, p. 157).
Even with these shortcomings, however, the Granger-Sims
test can be applied in order to test the Kaldorian view of causality.
Despite the fact that the latter is based on a deeper and more complex
notion of causality than just precedence over time of the development
of one economic sector among others, it is clear that a sector has to
develop before others, in order to be able to perform the role of
"leader" and to "cause" the development of other economic sectors and
branches, pulling them along behind it. Despite the fact, therefore,
that an indication of the existence of causality between two
variables, based on the Granger-Sims test, is certainly not a proof of
the existence of causality in the Kaldorian sense, such an indication
could serve as a basic precondition for the existence of a Kaldorian
type causal relationship between two sectors.
The following variables will be used for the econometric
investigations in this section:
GDP=Gross National Product
GDPM=Manufacturing output
GDPA=Agricultural output
GDPS=Service output
GDPT=Tourism sector output (Total earnings)
The output of the service sector is then broken down
further into the following categories:
TC=Transport and Communications
Trade
Bnks=Banks and Insurance
Dwellings
Pub-Ad=Public administration
Hth-Ed=Health and Education
Othser=Other Services
All the variables are expressed in constant (1970)
drachmas and represent growth rates. All the variables were tested for
stationarity and, in fact, all proved to be integrated of order either
I(0) or I(1). Therefore, first differences of the growth rates of all
the variables were used, in order to perform the Granger test. The
estimation period is 1970-1988. The main reason for this (in
comparison to the 1963-88 period used earlier) is that, as already
mentioned, tourism, which is of particular interest in this case, only
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started to gain in importance in the late 60s to early 70s.
The purpose of the following tests was, in the first
place, to look at the causal (if any) relations between GDP and
manufacturing output growth (as well as with service and agricultural
output growth), between manufacturing output growth, agriculture and
services and then between manufacturing output growth and the growth
of each of the above service branches. The same exercise was then
performed between tourist output growth (the growth of total tourist
receipts, in drs, was used as a proxy of tourist output) and the
output growth of each of the above sectors. Finally, the relation
between the growth of tourist and manufacturing output was examined.
The direct Granger test approach yielded the results presented in•
Table I of the Statistical Appendix, where: The figures in round
brackets under the estimated coefficients represent the t-ratios. F'
represents the F-value of the autocorrelation test, since the D.W
statistic is invalid in the case when lagged values of the dependent
variable are included in the regression equation. The figure in
brackets below it, is the critical value of the F distribution.
All of the results are concisely presented in the
following Table. The direction of the arrows indicates the direction
in which causality runs from one variable to another. Double arrows
(4) indicate feedback.
In some of the cases, the relationships between the
various macroeconomic variables listed in the first column of the
Table and the output of the manufacturing and tourism sectors,
respectively, may be hard to believe. In fact, the results summarised
in the above Table may seem to either contradict traditional economic
theory or common sense.
Depending on the way one views the consistency and
reliability of the direct Granger test approach, an opponent of this
approach would probably reject (or cast strong doubts on) the above
results, attributing them to the method itself, while a proponent of
the method in question, would probably question its applicability in
this case, or/and the reliability of the data involved. Evaluation of
the direct causality test approach, however, is far beyond the scope
of this study. Assuming that both the method itself and its
application in this particular case are both reasonably reliable
however, we shall now proceed to a critical evaluation and
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interpretation of the results.
Manufacturing GDP
	 Tourism GDP
GDP
GDP Agriculture	 No relationship
GDP Manufacturing
GDP Services
Transport-Communications 	 -------	 No relationship
Trade	 No relationship	 <-------
Banks-Insurance	 No relationship	 No relationship
Dwellings	 No relationship
Public Administration 	 No relationship
Health-Education	 No relationship
Other Services	 No relationship
Tourism GDP
-The feedback relationship between total GDP growth and manufacturing
output growth and most importantly, the one way causal relation
between tourist output growth and total GDP growth, contradicts the
Kaldorian theory, as far as the leading role of the manufacturing
sector is concerned. These relationships, however, in a sense justify
the reservations expressed at various points in the present thesis as
to whether manufacturing has truly been the "engine of growth" in
Greece. In fact, (even if this seems to oversimplify things) tourism
seems to have been more successful in this role. The above findings
also seem to be in accordance and to corroborate the results of the
application of the Kaldorian laws to the Greek manufacturing and
tourism sectors.
-The output of the tourist sector seems to have been a very important
determining factor as far as predicting the evolution of total GDP
growth, as well as the output of the service sector, in general, and
health-education and trade, in particular, are concerned.
More specifically:
a) The relationship between the output growth of tourism and services
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indicates the leading role of tourism as far as the growth of the
tertiary sector, as a whole, is concerned.
b) The relationship between the growth of tourism output and trade
seems to make sense. The development of tourism is believed, among
other things, to improve the image of an area or country, to open up
frontiers, bringing foreigners into contact with different cultures
and products, a fact which would normally be expected to have a
positive effect on international trade and vice-versa.
-The relationship between the output of tourism and Health and
Education seems to indicate that the development of tourism and the
consequent increased demand for services requires a higher level of
educational and health services in order to ensure an improved quality
of the final tourist product.
-
The fact that tourist output has no relation whatsoever with the
growth of agricultural output, dwellings and other services indicates
that tourism did not develop any linkages with these sectors.
-
The most important finding, however is the one way causal relation
between the output of tourism and manufacturing, which would seem to
indicate, however surprisingly, that tourism stimulates growth in the
manufacturing sector! This would seem to imply, in fact, that there
are indeed, strong linkages running from tourism to manufacturing, in
Greece, contrary to what is usually assumed. Obviously, if this is
true, it certainly contributes to emphasise the role of tourism, both
actual and potential (since growth rates rather than levels are used
throughout the analysis), in Greek economic development.
-
The failure of the Greek manufacturing sector to act as an engine of
growth for the Greek economy is indicated, among other things, by the
	
	 2
-6)
indication that manufacturing output growth "causes" only the growth 
L_
of agricultural output and dwellings. Contrary to the Kaldorian view,
a very important finding is represented by the indicated relation
between manufacturing output growth and total GDP growth. The latter
is not a one way causal relationship running from the former to the
latter, but one of feedback. The non-conventional structure and
development of the Greek manufacturing sector is indicated by the fact
that manufacturing output does not seem to be an important determinant ?
of GDP growth. In fact, there seems to be no relationship between
manufacturing and either trade or banks and insurance, both of which
represent sectors which, according to traditional economic theory, are
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stimulated by the growth of the manufacturing sector.
It is difficult to derive definite conclusions on the
basis of the above econometric tests alone. However, the above
indications (which corroborate the results of the application of
Kaldor's laws to Greece) seem to point out that the
manufacturing-engine of growth scheme has never been applicable to
the Greek economy. Tourism seems to have played this role better but
is still far from being what the theory attributes to manufacturing.
This could be partly due to the fact that such a role was never even
remotely expected of tourism, at least on the part of the Greek policy
makers. This is hardly surprising however, given that service-led
rather than manufacturing-led development represents a very radical
and non-conventional possibility, which is hardly ever considered,
while any significant service sector development occurs largely by
default, (Riddle, 1986, see also VI). This is especially true for a
country like Greece, which is very insecure and heavily dependent,
both materially and ideologically on the more developed countries of
Western Europe as well as the U.S.A.
Having proceeded to this point of the analysis, the next
step is to examine the actual and potential role which tourism can
play in economic development. The next two chapters of the thesis are
centred around this task, in an attempt to define and pinpoint certain
characteristic features of tourism in general and Greek tourism in
particular, in an attempt to see under what conditions it would be
possible for a tourism-engine of growth scheme to operate in Greece,
in the future.
CHAPTER IV
THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF TOURISM
A. INTRODUCTION
The analysis developed in the previous chapters of the
present thesis raises the question of whether it would be possible,
theoretically speaking, for any other economic sector to act as an
engine of growth, in case the manufacturing sector fails to perform as
such. The econometric investigation (Ch. III) has indicated the
relative failure of manufacturing in that respect in the case of
Greece. It has also revealed that tourism has acted equally well (if
not better) than manufacturing, in that sense. One could argue though,
that these findings are not sufficient to establish the case of
tourism as an engine of growth, in general and particularly for
Greece. It would be, therefore, necessary to form a theoretical basis
concerning the role of tourism in an economy (this will be the task of
the present chapter), as well as an application of this theoretical
framework in the case of Greece (this being the purpose of the next
chapter). The purpose of both chapters is:
1) to examine whether the tourist sector does (or could, in the
future) possess certain "Kaldorian type" features which would enable
it to assume a role as an alternative (or complementary) to
traditional industry, leading sector in economic development;
2) in the particular case of Greece, to see, if possible, under what
conditions the tourist sector could play such a role, to a higher
degree and in a more conscious and organised way than in the past.
In both this and the following chapter, the emphasis will
be on the economic effects of tourism as distinguished from the
environmental, social or cultural ones. Also, despite the fact that
domestic tourism represents approximately 70-88% of total
international tourist movements (WTO, 1982, p. 9), in Greece,
international tourism is still far more important than domestic
tourism; both chapters, therefore, will deal only with international
tourism as this is where the major economic effects of tourism are
usually attributed, (this being especially true for Greece) given that
domestic tourism mainly results in shifting wealth from one region of
the country to another rather than contributing to actual net growth
in the GDP of a country (Smith, 1989, p. 23).
Tourism is becoming increasingly appealing as an
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alternative (or complementary) route for economic development in both
developing and developed countries. Especially for countries at
intermediate stages of economic development, however, tourism as a
development strategy presents many characteristics which could lead to
the transformation of these economies from agricultural to developed
and, furthermore, it does not suffer (or, at least, not to the same
extent) from the disadvantages of other "traditional" means for
economic growth, namely exports of primary products or early
development of the manufacturing sector, either through import
substitution or export led policies.
In the first case, (exports of primary goods), a view
first expressed in 1949/50 by Prebisch and Singer, (see Sarkar, 1986)
which comes as a contradiction to that advanced by older economists
(e.g. Keynes, Robertson, Clark), argues that developing countries
usually find themselves at a serious disadvantage because, they
usually depend on one or two exportable agricultural products with a
relatively low income elasticity of demand. This, in combination with
the fact that the elasticity of demand for goods produced in the
advanced industrialised countries is, in general, very high in
developing countries, leads to a constant deterioration of their long
run barter terms of trade (Bond and Ladman, 1972, p. 38-40).
Some of the disadvantages of developing a domestic
manufacturing sector early in the development process, on the other
hand are that, among others, the following difficulties can be (and
usually are) encountered:
-
In the case of an import substitution strategy, developing countries
usually have to face the problem of the small size of their domestic
market which limits the diversification and the production scale of
industry.
-
Export led growth, on the other hand, implies that the manufactured
goods produced domestically will have to face the full competition of
similar goods produced in the advanced countries, which, in most
cases, embody higher quality and technology if not lower prices
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 1973, p. 57).
The appeal of tourism as a vehicle for economic
development lies in that it does not present these disadvantages, at
least not to the same extent. The last two decades have witnessed an
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extremely fast growth of travel imports on the part of the developed
countries, which is expected to continue and increase still further,
because of the rising wealth of the latter. This is mainly due to the
fact that tourism is characterised by a high income elasticity of
demand, estimated to be greater than one and even greater than two in
most developed countries (English, 1986, p. 19).
Another advantage of tourism, especially for developing
countries, is that it is a rather diversified product, with each
country having something different to offer potential tourists, so
that countries engaging in this activity may be able to play a
decisive role in the price determination of their tourist product
rather than being obliged to accept the terms of trade set by the
developed countries.
Perhaps one of the most obvious advantages of tourism,
particularly for countries at intermediate stages of development, is
that it is a direct earner of foreign exchange, much needed in these
countries in order to pay for their rapidly rising imports, especially
of intermediate manufactured products. Furthermore, the particular
structure of the tourist industry which spreads and intertwines itself
throughout the domestic economy could help stimulate investment in
other sectors, diversify the economy, help develop a domestic industry
of consumer goods and, generally, play a decisive role as far as
transforming the economy and speeding up the development process is
concerned; among other reasons, the development of the tourist sector
provides an extended market for the country's products and also, the
gestation period for most tourist investment projects is relatively
short (Gearing et al, 1976, p. 15). Moreover, during its early stages
of development, the tourism sector is usually relatively labour rather
than capital intensive, although, as one may see in section D of the
concluding chapter, the particular sector can be characterised either
by low or by high capital/ technology/skill intensity, according to
the development level, resources etc of the country in question. This
feature is particularly suited to the characteristics of developing
countries, at the early -intermediate stages of their development,
when capital is, usually, scarce and expensive, while labour is cheap
and plentiful.
The advantages of developing a successful tourist sector,
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however, are not limited to the developing countries only. According
to Murphy (1985, p. 2) who argues that "tourism can be seen as the
transitory period from an industrial society to whatever future awaits
us", they could well be extended to the advanced industrialised
countries as well. The relative decline of the manufacturing sector in
these countries, especially in terms of employment as well as of
output and the falling competitiveness of some, on the international
level, as far as their exports of industrial goods are concerned,
raises the question of shifting resources to an alternative potential
growth industry with a high capacity to absorb labour and an increased
competitiveness in the longer run. Tourism is a service activity,
compatible with the post-industrial, service oriented stage which,
according to this view, the industrialised countries of Western Europe
are about to enter; despite various fears about being highly unstable
and overdependent on numerous unpredictable and non-economic factors,
it seems to be more stable than many merchandise exports as well as
surprisingly resilient to economic crises (IUOTTO, 1975).
This may seem like a paradox, in the sense that it would
seem to imply that the development of the tourist sector is seen as an
alternative development strategy both for developed countries entering
the post-industrial stage, as well as an industrialisation-stimulating
(or replacing) strategy suited to developing countries. One should
keep in mind, though, that the positive effects tourist development is
hoped to have in these two different cases are expected to evolve in
two different ways. In the case of the less developed countries, the
development of the tourist sector is expected to stimulate economic
development, in general, through an increased consumer demand and a
larger market size for the country's products, which will, hopefully,
stimulate the development of sectors and industrial branches producing
the goods demanded. In short, in the case of developing countries,
tourism is expected to stimulate a sort of import-substituting
development strategy, apart from bringing in much needed foreign
exchange. In the case of the developed industrial and
de-industrialising economies, on the other hand, what is expected of
tourism, is to help "fill the gaps" (in terms of employment, GDP
growth etc), that are created by the process of de-industrialisation.
Apart from the fact that both 1967 and 1990 were
132
proclaimed "International Tourism Years", tourism has been
characterised as the "Growth Industry of the 21st Century" as well as
the largest single item in World Trade (Gearing, 1976, p. 28).
Receipts from international tourism are in excess of world exports of
merchandise goods, for most years in the period 1958-73 (Economist
Intelligence Unit, 1973, P. 55). The growth of international tourist
receipts in the period 1963-78 was 13.6% on average, 14.19% in 1988,
(current $ U.S.), while the growth rate of international arrivals was
7.7%, in the period 1958-73, despite the oil crisis of 1973, when
arrivals dropped sharply but recovered remarkably fast in the next two
years growing at an annual rate of 8.8% by 1988. Europe is the main
earner as well as spender on foreign travel. At the beginning of the
1980s it registered approximately 70% of total international tourist
arrivals, and tourist expenditure by EC residents in 1979 was 100
billion dollars (7% of total private consumption in the same year),
while tourist receipts by the EC members in the same year were 99
billion dollars (Commission of the European Communities, 1985, p. 5).
The main problem underlying the attempt to examine the
economic role of tourism is that, in order to analyse the economic
impact of the development of a particular sector or industry, one
should be able to, at least, distinguish and define, if not quantify
and measure the sector or industry in question, as well as its
components. This is a very hard task where tourism is concerned. The
generally accepted definition provided by the World Tourist
Organization (WTO) for the international tourist and the tourist
sector and product is the following; An international tourist is an
individual entering a country that is not his usual place of residence
and who spends at least one night in accommodation in the destination
country without intending to emigrate there, to find employment or to
stay there for more than a year, and who is not a diplomat, a member
of the armed forces, a nomad, a refugee or a border worker, a transit
passenger or a cruise passenger; but who may be a visitor for
recreation purposes, medical treatment, religious or family matters,
sporting events, conferences, study, business (lasting for less than a
year), an employee of international bodies on a less than a year
mission or a national returning home on a temporary visit. The tourist
sector comprises all those industrial and commercial activities
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producing goods and services wholly or mainly consumed by tourists
(Smith, 1989, p. 31).
On the basis of these definitions, however, it is
extremely hard to be more specific as far as the size and impact of
tourism on the economy is concerned, a fact which is attributed to the
high degree of diversification of the industry, its extremely
dispersed and unorganized nature and its various and complex linkages
with other industries the products of which are consumed by tourists
(e.g. manufacturing, retailing, transport, accommodation sectors etc).
Tourism as an identifiable industry cannot be found in either national
accounts figures or input-output tables. Even if one tries to
approximate the tourist product by the quantity of goods and services
mostly consumed by international tourists (e.g. accommodation), it
would be impossible to distinguish the portion actually consumed by
visitors to the country, from the consumption of the normal resident
population, given the fact that most (if not all) of the facilities
enjoyed and consumed by tourists are shared by the domestic population
as well. As a direct consequence of the above, most indices used to
measure tourist activity in a country (total receipts, arrivals and
nights spent by tourists), are, at best, approximations of the latter.
The result of this lack of generally accepted measures and definitions
and reliable data, which, even when available, are rarely comparable
among countries, as each uses its own method of measurement, and the
consequent difficulty in quantifying tourism, leads to a reluctance on
the part of both scientists as well as governments to even accept
the latter as a real industry (Smith, 1989, p. 8), let alone consider
its potential role as a leading economic sector.
B. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TOURISM.
The main areas where the impact of tourism on the economy
may be felt are the balance of payments, employment and income
generation and regional development. In general, the magnitude of the
economic impact of tourism is determined by
1. The nature and the attractiveness of the main facility of the
destination area.
2. The volume and intensity of tourist expenditure.
3. The level of development of the destination area.
4. The size of the economic base of the destination area.
5. The degree to which tourist expenditures recirculate in the
destination area.
6. The degree to which the destination area has adjusted to the
seasonality of demand inherent in tourism (Mathieson and Wall, 1982,
p. 52).
In the following paragraphs, the main areas of the
economic impact of tourism will be dealt with, one by one.
1. Tourism and the Balance of Payments 
One of the major (if not the primary) role of tourism in
economic development is seen as a foreign exchange earner. In some
cases (e.g. Greece for some years), foreign exchange earnings from
tourism exceeded earnings from any other single industry. It seems,
furthermore, that receipts from tourism are more stable, with less
fluctuations over time, than commodity exports (especially of primary
goods), this having a stabilizing influence on the balance of payments
(Erbes, 1972, p. 35, Eurostat Statistics, various issues), although
one could argue that tourism could still be the source of some
instability, given its high sensitivity to exogenous shocks.
The role of tourism as a foreign exchange earner is
particularly important for countries at intermediate stages of
development, usually characterised by fast rates of growth, especially
of the manufacturing sector. The rapid development of the latter,
usually coincides with a phase when industries of intermediate goods
necessary for production are very underdeveloped or even nonexistent.
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As a consequence, these products will have to be imported from
advanced countries, causing imports to rise sharply in the developing
economy. This raises the question of how the country will pay for its
imports, as shortage of foreign exchange is usually another
characteristic of developing economies. Earnings of foreign exchange
from tourism could help considerably in alleviating this problem, and
besides enabling imports and reducing the dependence on foreign loans,
they could also induce increased capital formation and, consequently,
a faster overall rate of economic growth (Gray, 1972, p. 141). Tourist
receipts as a percentage of total exports can serve as an index of the
importance of tourism as an export industry in a country, while
tourist receipts as a percentage of total imports indicates the
importance of tourism for financing imports (Goodall et. al., 1988, p.
115). Tourist receipts as a share in the exports and imports of the
E.C. countries, over the period 1970-1988, may be seen in the
following table. This table provides data for all 12 EC members since
1970, although some of them joined the Community later.
TABLE IV.B1 Tourist receipts as a share in exports and imports
EC-12,	 1970-1989.
(1)
1970
(2)
1975
(1)	 (2)
1980
(1)	 (2) (1)
1985
(2)
1988
(1)	 (2)
Belgium- 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.9 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.0 3.7 3.7
Luxemburg
Denmark 6.7 7.7 7.4 8.0 9.3 8.9
France 8.2 8.8 6.4 6.6 6.0 7.4 7.3 8.1 7.7 8.2
Germany 5.1 4.4 3.7 3.1 3.4 3.4 3.7 3.2 3.3 2.6
Greece 9.9 30.2 11.7 27.4 16.4 33.5 14.0 31.4 19.9 45.1
Ireland 11.3 17.1 6.9 8.2 4.2 5.6 5.6 5.1 6.4 5.3
Netherlands 3.1 3.6 3.1 3.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.8 2.7
Portugal 14.9 24.9 9.3 12.2 12.1 24.7 14.5 19.9 15.1 22.8
Spain 35.6 70.3 21.4 45.3 20.4 33.6 26.2 32.4 27.5 41.6
U.K. 4.7 5.3 4.6 5.7 5.9 6.2 6.3 6.8 5.8 7.5
EC-12 7.1 7.6 5.7 6.1 5.8 6.6 6.8 7.0 7.1 7.2
(1): International Tourist receipts as % of total imports
(2): International Tourist receipts as % of total exports
Source: 1) U.N. Statistical Yearbook, various issues
2) Own calculations
As we may see from the above table, tourism appears much
more important for the Mediterranean countries, as a share of both
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imports and exports. From 1975 onwards, Spain and Greece represent the
two E.C. countries where tourism is the main export industry and also
helps pay for the largest share of total imports. In 1970, Spain came
first, with tourist receipts forming 35.6% of total export earnings
and paying for 70.3% of total imports. While Greece came third as far
as its share of tourist receipts in total exports, after Portugal, it
came second after Spain where the share of tourism in imports was
concerned. By 1980 Greece comes first among the E.C. countries as far
as its share of tourism receipts in both exports and imports is
concerned. In 1988, on the other hand, Greece still has the largest
share of tourist receipts in exports, (45%) among the twelve E.C.
countries. The four Mediterranean countries, Greece, Spain, Italy and
Portugal present a share of tourist receipts in total exports and
imports which is much higher than the EC-12 average for all of the
years shown in table IV.B1.
It has been argued, however, that, in order to estimate
the true effect of tourism on the economy of a country and especially
on its balance of payments, one should look at the net effect of
tourism, that is tourist receipts minus expenditure of the country on
foreign travel abroad. Even under this assumption, which is not
accepted by most authors, the Mediterranean countries would probably
still be the greatest net gainers from tourism, given the fact that
their tourist expenditure abroad is among the lowest in the EC (UN
Statistical Notebook). It is argued, however, that balance in all the
accounts of the balance of payments (including the travel account) is
by no means necessary, since any attempt to achieve such a balance
would result in no trade at all, except in those items where two way
trade would be possible (Gray, 1972, p. 89).
On the other hand, tourism may have negative as well as
positive effects on the balance of payments. It is possible that
tourist receipts may "leak" outside the country. The net receipts from
tourism for a country will depend on three factors:
1. The propensity to import of the tourist exporting country.
2. The percentage of expatriate labour employed.
3. The nature of the country's capital investment (Mathieson and Wall,
1982, p. 53-60).
The propensity to import is the proportion of each unit of
137
tourist expenditure which is transferred to another area for the
purchase of goods and services. Imports can be either direct or
indirect. Direct imports are represented by imports of goods or
services consumed directly by the tourist or used by the tourist
sector. Indirect imports are imports of raw materials, manufactured
goods and services for domestic producers who provide goods and
services to the tourist sector. The volume of imports will depend on
the extent to which the demand for these goods and services can be met
domestically (op. cit., p. 60). In some developing countries, the
import content of tourism may be as high as 80%, greatly reducing the
benefits of tourism on the balance of payments. In some other
countries where the manufacturing industry and the economic base are
fairly developed, like Greece, Yugoslavia etc, the import content of
tourism is estimated to be around 10-20% (Cleverdon, 1979, p. 30), or
lower. The import content of tourism may also depend on the
consumption pattern adopted by international tourists visiting the
country. If, for example, they feel adventurous and decide to sample
domestically produced goods (e.g. particular drinks or food
specialties etc), the imports of foodstuff and beverages for tourists
will decline and, furthermore, if, on return to their country of
origin, the tourists decide to continue consuming these particular
products, there might even be scope for the destination country to
increase its exports to the tourist generating countries. If, on the
other hand, tourists insist in consuming goods with which they are
familiar from their own countries, the receiving country will have to
increase its imports of these goods in order to meed tourist demand;
moreover, the consumption pattern of the tourists may be partly
transferred to the domestic population, thereby, permanently
increasing certain imports for the tourist exporting country. This is
rather a remote possibility, however, and could, perhaps, be
applicable in eg. a very small island economy with a small resident
population and very little diversification of the economy, which,
under these circumstances might be totally dependent on the
life-pattern of international tourists. Small developing countries,
for obvious reasons (eg. the size of their domestic market which
limits the scale of production, the lack of developed intermediate
goods industries etc), usually tend to have a higher import content
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for tourism while, larger developed countries are usually fairly
diversified with a complex system of backward linkages supporting the
tourist sector, so that their import content tends to be rather low.
The percentage of expatriate labour employed in tourism is
another cause for leakages to occur from the country (Mathieson and
Wall, 1982, p. 61). Expatriate labour is more likely to be necessary
in developing countries at the highest ranks (eg. managerial
positions) due to a lack of skilled domestic labour, although
developing countries deciding to specialise in international tourism
could concentrate in training their labour force so as to eventually
take on such positions; it is also sometimes found at the lowest
ranking jobs, in the developed countries, where emigrants tend to take
over low skilled, low pay positions, unwanted by the domestic labour.
Remittances on the part of the foreign workers to their countries of
origin, would tend to diminish the net receipts from tourism in the
receiving country. Naturally, this phenomenon is even more marked when
the domestic tourist sector is constituted to a large extent by
multinational enterprises (e.g. hotel chains such as Hilton).
The nature of the capital investment in the tourism
exporting country is another factor that determines the proportion of
tourist receipts that will finally stay in the country (op. cit., p.
62). The share of the tourist sector controlled by foreigners is of
crucial importance to this effect. Either because of the need to
finance the development of the tourist sector at the early stages,
especially in developing countries, or because of the emergence of
multinational hotel chains, a large part of the tourist sector may
find itself under foreign control. This is bound to have a negative
effect on the balance of payments for two main reasons:
1. Foreign investors will usually tend to use equipment (building
materials, furnishings, food, beverages, cutlery etc) with which they
are familiar from their own countries and which they will tend to
import in the absence of relevant import restrictions.
2. Foreign owned firms, especially multinationals, usually transfer a
large proportion of (if not all) their profits to their country of
origin.
It results, therefore, that foreign ownership of the
tourist sector will have to be limited to a minimum or, at least,
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strictly controlled, in order to minimize the negative effects which a
large import content of tourism may have on the balance of payments of
countries investing in the development of their tourist sector.
2. Tourism and Employment 
The generation of new jobs is another area where the role
of tourism development may be important. Because of the nature of the
tourism industry whose primary role is the provision of various
services to the tourists, this necessarily involving a lot of direct
personal contact between the latter and those employed in the sector,
tourism has been characterised by many authors, a labour rather than
capital intensive activity. Although the high unemployment rates
prevailing in most western industrialised countries and the consequent
necessity to create new jobs outside industry which seems unable to
absorb more labour, makes this particular feature of the tourist
sector very attractive to developed countries as well, it seems
especially important for developing countries. In fact, the latter,
usually, have to rely for the development of their manufacturing
sector on western, capital intensive technology, for various reasons
analysed in previous chapters of the thesis (chapters I and II, in
particular), with the consequence that the industrial sector can be of
little help in creating employment for the generally abundant supply
of labour in these economies (English, 1986, p. 38). While it would be
possible to argue that this may also be true for tourism it is
believed, in general, that it is possible for the latter to rely on
domestic resources (both capital, technology and labour) much more
than the manufacturing sector, partly because (see also section C of
chapter VI) tourism (in particular, the type of development of the
tourist sector, i.e. more or less capital/ skill/technology intensive)
is much more adaptable than manufacturing to the conditions prevailing
in the economy at various stages of development. Another feature of
tourism particularly suited to developing economies is that, during
the initial stages of its development, the tourist sector requires
mainly unskilled labour, while it only starts requiring more skilled
labour which is not so abundant in developing countries, at later
stages of development (Mathieson and Wall, 1982, p. 43). One of the
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reasons is that, one could hardly assume a high demand for skilled
labour on the part of the tourist sector in a "virgin" field, (in
terms of general development level, existing infrastructure etc), at
least during the first stages of the sector's development. At higher
levels of development, however, as more advanced information
technology is used and the nature and quality of the services provided
is transformed, it is plausible to assume that the tourism sector will
require progressively more skilled labour (Poon, 1989, p. 16). The
impact of tourism on employment in both developed and
developing countries, could also be of major importance at the
regional rather than at the national level, as a solution to the
employment problems of areas where it would be very difficult, if not
impossible, to develop a manufacturing sector, due to lack of
resources but which, nevertheless, present the necessary
characteristics for the development of a successful tourism sector
(e.g. islands or declining industrialised areas) (Medlik, 1979, p.
21).
Some authors, however, question the argument that tourism
is more labour intensive than other industries and consequently that
it is more efficient in creating employment, because of the highly
capital intensive demands it makes on infrastructure, especially at
the initial stages of its development (Erbes, 1972, p. 80 and
Cleverdon, 1979, p. 40). However not only tourism, but other economic
sectors as well, will benefit from the existing infrastructure once it
is created and in any case it has been estimated that approximately
seven times less investment is needed for the creation of one job in
tourism than in the manufacturing sector (Commission of the European
Communities, 1985, p. 23).
According to the British Tourist Authority report, despite
the fact that employment in the economy tended to remain static or
even decline in the 1970s, employment in tourism increased during the
same period. According to the same report, tourist generated
employment is a major source of employment in the EC, which is
moreover expanding in relation to other sectors (British Tourist
Authority, 1981). The following table shows an estimate of the number
of full time job equivalents generated by tourist receipts in the EC
countries in 1985. The latter was approximately 7.4 million. In
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absolute terms, France, Germany, Italy, the U.K. and Spain had the
highest level of employment, accounting for 84.7% of the total.
However, when expressed as a percentage of total civilian employment,
employment was highest in Spain (9.1%) followed by Portugal (8.6%),
France (6.9%), Greece (6.9%), Italy (6.7%), Ireland (5.8%), Germany
(5.1%), BLEU (4.7%), Denmark (4.4%), U.K. (4.4%) and Netherlands
(3.3%), while the percentage of EC-12 was 6.0% (Commission of the
European Communities, 1985, P. 6).
Table IV.B2 Full time job equivalents generated by tourism receipts,
EUR(12), 1985.
(000s) (% of EUR-12 total)
BLEU 180 2.4
Denmark 114 1.5
France 1487 20.2
Germany 1300 17.6
Greece 260 3.5
Ireland 62 0.8
Italy 1405 19.0
Netherlands 172 2.3
Portugal 355 4.8
Spain 980 13.3
UK 1081 14.6
EUR(12) 7396 100.0
Source: Commission of the European Communities, 1985, p. 5
Despite the fact that, as a service industry, tourism has
been criticised because of its relatively low labour productivity, it
seems that, in recent years, the number of employed increased less
than tourist spending. It would seem that, in terms of the ratio of
tourism's share in total output, over its share in total employment,
in 1990, the productivity of the tourist sector is higher in Spain,
France, Greece and Ireland and lower in Italy, among the EC
member-states (Introduction, p. 6). Naturally, one should view these
estimates with some caution, due to the high levels of hidden
employment (and hidden economic activities, in general) concentrated
in tourism.
The impact that the development of the tourist sector may
have on employment depends on a number of factors: First of all, it
depends principally on the absolute magnitude of direct tourist
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spending in the region. In the second place, it depends on the size of
the employment multiplier, the strength of backward linkages (Bond and
Ladman, 1972, p. 44), the extent to which the industry employs non
resident labour and on the type of employment offered (Brownrigg and
Greig, 1976, p. 7).
Due to the high degree of diversity of the tourist
industry and the fact that the development of the latter creates
employment not only in the sector in question but, also in other
economic sectors and industries, it is very hard to define what one
means by employment in the tourist sector. One of the most complete
and comprehensive definitions is given by Tempelman (1975). According
to the author, employment in the tourist sector may be distinguished
into primary and secondary:
Primary employment is created directly by the demand for
tourist services which create the revenues of tourist development.
Secondary employment is created throughout the economy by the spending
and respending of the incomes earned from primary employment. Primary
employment may be further distinguished into direct and indirect
employment: Direct employment is created in the tourist industry by
the provision of various services directly to tourists (accommodation
sector, restaurants, travel agencies etc). Indirect employment is
generated in other sectors of the economy which supply goods and
services to those who serve the tourists directly (e.g. builders, food
and drink suppliers etc) (Van Houts, 1979, p. 114 and Medlik, 1979, p.
10).
It is obvious from this definition that the size of the
primary direct employment depends on the size of tourist expenditure
in a destination area, that is on the size of the tourist market. The
number of new jobs created in primary indirect employment, on the
other hand, will depend on the strength of the backward linkages
between the tourist sectors and other industries which, in turn, will
depend on the existence and development level of intermediate and
final goods industries and on their ability to meet the demand of the
tourist sector, as well as on the import content of the tourist
product. Finally, the size of the secondary employment depends on the
size of the tourist employment multiplier, that is, the ratio of the
primary employment created by a given level of tourist expenditure to
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the secondary employment created by the same level of expenditure.
Assuming that one accepts this definition of tourist
employment, which as mentioned above is one of the completest
encountered in the relevant literature, one runs into tremendous
difficulties when attempting to measure the exact level of tourist
employment in an economy. The first difficulty arises from the extreme
diversity of the various activities involved in forming the tourist
product and the consequent difficulty in defining the sector, which
results in a question as to which of the numerous jobs encountered in
the various industries should be included in tourist employment. The
difficulty becomes even greater if one takes into account that many of
the existing jobs in clearly tourism or tourism related industries,
such as catering, entertainment etc, may be generated by the
expenditure of the inhabitants of the destination area rather than by
the expenditure of tourists (Schmidhauser, 1979, p. 106). Apart from
this, there are two other major problems as far as measuring tourist
employment is concerned:
A. Most types of tourism are highly seasonal. The fact that the
tourist product cannot be stored but must be consumed immediately when
produced, combined with the fact that most destination areas mainly
offer holiday tourism which can only be enjoyed during certain months
of the year, causes demand to be highly seasonal, usually peaking
during the summer months and being lower during the rest of the year.
This particularity of tourism should naturally be expected to have
some implications for the nature of tourist employment, at least as
far as the decision to enter, the type of employment attracted and its
mobility are concerned, despite the fact that, according to the WTO
(World Tourist Organisation) only 25% of tourism employees are victim
of this seasonality (Van louts, 1979, p. 116). Various remedies
against the seasonal nature of tourism have been suggested, most of
which aim at prolonging the tourist season. Some of these are
mentioned below:
1. Development of different forms of tourism apart from holiday
tourism which suffers the most from seasonality, such as conference
tourism, winter tourism etc. This would have the effect of prolonging
the tourist season and taking some of the pressure off the summer
months.
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2. Longer vacation time which would allow splitting or second
holidays; staggering of holidays, e.g. no summer closure of the
schools; sabbaticals, winter "sun-breaks etc, which would all have
the same effect as point 1 (Okawa, 1971 p. 25 and British Tourist
Authority, 1981, pp. 4 and 18).
3. Price variation of tourist services according to the level of
demand during different parts of the year (Gray, 1972, p. 143)
4. Development of "permanent tourism" for retired people and their
families, which would also have the advantage of attracting friends
and relatives as potential tourists (Economist Intelligence Unit,
1973, p. 63).
B. A large proportion of employment in the tourist sector consists of
part-time or secondary (e.g. female) employment. Tourism may also
attract employment on a part time basis from other sectors, e.g.
agriculture, whose seasonal nature is complementary to tourism. In
general, tourism is considered as an industry requiring low skilled
labour, especially at the initial-intermediate development stages,
with the result that it is used by young people, unemployed or part
time workers as a sort of second choice job or one from which they
will eventually move on to other sectors or to better paid jobs in the
same sector. As a consequence, the mobility of tourist employment is
very high. It was estimated (Van Houts, 1979, p. 116), that in some
developing countries, the whole hotel staff is being completely
changed every three years, due to the high mobility of labour in this
sector..
As a consequence of these difficulties in accurately
measuring employment in the tourist sector, either there are no
available data or the existing employment data are highly unreliable.
In the absence of data on tourism employment the share of tourism in
the GDP of a country may be used as an approximation of primary
tourism employment. That is, assuming that a given level of
expenditure sustains a given level of employment, one attributes to
tourism the share of total employment analogous to the one which would
be generated by its share in GDP, to account for primary employment
and then uses an employment multiplier to estimate the level of
secondary employment. Another way to approximate the level of
employment in tourism is to assume that it is a function of the total
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number of beds. In Switzerland, for example, this was estimated to be
0.4 of an employed person per bed (Schmidhauser, 1979, pp. 107 and
112).
3. Tourism as an Income Generator 
The importance of international tourist expenditure as far
as the economy of a country is concerned, may also be assessed through
its impact on the GDP of the country considered. The following table
shows the contribution of international tourist receipts to the GDP of
the EC countries, in 1985.
Table IV.B3 Tourist receipts as % of GDP, EUR(12), 1970-1987.
1970	 0.5	 -	 1.1	 0.8	 1.9	 4.5	 1.4	 1.2	 3.8	 4.5	 0.8	 2.0
1985	 3.2 3.4 2.1	 1.7	 5.5	 4.2	 3.2	 2.0	 7.0	 6.1	 2.2	 2.7
1987	 1.1	 2.3	 1.5	 0.7	 5.0	 3.3	 1.6	 1.3	 6.5	 7.6	 1.6	 2.9
Source:1) Commission of the European Communities, 	 1985, p. 4.
2) UN Statistical Notebook, various issues.
3) Own calculations.
The share of tourism in GDP is highest, as we may see, for
Spain and Portugal, followed by Greece, for 1985 and 1987, thus,
highlighting once again, the importance of the tourist industry for
the economies of the Mediterranean countries. Despite the fact,
however, that the percentage of tourist receipts in the GDP of a
country is a strong indication as to the importance of its tourist
market,it is not an exact indication as far as income generation for
the country is concerned. The effects of tourist expenditure on
income, resemble a lot, although they do not coincide with, the
effects of tourism on employment, which were examined in the previous
paragraph, in the sense that they can, also, be distinguished in
primary and secondary, direct and indirect. In order to estimate the
contribution of tourism to the generation of direct income, one must,
first of all, deduce from the gross tourist receipts, any "leakages"
of income from the regional or national economy towards the rest of
the world, which would reduce the net income that would finally stay
EUR(12)
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within the economy. Potential leakages may include (English, 1986, p.
25 and Erbes, 1972, pp. 73-4):
1. The import content of consumer goods and services directly sold to
the tourist, e.g. imported food or drink, cosmetics, petrol etc. This
category of leakages also includes expenses for publicity abroad etc.
2. The import content of goods and services sold to the tourist
industry by other sectors. This means that one must know the
proportion of the product of these sectors represented by goods and
services sold to the tourist sector, that is, the specific structure
of the intermediate purchases of the tourist sector.
3. The import content of capital goods for the tourism sector, (e.g.
import content of hotels, elevators, taxis, buses).
4. The import content of governmental expenditure for the
infrastructure requirements of the tourist sector, e.g. airports,
roads, electricity, sewage etc.
5. Foreign exchange payments to factors supplying services for the
national tourist sector, These could include, among others,
remittances of foreign workers employed by the tourist sector, profit
transfers abroad on the part of foreign owned firms, payments to
foreign tour operators.
One should bear in mind, that the leakages mentioned above
reflect the structure of the economy in general and do not, generally,
arise directly from the tourist industry, as it is plausible to assume
that incomes earned in tourism are likely to be spent in much the same
way as those earned, for example, in the manufacturing sector,
including the same sort of balance between expenditure on domestically
supplied goods and on imports (IUOTO, 1975, p. 10).
Once it is possible to estimate tourist earnings net of
import content of tourism without being stopped by unsurmountable
difficulties concerning the availability of data, the determination of
the industries to be included in the definition of the tourist sector
etc, the result is the income generated in the tourist industry by
international tourism.
The direct revenue created by the initial tourist
expenditure to the tourist industry, will be spent, eventually, to pay
for the salaries of the various workers employed in the industry, to
replenish the stocks of the various tourist establishments etc, thus,
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1 -TPI
TIM- MPS +MPI where,
creating additional indirect incomes. These additional direct and
indirect incomes will also be spent and respent within the economy in
order to purchase goods and services produced by other sectors, thus
inducing an increased overall economic activity, and at each round of
spending some of these incomes will leak outside the economy, until,
gradually, the impact of the initial expenditure on national income
dies out (Mathieson and Wall, 1982, pp. 64-5). One of the ways most
often used to estimate the total income (direct, indirect and
secondary) generated by one unit of initial tourist expenditure, is
the Keynesian income multiplier (Goodall and Ashworth, 1988, p. 120).
The latter can be defined as the number by which the initial tourist
expenditure must be multiplied, in order to obtain the total
cumulative income effect for a specific period of time (usually one
year: Mathieson and Wall, 1982, p. 64). The tourist income multiplier
is usually expressed in the following form (Erbes, 1972, pp. 90-2,
Murphy, 1985, p. 91):
TIM=Tourism income multiplier
TPI=Propensity to import of the tourist sector which is measured by
the ratio of total imports of the tourist sector to the total
expenditure of international tourists (Erbes, 1972, p. 90).
MPS=Marginal propensity of the residents to save rather than spend
their earnings.
MPI=Marginal propensity of residents to import.
The size of the multiplier varies from case to case,
depending on the size and complexity of the economy and the consequent
need of both tourists and residents to rely on imported goods (IUOTO,
1975, p. 10), as well as the residents' propensity to save rather than
spend (Murphy, 1985, p. 91). In general, the higher the country's
propensity to import, the higher will be the leakage of income outside
the economy and the lower the multiplier. The smaller the economic
base and diversification of the economy, the more reliant it will be
on imports, leading to a low value of the multiplier. The latter is
also influenced by the internal structure of the economy and the
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strength of the internal linkages between the various economic
sectors. The greater they are, the less likely it will be that
supplies will be required from outside the economy and, therefore, the
greater the value of the multiplier. A low import content and the
existence of an intermediate goods industry, possessing strong
linkages with the tourist industry and able to meet the demand of the
sector, is of particular importance. Even if, at the initial stages of
tourist development tourist demand is mainly satisfied through
imports, a stable long run demand of this sort should, under normal
circumstances, lead to the development of import substituting
industries for the production of these goods.
As far as the short term economic impacts of tourist
expenditure are concerned, multipliers can provide a lot of useful
information as far as (Mathieson and Wall, 1982, p. 71):
1. Identifying weak linkages in the economy (in the sense that a
relatively high increase in tourism expenditure leading to a
relatively low GDP growth, would imply weak linkages between the
tourist sector and total output).
2. Provide information on the degree to which such objectives as
maximising income and employment and minimising foreign exchange
losses are being met.
3. Identify areas in the economy which need stimulation and others
which bring large benefits and should be expanded.
The use of multipliers, however, is limited, as far as
long term economic analysis is concerned, because they assume that the
structure of the economy remains unchanged and that, without tourism,
all factors of production used in tourism would be unemployed which is
obviously, not the case. Multipliers imply that the total income
generated and the net income impact of tourism are the same (Erbes,
1972, pp. 90-2). It is believed, however, that there are two
conditions which tourism must fulfill in order to have a net impact on
National Income (Erbes, 1972, pp. 76-7).
1: The ratio costs in foreign exchange of the foreign exchange
earned/receipts in foreign exchange, must, obviously, be less than
one.
2: The foreign exchange earnings attributable to tourism must imply
that total earnings are higher than what they would have been if the
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country possessed no tourism sector. There are three ways to express
this condition:
a) The ratio of net tourist earnings to the cost in national currency
must be higher than for other sectors. This condition, however, is not
easily applicable because other export sectors usually do not export
such a high share of their product compared to the tourist sector,
where in some cases, nearly the whole output of the sector may be
exported.
b) The value of a local product sold by the tourist industry to
tourists must be higher than that of the same product on export
markets. It seems that this condition is fulfilled in many cases of
adverse terms of trade.
c) For the same input of factors of production, net foreign exchange
earnings by the tourism sector must, either be higher than foreign
exchange earnings by other sectors, or higher than foreign exchange
savings of industries producing import substitutes. In most cases,
apparently, (Erbes, 1972, p. 77), tourist receipts net of import
content earned with the same inputs, are higher than foreign exchange
savings of industries producing import substitutes with the same (or
higher) import content, since the latter are, usually, subsidised by
tariff protection, while the export sector, especially tourism,
usually has little or no protection.
In conclusion, there are reasons to suppose that if the
first condition is satisfied, the tourist industry, in developing
countries, may earn more foreign exchange than import substituting
industries (Erbes, 1972, p. 77). Compared with other export sectors,
the case is rather inconclusive, but may well be in favour of tourism
as a net income generator, given the fact that demand for tourist
services is rising faster than for most export products.
4. Tourism and Regional Development 
Apart from its favourable effects on the national economy
as far as mainly the balance of payments and generating income and
employment is concerned, it is considered that tourism may have a
particularly important role to play on the regional level as well. At
this stage the analysis will rather be brief, since regional aspects
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will be extensively analysed with reference to the case of Greece.
Most countries, irrespectively of whether they are
industrially developed or not usually are somewhat of a "dual"
nature, both in the sense of development level and economic
performance. The group of their relatively backward regions though is
not homogeneous, since it may include regions with different kinds of
problems. We should, therefore, distinguish,
- regions which have not been developed yet, at least not as much as
the rest of the country (e.g. rural areas, islands etc);
-regions which have been developed in the past but which are now
lagging behind, as far as the average development level of the country
is concerned, usually because the demand for their products has been
declining, either because of changing consumption patterns or changing
production techniques or both (e.g. declining industrial regions in
developed countries).
It is supposed that, because of the fact that the observed
distribution of tourist development is highly uneven and could be
directed away from industrial centres, to relatively low income
regions with a lower development level than the average of the
country, it may help reduce regional disparities and imbalances as
well as promote decentralisation (English, 1986, p. 37, Williams and
Shaw, 1988, p. 7).
The economic impact of tourism on the regional level can
be felt in same areas as on the national level, i.e concerning mainly,
income and employment generation and can be measured in the same way,
provided regional data are available. However, the net impact of
tourist development on regional income and employment depends on a
slightly different set of factors and, most importantly, on the
structure of the regional economy and on the type of tourism developed
in the region. In the case of the national economy, the net impact of
tourism on income and employment depends primarily on the import
content of the tourist product and on the leakages of receipts outside
the economy, as well as on the percentage of expatriate labour
employed. On the regional level, the same set of conditions apply as
well, but with some differences:
-First of all, the backward linkages between tourism and the other
economic sectors tend to be rather weak on the regional level, due to
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the much lower degree of diversification of the regional economy,
compared to the national one (Brownrigg and Greig, 1976, pp. 7-9).
-Furthermore, this lack of diversification of the regional economy
causes the costs for the development of the tourist sector to be
higher, as long as all infrastructure investment required for the
development of the tourist sector has to be solely or mainly
attributed to tourism in the absence of external economies and
benefits spread among various different industries and economic
sectors (Gray, 1972, p. 156).
Consequently, at the regional level, both the import content and the
costs incurred by the tourist sector are likely to be much higher than
at the national level and the net impact of tourism on income and
employment much lower. This, however, depends on the size and
structure of the regional economy. The larger it is, the more
diversified it is likely to be, the less dependent on tourism and the
more able to use local resources in the tourist industry rather than
import them.
The type of tourism developed and the type of tourists
attracted by a region will also have a different impact on the
regional level of income and employment (Williams and Shaw, 1988, pp.
7-10 . It is argued that if the aim of the policy makers is the
narrowing (and hopefully the elimination) of regional disparities,
depending on which part of the international tourist market is being
served (e.g. high or low income tourists), tourist development in
less-developed regions which could be attractive to tourists, should
rather be low level and small scale, so as to be well integrated in
the region's structure and development level, in order to use the
maximum level of local resources and labour. It is believed that if
the level of tourist development is low enough in this case, it may
even rely a hundred per cent on local suppliers and labour. If, on the
other hand, the aim is to achieve the fastest possible rate of overall
growth, then, tourist development should be planned on a high level
and large scale basis which would have the effect of attracting higher
spending tourists. This type of tourist development is more likely to
rely heavily on foreign investors and know-how, supplies from outside
the region and a high ratio of non regional labour with the result
that a form of internal migration might develop (Chow, 1980, p. 602,
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Williams and Shaw, 1988, P
.
 10).
The gradual economic integration of the European
countries, widens the meaning of the national and regional level. The
"harmonious development of all regions in the Community" is included
in the Rome Treaty as one of the main goals of the EC. Therefore,
another way to look at the role of tourism as far as narrowing
regional disparities is concerned, would be to examine its role in
relation to its contribution to economic convergence within the EC. It
has been supported that the fact that tourism grows faster for low
income countries (e.g. the Mediterranean countries whose share in
world receipts and arrivals rises faster than the EC average), even if
one could support that in a sense, this happens by chance, argues in
favour of the fact that tourist development contributes to reducing
the regional disparities within the EC framework (Yannopoulos, 1987,
p. 2). It seems, however, that this is true, in real terms, only up to
1980. After that, the share of Southern Europe in World receipts and
arrivals seems to remain stable.
The main explanation for that given by the author (op.
cit.) is that the kind of tourism developed by the Mediterranean
countries (mainly holiday tourism due to their climate) is highly
elastic to the disposable income of the tourist generating countries
as well as to relative prices. It would also be possible to argue that
tourism, in these countries, was income elastic only during the
1970s-80s, or only for certain income brackets which are no longer
applicable to some West European countries. There is also an element
of the tourist destinations gradually widening, for tourists from
North-Western Europe, e.g. a spread from Spain and Italy, initially,
to Greece, Turkey and parts of Africa. The economic recession in
Western Europe and the fact that economic integration in the EC
implies some sort of wage and price convergence among its members
which has an adverse effect on the competitiveness of the EC
Mediterranean countries in comparison to non-EC Mediterranean
countries, could also, in part, explain this trend.
Due to their inherent comparative advantage as far as
tourism is concerned, however, these countries could still adopt
policies which would make them more competitive. Their main options
appear to be a higher degree of vertical integration of their tourist
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industries which would enable them to receive a larger share of a
given level of world receipts, Horizontal differentiation of their
products through the development of new forms of tourism less
vulnerable to seasonality, disposable income and relative prices (e.g.
conference tourism), and greater price competitiveness through a well
planned pricing policy (Yannopoulos, 1987, pp. 11-30).
Apart from these policy options, if the above argument is
true, it would certainly have significant policy implications on the
macro-level, which will be discussed in the last chapter of the
thesis.
C. DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF TOURISM.
1. The Demand for Tourist Services 
Given the nature of the tourist industry and the
particularities associated with it, the problem of forecasting the
demand for tourist services and matching the level of demand with the
level of supply for each period, appears more critical and far more
complicated where tourism is concerned than for most other goods and
services.
Tourism has been characterised as a particular case of an
export industry whose whole product is consumed on the spot. A major
particularity of the tourist product, however, is that, being a
service activity, once produced, it must be consumed within a given
period of time. It differs from most traditional goods in that it
cannot be stored or stocked in order to be consumed at some later
date, if faced with deficient demand. Production, sale and consumption
are, therefore, identical in tourism, precisely because the product,
as a whole, is non storable. The problems faced by the hotel industry
arise mainly from this fact, because the production and distribution
of tourist services only happens at the time of demand for them. The
seasonal nature of tourism results in that, whatever part of the
tourist product is not consumed, represents a loss to those producing
and distributing tourist services. It is clear, therefore, that for a
country specialising (or intending to specialise) in the production of
tourist services, correctly forecasting the demand for its tourist
product becomes a major issue.
This is especially true for countries specialising in
"holiday tourism" which, for obvious reasons, represents the most
seasonal type of tourism as well as the most vulnerable one to both
economic and non economic changes and shocks. A precise knowledge of
the factors influencing the demand for tourist services would be an
invaluable tool as far as policy measures for the development of the
tourist sector are concerned. Unfortunately, however, it seems that
most major tourist forecasting models are not really very successful
as far as explaining and forecasting tourist flows are concerned
(simple random walk models seem to, in fact, perform better in
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predicting tourist flows for the next couple of years, than expensive
complex ones: Witt, 1990, p. 10).
The heterogeneous, perishable and intangible nature of the
tourist product, and its sensitivity to changing market conditions,
implies that the sector could benefit strongly from intensive use of
information technology. The latest applications to tourism, in this
field, include satellite printers, enabling tickets to be issued
directly at the point of demand, toll free numbers and computerised
reservations systems which would enable hotels to communicate late
vacancies to travel agents, thus, selling all, or at least, most of
their output, as well as allowing potential customers to catch this
sort of bargains. Because the tourist product cannot be inspected
before it is bought, information technology such as videos and video
brochures broadcasting various information about specific destinations
could be immensely useful (Poon, 1989, pp. 97 and 190). Apart from
increasing the efficiency and productivity of the tourist sector,
adoption of these new technologies will also lower the cost of
provision of tourist services and improve their quality. The fact that
information technology seems to be especially suited to services in
general (and international tourism, in particular), because of the
intangible nature of these products, comes as a contradiction to
traditional thinking where services are seen as parasitic and as
depending on the manufacturing sector for their development. On the
contrary, under this angle of view, services can be seen as a source
of growth on their own, with the ability to improve traditional
activities and to generate new ones and with, obviously, considerable
effects on the manufacturing sector of a post-industrial society
(Poon, 1989, p. 94).
Due to the particular nature of the tourist product, a
number of difficulties arise when attempting to model the demand for
tourism by directly applying traditional consumer theory.
First of all, the tourist product, contrary to the
assumptions of traditional consumer theory, is not homogeneous. It is
highly heterogeneous, most countries specialising in tourism having
something different to offer potential consumers. This combined with
the changing nature of international tourism, where a large share of
tourists are now planning their own trips instead of relying on
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package tours and are travelling for a combined variety of reasons
(including health, cultural, social, etc) instead of only holiday
tourism, results in that efficient marketing of different destination
areas may lead to their increased competitiveness in the tourist
industry and to their acquisition of a larger share of the tourist
market.
In the second place, tourism is considered to be a
"luxury" good and is to be found relatively high in the hierarchy of
goods, with a high income elasticity of demand. The demand for tourism
tends to rise much faster than income, at relatively high levels of
the latter. It has been estimated that the threshold, in terms of
income, where tourism expenditure begins to feature in household
budgets of the tourist generating countries, is around 500$-1,000$
(1970 prices, Young, 1973, P. 35). The fact that tourism is a luxury
good, highly sensitive to changes in disposable income, results in
that the propensity to consume tourist services has been observed to
rise in booms and drop in recessions. Furthermore, the demand for
tourism is highly elastic to changes in non-economic factors, such as
political crises, changes in preferences and expectations etc, all of
which are unpredictable factors, making the correct and accurate
forecasting of consumer demand for tourism a very hard task (Gray,
1972, pp. 50-1, Schulmeister, 1979, pp. 94-6).
Apart from the unpredictable and non-modelable effects
which exogenous factors may have on the demand for tourism, various
socioeconomic factors have been shown to be related somehow, to the
propensity to travel. Table IV.C1 shows the relation of some of these
with the demand for holiday tourism abroad.
Apart from income which is the single most important
factor positively related to the demand for tourism, it has been shown
that, especially when competition among different destinations and the
orientation of demand enters into the picture, there is a number of
other factors influencing the demand for holiday tourism as well.
Relative prices between different destination countries as
well as between a prospective destination country and the country of
origin of tourists seem to play an important role, although it has
been argued that, because of incomplete information prior to
travelling, they influence the length of stay in a given country
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Factor
	
Influence on travel
Income
Education of head of household
Occupation	 ..
	
..
Paid vacation
Urbanisation
Age of head of household
Life cycle
Race
Sex
Positively related
Positively related
Positively related to status
Positively related
Negatively related
II	 II
Negatively related to child
impedance and age
Non whites less active
Males more active
rather than the decision to visit the country in question
(Schulmeister, 1979).
Table IV.C1 Determinants of the Demand for Tourism (1).
1. Refers to the U.S.A.
Source: Young, 1973, p. 31.
The distance of a prospective destination country from the
major tourist generating countries, which has a major effect on
transportation costs, is another factor which influences the decision
to visit a particular country. It has been argued, that, especially
where holiday tourism is concerned, distance is one of the main
reasons why the Southern European countries are preferred on the part
of Western European tourists to most Third World countries, as long
as, in terms of climate, at least, both groups of countries have
similar things to offer. Weekly working hours also seem to affect the
decision to travel, since fewer working hours free more time to
travel.
Other factors which have been shown to be related to
tourism are, the income distribution in the tourist generating country
or countries, (the more equal it is, the more people will be able to
travel), price differences in terms of the currency of the tourist
generating country, i.e. exchange rates (Gray, 1972, p. 50), private
consumption which may be either positively or negatively related to
the demand for tourism depending on whether tourism is considered a
complementary or substitution good (Schulmeister, 1979, p. 95), etc.
An interesting thing about all the variables mentioned
above as being related to the demand for tourism, with the possible
exception of relative prices, is that not one of them depends or is
controllable by the destination countries. All of them are related to
the tourist generating countries, a fact which, as far as demand
forecasting and policy measures on the part of destination countries
is bound to raise some difficulties. Given that the production of
tourist services is mainly demand-led and that demand for
international tourism is mainly generated in the major tourist
generating countries, this, also raises the question of dependence of
the destination countries on the tourist generating countries, at
least where the most popular type of tourism, holiday tourism is
concerned. This, will be dealt with, among others, in the following
paragraph.
2. The Supply side of tourism
The supply side of the tourist industry, consists mainly,
as one would expect, of the basic tourist resources and attractions of
the destination country considered, whether these represent sunny,
sandy beaches or cultural heritage or both or whatever else. In order,
however, to make these basic resources more attractive, more enjoyable
and more easily accessible to potential tourists, a high level of
capital investment is required, for the development of a whole network
of supporting and complementary facilities; these are necessary in
order to meet tourist requirements and to enable the particular region
of tourist development to support a larger population than normal, for
part of the year, in spite of the fact that many tourists are
attracted by "unspoiled" places, with lower levels of obvious capital
investment.
Investment in the tourist sector may be distinguished into
three categories: 1) infrastructure investment, 2) investment in the
accommodation sector and 3) investment in the non-hotel branch. Where
infrastructure is concerned, which may be seen as an extensive and
highly indivisible type of fixed capital investment, tourism can be a
heavy user of capital, in relation to other sectors (Erbes, 1972, p.
12). Sometimes, the capital investment necessary for the
infrastructure requirements of the tourist sector is so considerable
(e.g. investment in airports and national airlines which will provide
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easy access to the destination considered, roads, sewage and
electricity installations to provide for tourists etc) that individual
businessmen or even the private sector as a whole, would be rather
unlikely to provide them on their own without state assistance. As a
consequence, it is usually the government which is called upon to
provide all the necessary infrastructure requirements of the tourist
industry, as well as its promotion abroad through advertising and the
financing of tourist offices , while the private sector is left with
the task of providing the bulk of tourist facilities and services such
as accommodation, catering etc. Typically, the private sector
initiates and leads the process of tourist development, while the
government provides the necessary financial assistance and
accommodates the demands and requirements of the former (Helber, 1987,
p. 17). This sort of policy, however, usually results in two major
disadvantages:
1. In the first place, when the planning and spatial distribution of
tourist development is left to the private sector, this may result in
a highly scattered and uneven pattern of development, as well as to
the inefficient use of resources, duplication of facilities, (Murphy,
1985, p. 17), over or under estimation of the tourist market and
consequent over or under investment etc. The latter is particularly
important, because of the seasonality of tourist demand, as
overinvestment may result in very low occupation rates (sometimes
lower than one half of the installed capacity), and consequently in an
abnormally high capital-output ratio for the tourist industry (Erbes,
1972, p. 12). It may furthermore result in the saturation of already
congested regions rather than in the development of retarded ones, as
long as private investment will tend to concentrate itself in already
developed regions where the necessary basic infrastructure is
relatively abundant. Underinvestment,on the other hand, may result in
unrecoverable losses, if demand proves to be higher than anticipated.
2. The danger of high dependence on the tourist generating countries
may become even more acute. The particular structure of the tourist
industry, where the product is immobile and has to be "bought" before
it is actually "consumed" (the prospective tourist has to book and pay
for his trip before he can actually see what he has bought by visiting
the country he has chosen), results in that the market place of the
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tourist product, where demand and supply of tourism are confronted,
consists of the "retailers" of the tourist product, that is the tour
operators. Here, however, the destination countries usually find
themselves at a disadvantage because it is very rare for the big tour
operators to be located in the destination countries. For a variety of
reasons, the most important of which is probably that demand may be
better observed and met where it is generated, they are usually
positioned in the tourist generating countries. Because of the
particularity of the tourist product mentioned above (immobility),
tour operators have the additional advantage that they are in a
position, not only to satisfy the demand for tourist services, but to
shape it, as well, up to a point and to direct it towards particular
destinations which seem more profitable to them. By being able to
orientate tourist flows to specific destinations, they are in a
position to dictate, up to a point, their terms to the destination
countries, especially as far as pricing policies, standards of tourist
services and the type of tourism (mass or high class) are concerned.
The fact that the tourist sector, usually, in most countries,
consists, mainly, of small family owned units scattered all over the
place and competing strongly between them for a larger share of the
tourist market, the fragmented and disorganised nature of the
industry, especially as far as the labour force is concerned, where,
due to the seasonality of demand trade unionism is very
underdeveloped, makes the imposition of their terms on the destination
countries even easier for the large tour operators. Again, because of
the disorganised and fragmented nature of their national tourist
sectors and the difficulty in communicating decisions on public policy
to all the agents involved (Cleverdon, 1979, p. 103), destination
countries, usually, cannot promote the vertical integration of the
supply side of the tourist industry and are obliged to accept these
terms in order to be included in the list of potential destinations of
the tour operators.
The conclusion to be derived from the above is that, if
tourism is to be seen as a major growth sector in a country, planning
is crucial. (Cleverdon, 1979, p. 103, Murphy, 1985, p. 33). Generally
speaking and, for reasons mentioned above, state intervention is
imperative where the tourist sector is concerned, in order to help
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ensure a more efficient operation of the sector. State intervention
usually implies planning, even in a market economy. Planning, however,
is also necessary where the private sector is involved in the tourist
sector, for reasons also mentioned above, especially in the case of
developing countries, where, usually, low entrepreneurship (although
the exact definition of this term is still undetermined: Barton and
Lischeron, 1991), and know-how, raise the need for more guidance and
support of the private sector, on the part of the State. In order to
help counteract the problems mentioned above, the government, apart
from providing assistance to the private sector, should assume an
additional role where tourist development is concerned: It should plan
and lead the process of tourist development and stimulate the interest
of the private sector (assuming that the latter will respond when
profits start to flow), within a comprehensive tourist development
plan which would chart a course of action in order to facilitate
private investment consistent with the predetermined goals and
objectives (Murphy, 1985, p. 18). There are certain major issues which
a government should consider in formulating such a plan:
-The government would have to decide the rate of growth desired in the
tourist sector as well as its importance in the national economy and
the way tourist development will fit in with plans for the regional
development of the country. It will have to decide, for example,
whether tourism will be considered a major or a complementary growth
industry, whether it should be concentrated in already developed areas
with existing infrastructure or in underdeveloped regions in order to
iron out regional imbalances etc (Robinson, 1976, p. 194).
-It should draw a summary of the regions of the country and of the
attractions and resources of each. Land zoning would be necessary, in
order to promote regional development and direct different types of
investment (e.g. tourist or industrial) to those regions where this
type of development would be most profitable (Cleverdon, 1979, p.
110).
Depending on whether fast growth or a slower and more
selective one is desired, the tourist market of the country would have
to be segmented and the tourist product of the country or of different
regions would have to be differentiated, in order to attract different
categories of tourists, (a large volume of low spending tourists or a
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smaller number of high spending tourists), according to the planned
objectives and carrying capacity of the country or region in question
(Murphy, 1985, p. 20).
In formulating its tourist development plan, the
government would also have to decide the respective roles of the
public and private sectors as well as the roles of local and foreign
capital (Gearing and Swart, 1976, Robinson, 1976, p. 194). Foreign
investment in the national tourist sector may have the advantages that
it would bring in considerable know how and that foreign investors
would be less likely to overestimate the local tourist market than
local investors and thus the danger of excessive installed capacity
and low occupancy rates could be somewhat counteracted, but it also
has the disadvantage that it decreases the share of net benefits to a
country or region (Gray, 1972, p. 153).
The most famous case of state intervention in the tourist
sector, is in Spain, where, to a certain extent, development is
tourist-led. In this case as well as in the case of most countries
where the tourist sector was turned into a major growth industry, a
ministry of tourism or a similar national organisation was created in
order to plan and promote the development of the tourist sector, and
accommodate its particular requirements, taking into account its
particular structure and its need for different treatment where
economic policy is concerned.
One should keep in mind, that the various particularities
of the sector, especially where its structure of ownership is
concerned, consisting of a large number of independent small to
average family units, could have the advantage that if the government
found a way to get over the major difficulty of communicating its
policy plans to the various agents involved, its planning for the
development of the sector could be more effective and efficient than
in the case of a smaller number of bigger, organised, and stronger
units. However, efficient communication with and control of the
various units involved in the production and distribution of tourism
would call for a high degree of decentralisation. Unfortunately, while
this may be possible in relatively advanced economies, it is virtually
unheard of in less developed countries which intend to exploit their
comparative advantage in the provision of tourist services, as all
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government services tend to be highly centralised.
Having seen the rather significant role that the
development of the tourist sector may play in the economies of both
developed and developing counties, we may now turn to the specific
issue of the actual and potential role of tourism as a leading sector
in Greek economic development, which will be dealt with in the
following chapter.
CHAPTER V
THE ROLE OF THE TOURIST SECTOR IN
THE GREEK ECONOMY
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A. INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOURIST SECTOR AND THE
ROLE OF THE STATE
The present chapter consists of an application of the
theoretical analysis of the previous chapter to the development of the
tourist sector in Greece; an understanding of its particular features
as well as the problems, difficulties and inefficiencies involved, is
attempted, in order to examine the possibility for tourism to perform
as a leading sector in the economic development of the country.
The development of the tourist sector in Greece is relatively
recent; in fact, this sector only achieved any significant proportions
in the late 1960s, when a number of new destinations, i.e. Portugal,
Spain and Yugoslavia made their appearance in the international
tourist mass market. This rather late development may be attributed to
factors such as: the distance of the country from the major tourist
generating countries of Western Europe, (and the fact that, in order
to reach Greece, by road at least, tourists, usually, have to pass
through other competitor countries, i.e. Yugoslavia or Italy); the
absence, until then, of any significant infrastructure able to support
tourist development; the strong political turmoil in the post-war
period which both delayed and acted as a setback for the development
of Greek tourism (Robinson, 1976, p. 330).
The Greek government first expressed an interest in tourism in
1953, when foreign exchange shortages started to impose pressures on
the economy after the end of the Marshall plan aid (although the
devaluation of the drachma and the consequent inflows of foreign
currency relieved these pressures to a certain extent: Logothetis,
1982, p. 25). The development of the tourist sector though started
later, in 1960, accelerating especially after 1970 (when industrial
growth rates started to decline). Between 1951 and 1964, the State
invested heavily in infrastructure projects, in an attempt to
restructure the country after the devastation of World War II and the
civil war that followed it. The bulk of public investment was then
channeled into construction and housing projects, while the "first
investment crisis" (stagnation in investment) that hit the economy
between 1958 and 1964 (Vaitsos in Tzannatos, 1986, p. 74), was
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expressed in a relative passivity of the private sector and a general
reluctance on its part to invest in dynamic branches such as
manufacturing or any major tourist projects (Komilis, 1986, p. 167).
The major part of private investment, during that period, was also
absorbed by the housing sector (see chapter II).
Tourism started featuring in plans and policies for economic
development, after 1960, when its potential for growth was beginning
to be realised (Alexandrakis, 1975, p. 174). However, tourism was only
seen as a major source of foreign exchange, as a means of covering the
growing deficit of the balance of payments; public policies, both
before and after 1974 (restoration of democracy), were aimed at very
short-run goals, i.e. at a rapid maximisation of tourist earnings in
order to pay for increasing imports and outweigh the limited
competitiveness of the country's visible exports on world markets. The
development of the tourist sector was especially emphasized after the
imposition of the dictatorship in Greece (April 1967), when a
simultaneous emphasis on constructions and housing was used in order
to "heat up the economy" (Leontidou, 1988, p. 82). Increased interest
in infrastructure, constructions, housing and tourism on the part of
the Junta can be explained by the freezing of the EC association
agreement. During the last years before the imposition of the military
regime, the Greek economy had been increasingly shifting to trade with
the EC countries. When this option was very much limited after the
imposition of the dictatorship, the government's options where the
industrial sector, trade etc were concerned shrunk significantly.
Consequently, it was, in a sense, forced, in the first place to start
trading heavily with the former communist countries and, in the second
place, to shift its resources elsewhere. The resulting emphasis on the
development and promotion of the Greek tourist sector was incorporated
in both five year development plans of the economy (1966-70, 1968-72).
The main goals set in both plans (which highlight the aims of tourist
development mentioned above), were (Alexandrakis, 1975, p. 177):
1) The acceleration of tourist development,
2) The improvement of the seasonal distribution of tourism,
3) The maintenance or increase of the average length of stay and per
capita expenditure,
4) Attraction of high income tourists,
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5) The development of the tourist sector within a regional development
plan.
The implementation of these plans through EOT (National Tourist
Organization), which, since it was founded in 1950, is the executive
body responsible for the formulation and implementation of
governmental tourist policy, included among other things, total
investment in tourism targeted at 500 million $ (current prices) for
the five year period 1966-70, with the State leading the way and
providing the necessary infrastructure and support, while the private
sector would undertake accommodation investment. In order to acquire
the necessary capital, special concessions were granted to all private
investors who wanted to invest in the hotel industry, in the form of
tax and depreciation allowances (Singh, 1978, p. 131), irrespectively
of origin, location or kind of investment. The average annual growth
rate of loans rose from 11.3% in the period 1960-66 to 26.7% in the
period 1967-73 (Komilis, 1986, p. 166). The result was that due to:
a) The extremely favourable attitude of the State towards private
investors, even including, in certain years an up to 50% State
guarantee on investment loans;
b) The general (and more specific to tourism) development of
infrastructure due to public projects before 1965 and;
c) The rapidly growing demand for tourism both in Europe and in the
Mediterranean countries during the early 60s;
there was a rising interest and a marked shift of the private sector
towards investment in the tourist industry, between 1965-7 and 1974
(Komilis, 1986, p. 167 and KEPE, 1987, p. 52). In contrast to this
shift on the part of the private sector, public investment in tourism
declined during the dictatorship and the expanding hotel industry, in
many cases, was not supported by a corresponding expansion of
infrastructure (Komilis, 1986, p. 167 and Leontidou, 1988, p. 85). As
far as foreign investment is concerned, the following table indicates
that it rose very sharply in 1968, when it accounted for 66.1% of
total foreign capital investment in all the sectors of the Greek
economy. In the period 1957-70, foreign investment in tourism
accounted for 23% of the total investment in the sector and was mostly
concentrated in hotel businesses in coastal areas (Alexandrakis, 1975,
p. 178).
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Table V.A1: Public and Private Investment in Greece, 1957-70, (000s
drs)
Public 1 Private2 private,
domestic
foreign3
%
Total
1957 1100 300 134 8.74 15340
1958 6600 5100 889 7.06 12589
1959 8500 8400 635 13.62 17535
1960 8500 8400 47 0.28 16947
1961 10400 7900 407 2.18 18707
1962 6900 15100 1208 5.21 23208
1963 7300 10300 229 1.28 17829
1964 4000 8100 1391 10.31 13491
1965 7800 9100 844 4.76 17744
1966 9700 10700 1151 5.34 21551
1967 6800 17600 0 0.00 24400
1968 8100 35100 84430 66.15 127630
1969 13100 57400 13468 16.04 83968
1970 14100 65900 6100 7.08 86100
1957-61 35100 30100 2112 3.14 67312
1962-67 42500 70900 4823 4.08 118223
1968-70 35300 158400 103998 34.93 297698
1. Financed by the Government and the National Tourist Organisation,
including infrastructure.
2.Financed by Banks only
3.Foreign investment projects approved by the Ministry of
Coordination.
Source: Alexandrakis, 1975, p. 177.
As far as the regional development and distribution of tourism is
concerned, one could say that public policy did very little to promote
it. Before 1967, policy makers were simply not concerned about it,
that being absolutely compatible with the general inefficiency and
lack of objectives and directives, characterising regional economic
policy in Greece (for a critical evaluation of the latter, see M.
Negreponti- Delivani, 1986, pp. 112-5). Incentives granted to private
investors met criteria of investment viability. High guarantees had to
be given before loans were granted and as a consequence, most tourist
investment projects were concentrated in the larger cities or in areas
where some sort of tourist development had already taken place. The
main reason for this was the higher land values there (which were able
to cover the guarantees requested by the banks) as well as already
existing infrastructure, which made investment prospects there more
profitable. During the dictatorship, loans did not have to meet
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criteria of investment viability, but the extreme generosity of the
State where private investment was concerned, while, in a sense,
promoting decentralisation and regional development, resulted in that
large hotel units were built in areas were still deficient tourist
demand and lacking infrastructure could not support them. The
consequence was a relative oversupply of tourist services, which made
the country very vulnerable and dependent on the pressures of large
tour operators abroad (EOT, 1985, p. 24).
After 1974, when democracy was restored in Greece, the economic
potential of tourism was increasingly realised and its further
development featured in both subsequent five year plans for economic
development (1976-80 and 1983-87). The first of these plans (but
especially the second one) expressed some concern about regional
development, decentralisation and decongestion of congested areas.
Under law 289/1976, the government attempted to favour investment
projects in less developed regions, by introducing various incentives
such as tax exemptions, governmental guarantees etc. However, like in
the period 1968-74, the result was the development of large, non
viable units, in regions where neither the existing infrastructure nor
demand were developed enough to support them. In 1978, therefore,
under law 849/78, tourist investments were excluded from the
favourable treatment granted to the industrial sector, in an attempt
to remedy the above situation. However, until the late 1970s, the
development of a competitive tourist sector, in comparison with the
corresponding sector of competitor Mediterranean countries, had not as
yet been achieved, mainly due to the lack of a comprehensive and
consistent development plan and to an inefficient set of incentives
(KEPE, 1987, p. 56).
The second five year plan (1983-87) emphasized the development
of small, family sized units rather than large ones, discouraged
foreign investment and continued to promote the decentralisation and
regional distribution of tourist services, by pursuing increasing
self-administration of the regions as well as the gradual
decentralisation of EOT (Greek Tourism Organisation). Law 1262/82 aims
at promoting investment in less developed regions and deterring it in
already congested ones. To this effect, the country is divided, by the
above law, into three areas and different investment incentives are
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applied according to their different needs. Tourist investments are
treated in the same way as industrial ones (once again!) and grants
are introduced instead of tax and discount exemptions (Leontidou,
1988, p. 86). However, the fact that loans still have to meet criteria
of investment viability, which, in general does little to promote
regional development, as most investment projects tend to be
concentrated in already developed regions, indicates that tourist
development was still meant as a fast way of earning foreign exchange
in order to cover up for deficits incurred by other economic sectors.
The new five year plan for economic development (1988-1992)
pointed to a further decentralisation and "privatisation" of the
tourist sector and delimited new areas for tourist development
(Leontidou, 1988, p. 86). These provisions, however, have not been
implemented yet, due to the recent multiple elections in Greece, a
fact which makes the identification and evaluation of recent and
future policy trends related to tourism, rather difficult.
B. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TOURISM
1. Tourism as a Leading Sector of the Greek Economy
Despite the highly inefficient, discontinued and
conjectural governmental policies where the development of the tourist
sector is concerned, the latter appears to be one of the most dynamic
and rapidly growing sectors of the Greek economy.
In 1960, when Greece first made its appearance in the
international mass tourist market, 400,000 foreign tourists visited
the country. In 1965, the above figure had already doubled to 847,000
arrivals, reaching 1,407,500 in 1970. In the next ten years, the
number of total foreign arrivals grew by more than four times
(4,532,400 in 1980) and reached 6,885,000 in 1986 and 7,717,500 in
1988. In the period 1967-81, only two countries in the EC experienced
a greater growth in their share of international tourist arrivals than
the general increase: The U.K. with a 167.8% increase compared to 1967
and Greece, with an extraordinary increase of 790% and 30% of
international tourism arrivals recorded in the country (Commission of
the European Communities, 1985, pp. 131-2). Accommodation capacity
from 60,000 beds in 1961 to 359,377 in 1986 (an increase of 498%) in
order to cope with increasing demand, but there is still a relative
shortage of beds in the summer period, while a lot of the capacity
remains idle during winter. Receipts from tourism as a percentage of
GDP rose from 1.22% in 1960 to 1.95 in 1970, and 5.5% in 1988. During
the period 1972-88, Greece, Portugal and Spain have the highest
relation between tourist receipts and GDP, that is, more than twice
the EC average (O'Hagan, 1986, pp. 4-8). Furthermore, tourism paid, on
average, for more than 14% of total imports (23% of manufacturing
imports) and represented more than 33% of total exports of goods and
services, through the period 1970-88. It is obvious that Greece more
than meets Bryden's definition of a "tourist country°. Over the
1
A tourist country is one where tourist receipts exceed 10% of visible
exports. Of the European countries, only Greece, Yugoslavia, Israel
and Spain meet this condition (Cleverdon, 1979, p. 49).
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(1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)
	
(6)
1960	 300.8	 49.3
	 16.5
1965	 847.0	 107.6	 181.5	 118.2	 17.4	 5
1970	 1407.5	 193.6	 66.1	 79.9	 22.9	 31.6
1975	 2840.1	 643.6	 101.7	 232.4	 43.4	 89.5
1980	 4795.9	 1733.5	 68.8	 169.3	 58.5	 34.7
1986	 6885.0	 1834.2	 43.5	 5.8	 54.3	 -7.1
1988	 7717.5	 2140.0	 12.0	 16.6	 55.2	 1.6
period 1972-88, Greece and Spain have the highest percentage of
tourist receipts in exports of goods and services among all the EC
countries.
The following tables indicate the above trends, especially
in comparison to the performance of the Greek manufacturing sector.
Table V.B1: The development of the Greek Tourism Sector, 1960-88
(1): Total Foreign Arrivals (000s)
(2):Total Receipts from International Tourism, million $ U.S.
(Constant 1970 prices)
(3):Annual Average % growth of (1)
(4):Annual Average % growth of (2)
(5):Average Daily Expenditure of Foreign Tourists in Greece, $ U.S.
(constant 1970 prices)
(6):Annual Average % growth of (5)
Sources: 1) The Greek Economy in Figures.
2) Own calculations.
The evolution of the number of total foreign arrivals,
tourist earnings in current $ and average daily expenditure (total
earnings/total number of nights spent in the country) may be seen in
graph V.B1:
Table V.B2: The Development of the Greek Tourism Sector 1960-1988
Manufacturing output	 Tourist Receipts
% of GDP	 % of GDP % of exports % of import
1960	 14.2	 1.22	 23.6	 9.7
1965	 15.0	 1.82	 32.5
	
10.5
1970	 19.0	 1.95	 31.6
	
11.3
1975	 20.8	 3.11	 31.7	 12.6
1980	 21.3	 4.25	 42.3
	
15.8
1986	 18.7	 4.92	 39.6
	
7.8
1988	 19.3	 5.50	 45.1
	
19.9
Source:1) Own Calculations
2) U.N. Statistical Yearbook
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Graph V.B1
The Evolution of International Tourism Receipts, Arrivals and Average
Expenditure
43- arrivals
	
* receipts
	
-0- daily expenditure
Source: 1) The Greek Economy in Figures
2) U.N. Statistical 'learbook , various issues
3) Own calculations
Despite the fact that the years 1967 and 1974 represented
a severe setback for Greek tourism, (the former because of the
dictatorship and the latter because of the oil crisis and political
turmoils related to Cyprus), indicated by a sharp drop in the number
of arrivals, the tourist sector showed a remarkably fast recovery as
both arrivals and receipts shot upwards after each crisis. Both total
earnings (in U.S $) and arrivals drop again between 1979 and 1988
(possibly a combined effect of the second oil shock, President
Reagan's travel directive of 1986 and the fact that inflation in
Greece was rising, by then, at a faster rate than in most EC
countries, the major tourist generating countries for Greece, apart
from the U.S.A.), but rise again from 1984 onwards.
One should keep in mind, when viewing these figures, that
foreign nights spent in Greece (as well as total foreign arrivals and
receipts) are grossly underestimated because only those spent in
hotels and registered rooms for rent are included. However, as
mentioned in numerous parts of this thesis and the present chapter, in
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particular, unlisted rooms and accommodation units have been growing
very fast in Greece and, moreover, a very large part of the foreign
tourists visiting the country, prefer the latter to the former; it has
been estimated (for 1990), that while nights spent in hotels and other
registered accommodation units have dropped by 30%, in comparison to
previous years, they have risen by more than that, as far as
non-registered units are concerned (Papandropoulos, 1991).
Despite the impressive increase in Greek tourism during
the period 1960-88 and especially after 1970, and in spite of various
surveys conducted by European tour operators which forecast that the
Greek tourist market is growing in importance and will continue to
claim even larger shares of international tourism in the future
(Commission of the European Communities, 1985, pp. 150 and 158), there
is still much scope for improvement (KEPE, 1987 and EOT, 1985). Apart
from the relative oversupply and congestion of tourist services in the
summer period and the fact that the seasonal distribution of tourism
is more marked in Greece than in most other European or Mediterranean
countries, a major problem is that the length of stay is lower than in
most other countries and average daily expenditure of tourists is very
low by world wide standards. In 1960, the latter was 13$ compared to
29$ in Israel, 16.8$ in Portugal, 15.7$ in Spain, 12.2$ in Yugoslavia
and 13.7$ in Turkey (Alexandrakis, 1975, pp. 155-7). From then
onwards, while both the number of arrivals and total nights spent in
the country are increasing rapidly, average daily expenditure remains
stable, grows slowly or even decreases for some years. Greece seems to
be increasingly attracting low income tourists, while the small size
of the country does not favour the development of mass tourism like in
Spain. Apart from trying to develop new forms of tourism in order to
deal with the problem of high seasonality, Greece should try to
attract higher income tourists and especially return tourism which has
proved to be a very important source of tourism for the country. It
has been observed, that most tourists who visit the country once, tend
to return at least once more, while most tourist coming to Greece are
influenced by the experience of friends or relatives and very few of
them rely on travel brochures (Leontidou, 1988, p. 90).
The analysis in the rest of this chapter, will correspond,
in terms of sections, to the analysis carried out in chapter IV, that
175
is, the influence of tourism on various macroeconomic variables of the
Greek economy will be examined in turn. The next section will deal
with the effects of tourism on the Greek balance of payments, while
its effect on income generation, regional development, employment etc,
will follow.
2. Tourism and the Balance of Payments 
It was mentioned in the previous section that tourism
growth was largely seen, on the part of the various Greek governments,
which were almost always characteristic of their short-sighted view of
things, as a source of foreign exchange which would help cover the
structural deficit of the balance of payments. WLat remail\s tb be
seen, here, is the performance of the tourist sector as far as this
specific role is concerned. It has been shown that tourism has, in
general, a stabilising effect on the balance of payments of the EC
member countries (where a stabilising effect is one where a surplus or
a deficit in the balance of goods and services excluding tourism is
eliminated or reduced by tourism) for most years in the period
1972-85, except in the cases of the U.K. and Ireland; in six of the
member states, i.e. Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal,
and Spain, tourism had a stabilising influence in every year since
1972 (a fact which reflects their natural advantages as tourist
destinations) (O'Hagan, 1986, p. 12). The following table shows the
effects of tourist receipts on the Greek balance of current accounts,
as well as their share in current account receipts, payments and
invisible earnings (million $ U.S): It is possible to see, in Table
V.B3 that, apart from certain setbacks in 1967-68, 1974 and 1982-83,
the reasons for which have already been mentioned, tourism steadily
increases its contribution to total invisible receipts as well as
current account receipts, despite the impressive increase in the
country's export earnings during that period. Also, tourist receipts
seem to be increasing their share in the country's payments abroad, as
well as in invisible receipts, during the period 1960-88.
Table	 V.B3	 The
1960-1988
Greek	 Balance	 of Current Accounts and	 Tourism
(1)	 (2) (3)	 (4) (5) (6) (7)
-
1960	 -45.8 -95.1 8.6 10.2 18.0
1961	 -49.5 -112.0 10.7 11.3 19.6
1962	 -50.0 483.6
-126.0 294.2 10.4 12.2 20.0
1963	 -36.1
-131.5 11.5 12.7 21.0
1964	 -171.3
-262.2 9.7 11.5 19.0
1965	 -267.3.
-374.9 9.2 12.2 19.6
1966	 -259.0
-402.4 11.0 13.8 22.6
1967	 -224.5 52.8
-351.3 60.6 9.4 11.4 19.2
1968	 -252.9
-373.2 8.3 10.2 16.7
1969	 -348.2
-497.7 8.9 11.3 19.0
1970	 -408.6
-602.2 9.8 12.4 20.41971	 -344.2
-649.-g 13.4 15.9 23.61972	 -401.5
-794.2 13.8 16.1 24.51973 -1191.5
1974 -1145.2
1975	 -956.7
134.1
-1706.4
-1581.2
-1600.3
165.7 11.1
8.1
11.0
15.0
10.7
13.5
23.5
18.7
23.6
1976	 -932.5
-1755.7 12.9 15.7 27.2
1977 -1079.2 131.6
-2059.8 146.8 13.4 16.3 28.01978	 -957.9
-2284.2 15.8 18.6 32.1
1979 -1881.4
-3543.7 14.2 17.0 29.3
1980 -2216.1
-3949.6 13.9 16.2 28.1
1981 -2421.0
-4302.0 13.7 16.7 29.0
1982 -1885.1
-3412.3 12.5 14.9 25.0
1983 -1875.9 47.8
-3051.6 19.0 10.2 12.1 21.0
1984 -2130.9
-3442.9 11.1 13.5 24.8
1985 -3375.7
-4703.7 10.2 14.9 27.1
1986 -1772.5
-3606.3 14.3 16.6 28.1
1987 -1219.2 -45.9
-3487.3 -7.0 14.7 15.8 26.4
1988 -1957.1
-3353.2 14.1 16.1 23.7
(1): The Balance of Current Accounts
(2): Average Annual % growth of (1)
(3): (1) minus tourist receipts
(4): Average Annual % growth of (3)
(5): % share of tourism in total payments
(6): "	 "	 "	 "	 "	 "	 receipts
(7): "	 "	 "	 "	 " invisible receipts
Sources:1) Singh, 1984, p. 97.
2) Bank of Greece p. 224.
3) Own calculations.
It is obvious, from the above table, that tourist receipts
have a highly stabilising influence on the balance of current
accounts, whose deficit would have been much higher and growing at a
faster rate without the existence of foreign exchange earnings from
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tourism. It seems quite obvious, then, that the development of the
tourist sector had a highly beneficial influence on the Greek balance
of payments. However, there are two points which must be kept in mind:
1. Foreign exchange receipts from tourism are quite likely to be
grossly underestimated. The main reason for this is that foreign
exchange receipts are usually estimated by the
"banking system, since tourists are supposed to change
foreign currency at the bank counters. The bank method,
however, may well result in an underestimation of actual
receipts, for tourists may sell currency directly while
purchasing goods and services. The receiver has an
economic incentive to encourage this for in an exchange
control system he can later sell the foreign currency at
a premium in the black market" (Singh, 1984, p. 61).
In that case, which, until recently, was typical of the Greek
economy, the positive effect of tourist receipts on the Greek balance
of payments is also underestimated.
2. What was examined above, was the "gross impact" of tourist receipts
on the balance of payments. While it is considered wrong to subtract
foreign exchange expenditure on the part of the country's residents
abroad (unless it is caused by foreigners expenditure in the country),
from total tourist receipts, in order to get the net tourist balance,
one should, however, as mentioned in the corresponding section of the
previous chapter, subtract the total foreign exchange cost of tourism
from total tourist earnings in order to get the net impact of tourism
on the balance of payments.
As far as the second point is concerned, it has been
argued and it is generally believed in Greece, that the foreign
exchange costs which should be attributed to tourism, are rather
small. The estimation of the foreign exchange cost of tourism is a
very complicated task, because what one should do, is to identify all
the services and goods consumed by tourists and provided both by the
private and the public sectors, estimate their production cost, decide
what part of that cost should be attributed to foreign tourism rather
than to the local population and, finally, compare the latter figure
to foreign exchange earnings from tourism. A very interesting study by
B.P. Singh (1984) attempts to estimate the net impact of tourism on
the balance of payments, on just the above lines. Although, in some
cases, the method used is rather arbitrary (e.g. when the author
decides on the import coefficients to be applied to the various
sectors), it could hardly be otherwise, given the chaos prevailing
both in the definition of "tourism" (and, consequently, in relation to
the industries which should be included in the tourist sector), as
well as in the available data. Unfortunately, while the study was
published in 1984, the period considered is only up to 1978 (probably
because of the time lags with which data-series become available in
Greece) and, as far as I know, no similar survey has been carried out
in Greece, since. However, even if slightly outdated, and apart from
whatever reservations one could have as to the accuracy of the final
figures, the end result, as presented in the following table, is very
indicative as far as the net impact of tourism in the 70s is
concerned, and could, perhaps, serve to extend certain conclusions to
the period after 1978.
The net impact of tourism on the Greek balance of payments
is calculated by subtracting the negative impact (foreign exchange
expenditure) from the positive impact (total receipts). The net
impact, as we may see, increases seven times in the nine years
considered (from 169.98 $ millions to 1185.89 $ millions in 1978).
Also, the benefit in foreign exchange per person per year increases
approximately seven times as well, because an increasing inflow of
foreign exchange was received by a more or less constant Greek
population. The negative impact of tourism, as a percentage of total
receipts is 10-11% for the whole period, which means that, even after
paying for the cost of foreign tourism, 90% of total earnings still
stay within the country (Singh, 1984, p. 179). The following figures
also imply that every unit of foreign exchange spent on tourism,
raises 10 times that as far as total receipts are concerned, which is
not at all negligible. In relation to total imports, the foreign
exchange cost of tourism represents approximately 1.5% on average
during the period 1960-1978.
It seems therefore, that tourism served well its role of
helping to cover Greece's growing current account deficit. Whether the
fast growth of tourism can still continue at the same rate, given the
extreme concentration of the tourist industry in Greece, as well as
other problems already mentioned, such as relative oversupply,
179
Year	 Tourist	 Foreign exchange•
receipts	 expenditure (million
drachmas)
A
dependence on foreign tour operators, seasonality, low per capita
spending, low average length of stay etc, is something which still
remains to be seen.
Table V.B4: Net Impact of Tourism on the Balance of Payments.
Net
receipts
or net
impact
of tourism
(million
dollars)
Per
capita
net benefit
of tourism
(dollars)
Foreign
exchange
expenditure
as a%
of tourist
receipts
Tourist
receipts
per
tourist
night
(dollars)
Foreign
exchange
expenditur(
per tourist
night
(dollars)
1970
1971
193.6
305.3
l1 23.62 .30.35
23.95
31.17
169.98	 (.
274.95 (
19.33	 I
31.10
12.20 t
9.94
25.2
27.9
3.08
2.70
1972 292.7 38.19 _ 38.99 354.51	 ; 39.88 9.72 27.9 2.71
1973 514.9 50.45 52.60 464.45 52.02 9.80 32.8 3.21
1974 447.6 50.46 64.41 388.14 43.31 13.28 43.8 5.82
1975 643.6 71.66 74.08 571.94 63.23 11.13 43.4 4.84
1976 823.7 94.28 94.37 729.42 79.57 11.45 39.6 4.53
1977 980.6 110.58 114.75 870.02 93.87 11.28 48.2 5.44
1978 1326.3 140.41 141.66 1185.89	 • 126.83 10.59 37.98 5.76
,-
Notes: * 1. A estimates are based on the pricing of fuel in the case of rented cars, private cars, tourist buses, yachts,
and taxis in terms of equivalent crude, while B estimates are based on the pricing of fuel as a direct im-
port.
2. All other columns use the estimates only when required.
Source: Singh, B.P, 1984, p. 178.
3. Tourism and Employment
The impact of tourism development on employment is, along
with its impact on income, the most difficult to estimate accurately,
the main reason being the extreme diversification and dispersion of
jobs related to the tourist sector, which makes identification hard,
as well as because of high levels of hidden and part-time employment
in the sector. The highly seasonal nature of tourism which results in
the creation of a large number of jobs during peak periods (usually
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summer) and in a large number of lay-offs during the idle months
(usually winter), is another factor which, apart from the usual
problems related to employment data, makes the estimation of the
number of full time jobs which could be attributed to tourism rather
problematic.
In the case of Greece, it has been estimated that, in
1966, 23,500 direct and indirect jobs could be attributed to tourist
development, while that figure had risen to 26,100 in 1970, 50,000 in
1984 and 200,000 in 1987. It is estimated that the labour force
employed in hotels, restaurants, recreational and cultural
establishments as well as transport, grew from 6.1% to 10.5% of total
employment in the period 1971-81 (KEPE, 1987).
The estimation of employment generated by tourism in
Greece, faces certain additional problems, mostly related to the
structure of the economy in question.
As in most countries, the Greek tourist sector is
constituted of a large number of small family sized and family owned
units, employing on average 2.2 to 3.3 employees (Leontidou, 1988, p.
96), depending on the nature of the unit (e.g. accommodation,
restaurants etc), and this figure has not changed considerably since
1971. Seasonal variations in employment are very marked and this does
not seem to improve with time (Komilis, 1986, p. 131 and Leontidou,
1988, p. 80). In the larger cities, where tourism does not, usually,
only depend on the weather, employment is more or less normally
distributed all year round. This is not so, however, in the smaller
regions (e.g. in the islands) where tourist demand as well as
employment rise sharply during the summer months and drop off in
winter. These seasonal variations in employment and the differences
between large and small tourist centres, may be seen in graph I
(Statistical Appendix) which shows the monthly distribution of hotel
employment in Greece. Employment figures are based on the number of
insured hotel employees. The first two figures represent the monthly
variation in employment, in the two larger Greek cities, Athens and
Thessaloniki, while the third and fourth figures show corresponding
variations in employment in two well known Greek islands, Rhodes and
Corfu. Similarities and differences are rather obvious: While monthly
fluctuations in hotel employment are also clear in the cases of Athens
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and Thessaloniki, with employment rising from August to September,
declining from October to April and picking up again slightly in May,
these seasonal fluctuations are much sharper in the case of both Corfu
and Rhodes. In both islands, employment starts slowly climbing in
April, shoots up to its peak in August, then starts on a slow decline
in October and drops very sharply during February and March.
While employment data on tourism can be assumed to be more
reliable (as far as that can be true for employment data, especially
Greek data, given moreover, that tourism is especially attractive for
hidden and part-time employment), in the larger cities, because
employment controls are more efficient and seasonality is lower,
tourist employment is certainly grossly underestimated in the smaller
and less developed regions, e.g. the islands. The reason for this is
twofold: In the first place, the larger cities do not only cater for
foreign tourism, but domestic tourism, commercial purposes etc, as
well, and tourism is largely based on big hotel units which, usually,
operate all year round (not just in summer) and employ a number of
full time employees which are officially declared as such, are insured
and have, for the most part, tourism as their main or only occupation.
The practically negligible seasonal fluctuations in the larger cities,
is also a factor resulting in more stable employment structures. In
the less developed Greek regions, however, seasonality is very acute
and tourism is virtually nonexistent in winter. Agriculture is the
only other sector apart from tourism, which has been, in any sense,
developed in these regions, as, mainly due to geographical reasons,
industry is practically nonexistent. Most of the population is
employed in agriculture and is officially registered as farmers or
fishermen. Seasonality however, is also very marked in agriculture,
although in a way complementary to tourism, with labour shortages
during spring and fall and relative surpluses during the summer
(Alexandrakis, 1975, p. 107). The result is, that during the summer
months, most of the active population turns to the provision of
tourist services, especially accommodation, by transforming their
houses or extensions of them, into rooms for rent, a large number of
which is undeclared. This is especially true for a large part of the
female labour force, officially registered as housewives or farmers.
Despite the fact that female participation in the labour force has
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decreased slightly, between 1961 and 1981, largely due to the sharp
drop in agricultural employment, over the period 1960-70, in the
country as a whole, it has increased in sectors related to tourism
(Lentidou, 1988, p. 97). This applies especially to the accommodation
sector, as the job of renting rooms to tourists and providing other
minor services such as breakfast etc, comes "naturally as an extension
of the household" (Leontidou, 1988, p. 98).
It is obvious, therefore, that employment in the Greek
tourist sector is underestimated by a very large (and increasing)
number of employees, especially in the smaller and peripheral regions
of the country, for reasons explained above. It has been observed, as
a confirmation of this, that the ratio of total nights spent by
tourists in Greece, to the total number of "official" hotel employees,
tends to increase sharply in the peak (summer) months (Komilis, 1986).
This can only mean, either that the quality of the services provided
to tourist deteriorates during the peak season, since a stable number
of employees is called upon to cater for a much larger number of
tourists, or that these additional needs are covered by people
employed (or underemployed) in other sectors, e.g. agriculture, or by
young and unskilled workers (the latter account for about one quarter
of the total number of workers employed in tourism), such as students
or even foreign tourists!
4. Tourism and Income Generation
As far as the contribution of the Greek tourist sector to
national income is concerned, apart from looking at its contribution
to GDP growth, in relation to other sectors, one could also, derive
some conclusions from the evolution of its contribution to the output
of the tertiary sector. In the following table, one may see the
evolution of tourism's contribution to GDP growth and tertiary sector
output growth, in comparison to the corresponding performance of the
manufacturing sector, over the period 1960-1988.
As we may see from the table, while, as one would expect,
the percentage contribution of tourist receipts, both to total GDP and
to the output of the tertiary sector, is smaller, in absolute terms
than the contribution of manufacturing output to GDP and to the output
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of the secondary sector, when we look at the growth rates of the above
figures, tourism grows much faster than manufacturing, both as a
percentage of GDP and as a percentage of sectoral output. The
contribution of tourism receipts to GDP growth grew at an average rate
of 8.0% in the period 1960-1988, compared to an average growth of 1.1%
for the manufacturing sector, while the contribution of tourism to the
output of the service sector grew on average by 3.5%, compared to a
growth of 0.6% for manufacturing output as a percentage of secondary
sector output, over the same period.
Table V.B5: Evolution of the output of the tourism and manufacturing
sectors in Greece, 1960-1988.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1960-65 1.64 9.0 14.4 1.0 3.25 9.76 55.4 0.02
1965-70 1.99 8.1 16.8 4.84 3.93 4.60 56.7 1.99
1970-75 2.99 9.2 20.0 1.87 5.94 0.71 61.8 1.73
1975-80 3.99 6.8 21.3 0.49 7.61 2.88 65.0 -0.1
1980-85 4.05 -4.4 20.1 -2.33 7.38 -0.42 65.8 -0.1
1985-88 4.77 7.8 19.5 -3.01 8.37 5.40 77.1 -2.5
(I): % share of tourism output in GDP
(2): Average Annual % growth of (1)
(3): % share of manufacturing output in GDP
(4): Average Annual % growth of (3)
(5): % share of tourism output in tertiary sector output
(6): Average Annual % growth of (5)
(7): % share of manufacturing output in secondary sector output
(8): Average Annual % growth of (7)
Source: 1) The Greek economy in figures.
2) Own calculations
The above table is quite indicative as to the dynamism of
the tourist sector in Greece, as far as income generation is
concerned, keeping in mind that the import content of tourism is low
in comparison to other sectors, especially manufacturing, whose
imports grew steadily at approximately the same rate as exports. An
even more indicative measure of the impact of tourism on income
generation would probably be the value of the tourist income
multiplier in Greece.
As far as I know, there have been very few attempts to
estimate the value of the tourist income multiplier in the Greek
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economy in the past, let alone in recent years. In the remaining part
of this section, I will attempt to estimate the value of the tourist
income multiplier for the period 1960-1988, based on the multiplier
formula presented in chapter IV. The tourist multiplier is assumed to
be equal to:
1-TPI
TIM- mps+mpi , where,
TIM= Tourist income multiplier
TPI =propensity to import of the tourist sector (measured as total
imports of the tourist sector over total tourist earnings)
MPS= Marginal propensity to save of the region's population
MPI= Marginal propensity of the region's population to consume
imported goods.
Obviously, the major difficulty one faces when trying to
estimate the value of the multiplier is related to the estimation of
the import content of the tourist sector, or, in other words, the
estimation of the total foreign exchange cost of tourism. I decided to
solve this problem by using the total foreign exchange cost of tourism
as estimated by Singh (1984), and presented in table V.B4, in the
second paragraph of the present section. Unfortunately, the period
used by Singh, only covered nine years (1970-78), but after the
necessary calculations were done, the propensity to import of the
tourism sector appeared to be remarkably constant, ranging from 0.10
in the period 1970-1974 to 0.11 in the period 1975-1978. I therefore,
decided to use a marginal propensity to import equal to 0.11, over the
whole period 1960-1988. This may seem slightly arbitrary, but I do not
think that there is any reason to suppose that the import content of
the Greek tourist sector changed significantly after 1978. After this
problem was solved, the rest of the calculations was relatively
straightforward. The marginal propensity to save of the Greek
population was calculated as MPS=1-MPC where MPC is the marginal
propensity to consume (out of net national income) in Greece. The
marginal propensities to save and to import in general, and the
marginal propensity to import of the tourist sector in particular, as
well as the estimated value of the tourist income multiplier, is
presented in the following table:
185
1 -TPI 
MPS+MPI
	
1960-65	 0.11	 0.30	 0.28	 1.53
	
1965-70	 0.11	 0.29	 0.21	 1.78
	
1970-75	 0.11	 0.27	 0.28	 1.61
	
1975-80	 0.11	 0.26	 0.29	 1.61
	
1980-85	 0.11	 0.17	 0.34	 1.74
	
1985-88	 0.11	 0.13	 0.41	 1.64
TPI	 MPS	 MPI
The value of the tourist income multiplier, according to
the following calculations, was highest for the periods 1965-70 and
1980-85. It is slightly lower during the 1970-75 and 1975-80 periods
and, again, drops slightly after 1985. However, most of these
fluctuations are very small, while the average value of the multiplier
for the whole period 1960-1978 is equal to 1.65, implying that a one
unit rise in foreign exchange earnings from tourism, will cause an
increase in direct and indirect income of approximately one and one
half times greater.
Table V.B6: The Greek Tourism Income Multiplier, 1960-1988
Source: 1) Singh, 1984.
2) The Greek Economy in figures.
3) Own calculations.
The above estimations are compatible with an estimation of
the Greek tourist income multiplier found in Bryden (1973, p. 73-4),
according to which the latter was approximately equal to 1.4-1.7 in
the 1970s.
5. Tourism and Regional Development 
In order to evaluate the impact of tourist development on
each of the Greek regions, one would, optimally, have to go all
through the analysis made on the national level, on the regional level
as well. However, due to the non availability of most of the necessary
data, as far as the Greek regions are concerned, one will have to
deduce the impact of tourist development on the regional level, from
the evolution of indirect factors, such as the regional distribution
of the demand and supply of tourist services, new jobs created by
tourism etc.
186
The regional distribution of tourism in Greece, seems to
follow the pattern of concentration observed in the Greek economy, in
general. In fact, the largest part of total economic activity, related
to all three economic sectors, as well as the largest part of the
total Greek population is mainly concentrated in one or two regions,
namely, the Greater Athens area and the Greater Thessaloniki area.
Tourism might have been expected to break this pattern, in the sense
that a number of less developed regions have such a natural
comparative advantage in tourism, as to absorb a large part of total
tourist flows. It seems, however, that both the demand and the supply
of tourism, follow a definite pattern, concentrating mainly in three
or four regions of the country and, that this pattern has changed very
little, if any, since 1973, despite various plans and policies aiming
at the decentralisation and decongestion of already developed regions
and the development of new destinations. In fact, as far as the supply
of tourist services is concerned, the Greater Athens area and the
island of Rhodes absorbed 41% of new hotel bed places in the period
1963-73 and 32% in 1983 (Komilis, 1986, p. 102 and Leontidou, 1988, p.
98). The Greater Athens area and the Dodecanese absorbed 67% and 53%
respectively of the total new hotel bed places in 1973 (Komilis, 1986,
p. 102).
It is possible to see the regional distribution of hotel
beds in Greece, from 1963 to 1973, in Graph II of the Appendix. It is
clear that the supply of tourist services is concentrated in three
regions, the Greater Athens region, the Greater Thessaloniki region
and the island of Rhodes.
Even after 1983, when development law 1262/82 started to
operate, the main objectives of which were to provide financial
incentives that would attract new investment projects away from
congested regions and towards new regions possessing some growth
potential, the above pattern of concentration was not significantly
broken. In fact, from 1983 to 1988, the bulk of new investment
projects under law 1262/82 were absorbed, mainly, by three regions,
namely, the regions of the South Aegean Islands, the Ionian islands
and Crete, which, together, absorbed 49.7% of total investment
projects planned under the above development law. The following table
shows the regional distribution and percentage share of each region,
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both in total tourist investment and in total investment in all three
economic sectors, planned under law 1262/82, as well as the number of
new jobs created (or to be created for investment projects that have
not been completed yet), through these investments.
Table V.B7: Investment projects planned under Law 1262/82, 1983-88.
Regions	 Investment % in the	 Investment in all % in the
in Tourism country's three sectors 	 total
(drchs)	 total
1.East Macedonia
and Thrace	 9,398,673,052 4.4 70,886,344,841 10.8
2. Central
Macedonia and
Thessaloniki	 15,044,104,593 7.1 114,655,679,748 17.5
3. West Macedonia	 1,458,400,000 0.7 12,263,189,809 1.9
4. Epirus	 6,040,141,648 2.8 25,072,738,326 3.8
5.Thessaly	 10,887,712,921 5.1 45,682,075,762 6.9
6. Ionian
Islands	 17,837,654,932 8.4 23,423,591,391 3.6
7.Western Greece	 5,315,906,805 2.5 42,346,937,799 6.4
8. Continental
Greece	 9,512,690,989 4.5 82,586,772,809 12.6
9. Attica	 12,048,177,149 5.5 25,214,029,271 3.0
10.Peloponese	 8,389,476,545 4.0 44,841,328,454 6.8
11.North Aegean	 15,692,710,464 7.3 24,114,329,348 3.6
12.South Aegean	 62,028,997,299 29.1 70,698,096,016 10.8
13. Crete	 43,701,086,035 20.6 62,005,926,089 9.4
Total	 217,870,084,218 100.0 656,539,902,844 100.0
Source: 1) Stavros, 1989, p. 27-29.
2) Own calculations.
From the figures in tables V.B7 and V.B8, one may observe
that the incentives granted by law 1262/82 only succeeded, to some
extent, to draw new investment projects, both in tourism and in the
other economic sectors, away from the congested region of Greater
Athens. However, new tourist projects, investment in all three sectors
and new jobs created still follow a clear pattern of concentration. In
fact, where new tourist projects and new jobs in tourism are
concerned, the South Aegean region and Crete, absorb nearly 50% of
both. Where all three economic sectors are concerned, the regions of
Central Macedonia and Thessaloniki, Continental Greece and the regions
of the South Aegean and Crete benefit the most.
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Table V.B8: New Jobs created by Law 1262/82, 1983-88
Regions	 In tourism % in the
country
total
In all three
sectors
% in the
country
total
1.East Macedonia
and Thrace 1,611 4.80 18,277 14.4
2.Central Macedonia 2,188 6.52 24,304 19.1
3.West Macedonia 214 0.63 2,997 2.4
4.Epirus 1,018 3.12 5,091 3.9
5.Thessaly 1,580 4.7 7,429 5.8
6.Ionian Islands 3,240 9.6 4,566 3.6
7.W.	 Greece 948 2.8 8,729 6.9
8.Continental Greece 1,769 5.2 14,737 11.6
9.Attica 1,008 3.0 3,115 2.4
10.Peloponese 1,764 5.2 8,355 6.6
11.North Aegean 2,395 7.1 4,759 3.7
12.South Aegean 8,770 26.1 10,917 8.6
13.Crete 7,044 20.9 14,089 11.0
Total 33,546 100.0 127,365 100.0
Source: Same as Table V.B7.
Investment in tourism is heavily concentrated in the
coastal areas and, among these, in those regions traditionally
preferred by tourists. Other forms of tourism which could be initiated
in different, equally attractive regions of the country, such as
winter and mountain tourism in the regions of Western Macedonia or
Epirus do not seem to attract investors. Apart from contributing to a
more balanced type of regional development however, where tourism is
concerned, this would have had the additional benefit of attracting
"second year tourists" (Stavros, 1989, p. 109), that is, tourists who
visit Greece for the second or third time (this type of tourism
constitutes a rather large part of Greek tourism, as already mentioned
above) and who would like to see different places within the country
and get away from the over congested, during the summer months,
traditional tourist centres.
Foreign direct investment in Greek tourism, also follows a
strong concentration pattern, although, from the following table, it
is clear that foreign investors believe that investment projects in
the more developed regions of the country are more profitable,
probably because of the higher level of development of infrastructure
and services in general, as well as because of the larger market size
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(both in terms of population and of purchasing power) in those
regions.
Table V.B9: Foreign Direct Investment in Tourism by region, 1975-84
Regions	 Cost of investment($) % in country total
1.Greater Athens 44,630,000 27.57
2.Remainder of Central
Greece and Eubea 3,745,000 2.31
3.Peloponese 45,643,410 28.19
4.Ionian Islands
5.Epirus 5,940,000 3.66
6.Thessaly 3,000,000 1.85
7. West-Central Macedonia 48,000,000 29.65
8. East Macedonia-Thrace
9.Aegean Islands 9,000,000 5.56
10. Crete 1,900,000 1.17
Greece 161,858,410 100.00
Source: C. Nikas, unpublished paper for the IRISS project on tourism
and regional development
The relatively high percentage of foreign investment in
the region of Western and Central Macedonia may be misleading because
Chalkidiki, the major tourist destination of Macedonia (as far as both
domestic and foreign tourism is concerned) is included, and the bulk
if not the total of foreign investment in the region is channeled
there, not towards the less developed areas of the region.
Apart from the regional concentration of tourist services,
the demand for foreign tourism seems to follow exactly the same
pattern, at least up to 1980, as one may see from the regional
concentration of foreign hotel nights, in the period 1963-73. since
1981, however, this pattern slightly changes, with tourists showing a
preference for the islands and especially for Crete, Corfu, the
Dodecanese and Chalkidiki rather than for the large cities of Athens
and Thessaloniki. These evolutions may be seen in Graph III of the
Statistical Appendix.
In conclusion, one could say that the regional
distribution of tourism in Greece has not improved significantly over
the years, as far as promoting the development of new destinations and
new types of tourism is concerned. Although the concentration of
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tourist supply and demand shifts away from the regions of Athens and
Thessaloniki, decentralisation is not achieved, because both demand
and supply concentrate themselves in three or four coastal regions,
which were already developed as far as tourism was concerned, as long
as they served as traditional tourist destinations for years. In any
case, these newer mass destinations within Greece, are also becoming
rapidly over congested during the summer months, as to be practically
non-viable, especially during July and August, the peak of the tourist
season in Greece.
6. Tourism and its Linkages with the Rest of the Economy
One of the main arguments against a heavy reliance on the
tourist sector for the development of a country, concerns the
"suspicion" that tourism has very weak backward and forward linkages
with other economic sectors. It has been argued that tourism only
presents certain backward linkages with branches such as handicrafts
and souvenirs which can do very little as far as improving the
country's economic structure and competitiveness is concerned.
Given that tourism is a service product, mainly designed
to meet final consumer demand, it would be surprising if it presented
any forward linkages with other industries. Where backward linkages
are concerned, however,there is first of all the problem as to how
these are measured. The obvious way would be to use an input-output
table, trace the distribution of total tourist receipts to various
industries and apply the inverse coefficient of each sector to the
share of tourist earnings received by each, in order to find the total
backward linkages of the tourist industry. The problem with this
method, though, is that the sectoral breakdown used in the
input-output tables of the Greek economy, at least, does not permit
the identification of the industries included in tourist spending. The
category of "other services" which would be the closest proxy to
tourism, includes, among others, education, domestic services, civil
engineering etc, all of which are believed to have little or no
backward linkages (Alexandrakis, 1975, p. 183), and therefore, any
estimation based on this sectoral breakdown would probably bias and
underestimate any linkages found for tourism. Attempts to measure the
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linkages of the tourist industry using multipliers (income and
employment multipliers, in particular), indicate that these are very
widespread, ranging from transport, retailing, wholesaling, to
manufacturing and agriculture. Earlier approaches, attempting to
measure the backward linkages of the tourist sector in Greece, using
1960 data (Alexandrakis, 1975), suggested that the latter are weaker
than in the manufacturing sector but stronger than one would expect,
including dynamic effects such as the appearance of industries
producing basic metal products for hotel construction, leading to a
decrease of such imports (Leontidou, 1988, p. 100).
One would expect tourism to have relatively widespread
linkages in Greece, at least if one looks at the matter in relation to
the linkages presented by other sectors. The reason for this, is that
tourism in Greece has a rather low import content, (Cleverdon, 1979,
p. 30, Singh, 1984) contrary to other sectors, and especially in
relation to manufacturing. It seems, therefore, to rely largely on
domestic resources for its development. One would expect tourism to
have rather marked linkages with sectors such as transport and
communications (although most of the capital and machinery used in
these sectors is imported from abroad), light manufacturing branches
producing consumer goods, and especially with constructions. The
latter however is a sector that is already "overgrown" in Greece and
further development due to tourism would probably not be considered a
benefit. However, the fact that the tourist sector seems to use
domestic resources, rather than imported goods, comes as a happy
contrast to the manufacturing sector; despite the fact that
manufacturing exports shoot up after 1966 manufacturing industry did
not manage to develop any significant linkages with the rest of the
economy, as long as no intermediate goods industry worth of the name
was ever developed in Greece. On the contrary, the very fast growth of
Greek manufacturing exports was followed by an equally fast growth of
manufacturing imports, especially imports of intermediate goods which
were re-exported, after being subject to a minimum of value added.
C. DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF TOURISM
1. The Demand for Tourism in Greece
According to economic theory, the main exogenous factors
influencing the demand for tourist services, are per capita incomes of
tourists and relative prices. In fact, various studies 2 estimate the
income elasticity of demand for tourism to be approximately 1.8, while
the price elasticity of the demand for tourist services was estimated
as ranging from -2.5 to -3.0, for most OECD countries
(Paraskevopoulos, 1981, p. 104). In the following table one may see a
grouping of almost all known empirical studies (both published and
unpublished) on tourism as well as the dependent and independent
variables used in each case.
Other determining factors of tourist demand include the
distance of the destination country from the main tourist generating
countries, the travel cost involved in getting there, average weekly
working hours and paid holidays which determine the available free
time one has for travel, various macroeconomic variables such as
unemployment or inflation in the tourist generating countries,
because, presumably, they influence expectations about future incomes,
status etc, consumption patterns in the tourist generating countries
etc. Apart from these demand side factors, certain supply side
variables are supposed to influence the demand for tourism, such as
the capacity of the destination country to accommodate visitors, the
level (or growth rate) of investment in tourism and infrastructure
projects, the development level of the destination country and its
attractions etc.
2
For some econometric investigations of the demand for tourist services
in Greece as well as other OECD countries, see 1) Paraskevopoulos,
1981, 2) Komilis, 1986, 3) Schulmeister, 1979.
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Table V.B10
• l'REVIOUS EMPIRICAL STUDIES
ALTDOR(S)
Anastasopoulos ((984)
Armstmng 0972)
Anus (1970)
Anus (1972)
Askan (1973)
Barry et al. (1972)
Bechdolt (1973)
Blaclovell (1970)
Bond et al. (1972)
Chadee et al. (1987)
Cigliano (1980)
Clarke (1978)
°evertton et al. (19132)
Crampon et al. (1973)
Diamond (1977)
Fuji' et al. (1981)
Gerakis (1965)
Gray (1966)
Guthne (1961)
Hollander (1982)
IAC (1989)
Jud (1971)
Jud et al. (1974)
Jud (1974)
Kanalani (1980)
KJiman (1981)
Ksrack (1972)
Laber (1969)
Little (1980)
Loeb (1982)
Mak et al. (1977)
Martin et al. (1987)
Martin et al. (1988)
Muni et al. (1977)
Noval (1975)
O'Hapn et AL (1984)
Oliver (1471)
Papadopoulos et aL(1985)
Papadopoulos (1987)
Guayson et al. (1982)
Rofrannasin (1982)
Rugg (1471)
Schulmeister (1979)
Srneral (1988)
Smith et al. (1978)
Sirazheim (1978)
Strange et al. (1982)
Summary (1987)
Sunday (1778)
Taplin (1980)
Tremblay (1989)
Truett et al. (1982)
Truett et al. (1987)
Uysal (1983)
Uysal et al. (1984)
L'ysal et al. (1986)
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Most studies which have attempted to model the demand for
tourism (using either time series or cross section data or a
combination of both), express the dependent variables of the estimated
models, either in terms of the total number of tourist nights spent in
the country of destination or as the total number of tourist arrivals
(measured at ports, airports and other similar entry points), or,
sometimes, total tourist earnings from foreign tourism, received by
the destination country. In the following table one may see the
distribution of the income and price elasticities of demand for
tourism, as estimated in each of the studies included in the above
table.
The view taken in this section is that, from a policy
aspect point of view, what is most important, apart from the total
number of arrivals, is the average length of stay of foreign tourists
in Greece, as well as their average expenditure per day or per
tourist. The reason for this is, that during the last years, despite
the fact that Greece's share in the international tourist market has
not significantly diminished and despite the fact that the number of
foreign tourists visiting the country each year continues to grow at a
rather satisfactory rate (although not so fast as in the 1970s), the
average length of stay of foreign tourists in Greece as well as their
average per capita expenditure in dollars, is not rising, as we may
see from table V.B12.
Staiisiics':
mcan= 1.758
std.dcv.= 1.799
t-statistic= 27.3
for hypothesis
that mean =0
t-prob.=0.000
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Table V.B11
FIGURE 1: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF
INCOME EIASTICITIES
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INCOME ELASTICITY
FIGURE 2: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION
OF PRICE ELASTICITIES
Staiisticv:
mean= -0.396
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t-statistic= -3.65
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that mean = 0
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d.o.f. = 1226
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PRICE ELASTICITY
full set
II/,iftsA 
6	 8	 10
Source: Crouch, 1990, p. 6
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Table V.B12: Average Length of Stay and Average Expenditure of Foreign
Tourists in Greece, 1960-88
Average stay
	
Average per capita
(days)	 expenditure (Constant $ U.S)
1960 7.9 163
1965 6.7 127
1970 7.3 137
1975 3.7 226
1980 5.1 361
1985 4.6 217
1988 5.2 302
Sources: 1) Economicos Tachidromos, November 1990, p. 94
2) United Nations Statistical Yearbook
3) Own Calculations
In order to see which variables determine the average
length of stay and average expenditure of foreign tourists in Greece,
as well as their decision to visit the country, three model
specifications were estimated. In the first model, the dependent
variable is represented by the number of foreign tourist arrivals in
Greece. The dependent variable of the second model is represented by
the average length of stay of foreign tourists in Greece, while the
dependent variable of the third model is the average daily expenditure
of foreign tourists in the country. Given the fact that approximately
70-80% of the foreign tourists visiting Greece are either Americans or
EC residents, an attempt was made to estimate the above models
separately for the two groups of countries in order to pick up
possible differences in the tastes and attitudes of tourists of
different nationalities. While this was possible for the first two
models, with rather interesting results, it was not possible for the
third model. The reason for this is that, while the data on arrivals
and tourist nights spent in the country are broken down by country of
origin of the tourists, this is not the case for tourist receipts
which are only found in the form of total yearly earnings.
The estimated models and their interpretation are
presented below. The estimation period used is 1962-1988.
Model I
a. Applied to tourists from the EC countries 
The form of the final model was:
Log(ECARVS) =5.69 + 2.29Log(PcY1) - 1.3Log(U) - 0.38Log(gr/medS) - 0.34D
(35.7)	 (8.5)	 (3.98)	 (0.75)	 (2.06)
R
2
=0.96
	
F(4,21)=161.29	 D.W=1.80
The dependent variable of the model represents the number of arrivals
from the EC countries to Greece. The independant variables included in
the model are:
PCY1:	 Lagged value of the per capita income of EC residents
U:	 Unemployment rate in the EC
gr/medS:	 Ratio of the index of consumer prices in Greece to the
index of consumer prices in Italy, Spain and Portugal, in
dollars.
D: Dummy variable picking up the influence of political
unstability in Greece. It takes the value of 0 for all years
except for 1967 (Junta), 1974 (Greek-Cypriot crisis) and 1986
(president Reagan's travel directive).
All the variables are expressed in logarithms.
Per capita income is, as one might have expected, the most
significant variable. In fact, the coefficient of this variable seems
to agree with other empirical estimates (Paraskevopoulos, 1981),
indicating an income elasticity of demand for tourism equal to 2.2 for
the EC tourists. What is rather interesting is that relative prices
(between Greece and its other Mediterranean competitors) do not seem
to influence the number of EC tourists that decide to visit the
country. This could be explained by the fact that Greece is seen as a
"differentiated" product, perhaps not just as a holiday destination
with plenty of sun and sea but, also, as a place with significant
cultural attractions (historical, archaeological etc), which cannot be
found elsewhere. Another interesting point is that the unemployment
rate in the EC is a very significant deterrent factor where tourist
demand is concerned, with an elasticity of -1.32. Obviously, a rising
unemployment rate implies uncertainty about the future and rather
unfavourable consumer expectations as to future employment, income,
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paid vacations etc. Exogenous factors such as political unstability in
Greece, also influence adversely the demand for tourism on the part of
EC residents, as one may see from the significance of the dummy
variable included in the model. Working hours per week, consumer
prices in the EC and consumptions patterns were tried as well, in the
above model, but they were either not significant or had the wrong
sign.
The same model estimated for American tourists has
slightly different implications. The final model takes the following
form:
Model I:
b) Estimated for U.S.A tourists 
Log(USARVS)=-14.84 + 6.19Log(GDPPC1) - 1.7Log(IPUS) - 6.38Log(WHUS1) -
(1.95) (9.86)
	
(3.11)	 (4.3)
-1.21Log(gr/med$)
(2.28)
R
2
=0.96
	
F(4,21)=158.92	 D.W=1.65
The fit of the model is quite satisfactory and both the D.W statistic
and the other tests show no autocorrelation. The dependent variable is
again represented by the number of U.S arrivals this time. All the
independent variables are, once again, expressed in logs and
represent:
GDPpcli	 Lagged value of per capita GDP of American residents
gr/med$:
	 Relative prices between Greece and the other
Mediterranean countries.
IpUS:	 Index of consumer prices in the U.S.A
wh-US1:	 Lagged weekly working hours in the U.S.A
As one would normally expect, per capita GDP is the most
significant explanatory variable, with an elasticity of 6.19.
Interestingly and contrary to EC tourists, Americans are not put off
by a rising unemployment rate but rather, by inflation as indicates
the coefficient of the index of consumer prices in the U.S.A. Working
hours per week (with a one year lag) also seem significant, as long as
when they rise, the number of U.S tourists coming to Greece drops.
Interestingly, American tourists seem to think of tourist services in
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Greece and its neighbouring Mediterranean competitors, Italy, Spain
and Portugal, as, very close substitutes since, when relative prices
rise in Greece, the number of U.S arrivals drops significantly. Could
this mean that Americans are more interested in "sunlust" tourism than
Europeans who prefer to combine their holidays with other forms of
sightseeing?
The second type of model which was estimated separately
for each group, has the average length of stay as the dependant
variable and takes the following form for the EC tourists:
Model II.
Estimated for EC tourists 
AvstayEC=-139.1 + 0.27avstayEC1 - 2.97wh-ec - 0.15expnightpc
(2.3)	 (1.5)	 (2.2)	 (1.56)
-42.6gr/med$1 + 7.38sizegr/ec - 5.26pcYec
(2.26)	 (3.2)	 (3.1)
R
2
=0.71
	
F(6,19)=8.12
The dependant variable in this case is the average length
of stay (in days) of EC tourists in Greece. The independant variables
are:
AvsatyEC1: Lagged average length of stay of EC tourists.
Wh-ec:	 Weekly working hours in the EC.
gr/med$1:
	 Lagged value of relative consumer prices between
Greece and the other Mediterranean countries.
sizegr/ec: Relative size of Greece to the EC, in terms of
population.
PCY:	 Per capita income of EC residents.
The lagged value of the dependant variable is not
significant at the 95% level, but its presence in the model eliminates
first order residual autocorrelation. The D.W. statistic is invalided
in this case, but the coefficients of the test for autocorrelated
errors show that autocorrelation has been eliminated:
F1(1,18)=0.08	 [0.78] F2(2,17)=0.10 [0.9] F4(4,15) =0.15 [0.95]
F1-F4 indicate the F values for autocorrelation of 1st to 4th order
and the values in square brackets indicate the critical value.
Weekly working hours seem to influence the average length
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of stay while this was not the case as far as arrivals were concerned.
The interesting thing is, that while relative prices were not
significant where arrivals were concerned, they do influence
significantly the average length of stay of EC tourists, shortening it
whenever relative prices in Greece rise. Perhaps this could be
attributed to the fact that prices (and relative prices) are only
really felt when one actually visits a country rather than beforehand.
Daily expenditure is not statistically significant but it has the
correct sign, as the natural thing to do would be to shorten one's
stay when daily expenditure rises. The relative size (in terms of
population) of Greece to the EC seems to be very significant as far as
the average length of stay of EC tourists is concerned. The larger the
country, the longer the stay. This could be due either to the fact
that a larger country takes longer to see, or that a smaller country
gets easier over congested in peak tourist periods, thus making one's
stay uncomfortable or even disagreeable. The most impressive point,
however, is the sign and significance of the per capita income of EC
tourists. In fact, the sign is negative, indicating that rising
incomes in the EC shorten the stay of EC tourists in the country. This
is rather surprising at first sight but it could be explained by the
possibility that with higher incomes, EC tourists decide to visit more
than one country during their holidays rather than spend all of their
available time in just one country.
The same model, applied to the U.S.A tourists takes the
following form:
Model II
Estimated for U.S tourists 
Log(avstayUS) =14.03 - 0311J + 0.18Log(pcYus) - 2.03Log(wh-us)
(2.99)(-2.39) (2.86) 	 (1.72)
-0.88Log(expnightpc) + 0.88Log(beds/arvs)
(4.74)
	
(3.89)
R
2
=0.922
	
F(5,20)=47.77	 D.W=1.72
The dependant variable in this model is the average length
of stay of American tourists in Greece. Again, one may see the
differences in their tastes and attitudes in relation to European
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tourists. The independent variables included in the model are:
D:	 Dummy variable for political unstability, same as for
Model I applied to EC tourist. (Value e qual to 0 for all 	 years
except 1967, 1974, 1986)
pcYus:	 Per capita income for U.S. residents.
Wh-Us:	 Weekly working hours in the U.S.A
Expnightpc: Nightly expenditure of foreign tourists in Greece.
Beds/Arvs: Ratio of total bed places available in Greece to the total
number of foreign tourist arrivals
All variables are expressed in logarithms.
Surprisingly and contrary to what happens to the EC
tourists, political crises do not seem to influence the decision of
American tourists to visit Greece, but they do influence negatively
their length of stay there. Per capita income, on the other hand is
significant, and positive in this case, indicating that higher incomes
mean a longer stay in the country. One explanation for this, could be
that the greater distance which Americans have to face when travelling
to Europe, which may imply that they prefer to spend all of their
holiday in one country once they get there, rather than waste time and
money travelling around. Weekly working hours influence both arrivals
and length of stay adversely. Again, it seems that American tourists
are more price- conscious than Europeans, for their daily expenditure
is of much greater importance to them. When the latter is high, they
choose to spend less time in the country. A very interesting thing
about the above model is that it is the only one which could
incorporate a supply variable. The accommodation capacity of Greece,
expressed as the number of beds divided by the total number of
tourists, is of great significance, as a relative shortage of beds
would mean a shorter stay for American tourists. Despite the fact that
two supply side variables were tried in all four models presented
here, (investment in the tertiary sector and number of beds over
arrivals), this is the only model where one of them proved to be
significant without causing any statistical problems. One could argue,
therefore, that where arrivals are concerned, it is the demand for
tourist services which creates their supply, both as far as European
and American tourists are concerned. While the length of stay of EC
tourists does not depend on supply variables either, Americans do take
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into account supply side variables where their length of stay is
concerned.
The fit of the model is, again, quite satisfactory and the
D.W tests indicate no residual autocorrelation.
The last model which was specified and estimated is common
to both groups of countries as long as the available data did not make
possible a breakdown like in the case of the previous models. Here,
the dependent variable is represented by the average daily expenditure
per foreign tourist in Greece. The final model takes the following
form:
Model III
Estimated for Both EC and U.S tourists 
Expnightpc=-264.06 + 1.02IPCY + 4.17 (C/Y) + 0.31Indxgr$
(3.88) (4.59)	 (3.05)	 (11.99)
R
2
=0.98
IPCY:
	 Average index of per capita income for U.S and EC
residents
Indxgr$:
	 Index of consumer prices in Greece in $ U.S
C/Y:	 Average ratio of final private consumption to income in
the	 EC and U.S.A.
The above model was estimated using autoregressive least
squares, in order to correct for the autoregression present in the
initial estimates. The R2 shown above is the correlation coefficient
between actual and predicted values of the dependent variable.
The fact that the great majority of foreign tourists in
Greece are either American or originate from EC countries (70-80%)
implies that the inclusion of total receipts to total nights as the
dependent variable particular only to the U.S.A and the EC, should not
bias significantly the estimated coefficients.
The index of per capita income influences positively the
average daily expenditure of foreign tourists. Naturally, high
consumer prices in Greece, cause higher daily expenditures. However,
where policy aspects are concerned, one should keep in mind that high
relative prices tend to imply shorter length of stay where European
tourists are concerned, and fewer arrivals where American tourists are
203
concerned. On the other hand, while higher incomes imply a higher
average daily expenditure for both nationalities, they also tend to
imply a shorter length of stay for the Europeans, although they do
mean a larger number of arrivals for both nationalities. An
interesting point in this last model is that when consumption rises as
a percentage of income, daily expenditure on tourism rises as well,
which seems to imply that expenditure on tourism and private
consumption are rather complementary than competitive items.
2. Supply of Tourist Services in Greece 
Measuring the supply of tourism services in a country
faces certain difficulties, the main one being that there is a problem
of definition of what one means exactly, by the term "supply of
tourist services". In fact, a warm and sunny climate, large stretches
of sandy beaches, clear sea, hospitality of the residents, interesting
food etc, and any similar factors which help to attract tourists, but
are exogenous, in the sense that they are independent of private or
public sector current decisions, may be included in the country's
supply of tourist services, just as much or, perhaps, more than the
number of beds, recreation facilities, restaurants etc, which are made
available for tourists. As a consequence, it would be helpful to
distinguish the total supply of tourist services into two broad
categories (Komilis, 1986, p. 12).
1) Supply resources of a region or country which are not directly
related to tourism, but which determine the nature and direction of
such tourist-related activities, through their ability to attract
tourists (e.g. the climate, landscape, beaches, cultural heritage
etc).
2) Supply resources which are demand oriented and depend on private or
public sector investment decisions (e.g. accommodation establishments,
amusement centers, museums and, generally speaking, all kinds of
services which are developed in order to satisfy tourist demand.
Although the first category of supply resources represents
the "primary tourist product" which attracts tourist demand from
abroad and enables a country to develop its tourist sector, but remain
relatively stable over time, the second category of tourist resources
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may be seen as a "by-product" of the first and their growth rate may
be said to depend on the demand of foreign tourists. It is, however,
the combination of these two categories of supply resources which
constitute the total supply of tourist services of a country and
determine the size of foreign tourist flows. Different kinds of
tourists visit a country or different regions of a country for
different reasons and, while the main ones are likely to be the
existence of a combination of the first kind of resources (in the case
of Greece, at least), it is obvious that the existence or absence as
well as the quality standard of a whole network of supporting man-made
activities, such as the general infrastructure, accommodation
establishments, transport services etc, will substantially affect both
the size and pattern of international tourist flows.
The Greater Athens area and a limited number of other
regions suffer from an extreme concentration of supply services
(man-made rather than natural), in Greece. This concentration pattern,
furthermore, grows worse rather than better with time (Komilis, p.
167). Where the number of beds in all accommodation establishments are
concerned, the Greater Athens area possesses 21.41% of the total,
while, 57.32% of all tourist related industries, 43.85% of all
recreation establishments, 56.7% of the total urban population (1971
census), 43.35% of tertiary sector employment and 43.71% of all
tourist related employment was concentrated in that region, in 1978.
This trend is still moving in the same direction. The degree of
concentration is by far highest for the Greater Athens region,
followed to a much lesser extent by the Thessaloniki-Chalkidiki region
(the second largest Greek region in terms of population and economic
activity), the Dodecanese Islands and the Cyclades Islands. One look
at section 2.5 of the present chapter and graph II of the Appendix,
will satisfy the reader as to the stability and continuity of this
concentration pattern of tourist supply, in Greece. While Greece is
the only EC country whose accommodation capacity continues to grow at
a very fast rate (it tripled between 1970 and 1985), while that of the
EC as a whole has been leveling out if not declining, Greece and
France are the only two member countries to witness such a high level
of geographic concentration on the supply side of tourism (Commission
of the European Communities, 1985).
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This high growth rate of the country's accommodation
capacity, however, creates serious problems of excess capacity and low
occupation rates in nearly all regions with the exception of the
Ionian Islands, Corfu and Crete where average occupation rates equal
50% in the last years, while the average occupation rate in the
country is approximately 30-40%. Although, where the country as a
whole is concerned, this is mainly due to a very fast rate of growth
in the accommodation sector (especially of undeclared units), in the
Greater Athens area it is rather due to a decline in tourist demand
because of the over congestion of the city which can make one's stay
unpleasant there, especially in the summer (KEPE, 1987, p. 43).
However, the official growth rates attributed to the
country's accommodation capacity (9.5% a year in the period 1973-1987)
is largely underestimated when one takes into account that, the
official accommodation capacity of the country only represents 30% of
the total, the rest being undeclared units whose growth is much faster
than that of the official sector, especially, as one would expect, in
the regions that suffer from the highest seasonality in tourist
demand, such as the islands, the Chalkidiki region etc. It goes
without saying that the existence of such a large number of undeclared
accommodation units in the country, raises a series of problems as to
the normal operation of hotels, the main one being the appearance of a
sort of "unfair" price competition between officially declared and
undeclared units, during the peak periods, as to which will be able to
afford the offer of the lowest price. On the other hand, this
extremely large percentage of undeclared accommodation units is the
main reason behind the existence of such a large hidden economy where
the tourist sector is concerned. It contributes to major forms of tax
evasion and leakages of foreign currency from the total tourist
revenue of the country (which, as a result, are also underestimated),
as well as all the other tourist indicators, e.g. total nights spent,
average length of stay etc). Furthermore, the existence of this large
part of the accommodation sector which the Government is unable to
control or categorise according to some internationally adopted system
(e.g. the star system), may (and in fact does) lower the average
quality standards of the services provided. In fact, while the
standards of most Greek hotels are considered to be satisfactory where
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infrastructure and equipment is concerned, the quality of the services
provided lags far behind that of most developed tourist countries in
Western Europe, especially in comparison to other Mediterranean ones.
This problem becomes more acute in the less developed regions of the
country where skilled tourism employees are hard to find (KEPE, 1987,
p. 42), or too expensive to employ on a permanent basis, given high
seasonality and low occupation rates. This relatively low standard of
services provided to foreign tourists, combined with increasing costs,
price competition within the country as well as with the ability of
large foreign tour-operators to dictate (to a large extent) their
terms as far as prices, quality standards etc are concerned, leads to
a decrease of the country's tourist sector competitiveness on the
international level.
D. CONCLUSIONS
From the extensive analysis of the development of the
Greek economy, in various parts of the thesis (especially pp. 70-71),
it should be rather obvious by now that, Governmental intervention and
planning were not very successful in Greece. While this was rarely due
to a lack of targets, the measures and sets of incentives which were
adopted in order to achieve these objectives were, more often than
not, unsystematic, disorganised and circumstantial, in the sense that
they were never really integrated in a complete, comprehensive and
long term development plan. There is no reason why tourism, in
particular, should be an exception to this rule and, in fact, it was
no exception. Despite the fact that tourism was seen as a major source
of foreign exchange and as a possible solution to the country's
balance of payments constraints and despite the State's strong
interest and very substantial support, especially were developing
infrastructure and providing incentives to the private sector were
concerned, the overall development of the tourist sector evolved in a
rather haphasard way. This was an indication of a rather cloudy
understanding of what was really expected of tourism, the time span in
which this should be expected and the best way in which it was to be
achieved. The result was, as we have seen, a very uneven regional
distribution of tourism, with large non viable units in regions with a
high seasonality of demand, low occupation rates and a lack of skilled
employees, as well as an over concentration of supply in a few
regions, while no measures were ever taken in time, to prepare new
less developed regions to succeed the former, as poles of attraction
of foreign tourists. Furthermore, the fragmentation and
disorganisation of the Greek tourist sector, and the resulting large
hidden tourist economy (estimated to be as high as 60-70%, in the
accommodation sector, at least), creates a series of additional
problems and inefficiencies, leading, among others, to an
overdependance on foreign tour operators and often resulting in prices
too low to cover costs, low occupation rates of hotels, low average
stay of foreign tourists, low quality of services provided etc.
However, despite these problems and deficiencies, the
tourist sector, in Greece, seems to be among the most dynamic and
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efficient ones in the economy and still far from realising its full
growth potential. Despite the fact that tourism is internationally
seen as a very volatile, uncertain and extremely sensitive to
exogenous unforeseeable shocks activity, with Greek tourism being no
exception, as indicate the major setbacks caused by the Junta, the
Greek-Cypriot crisis, president Reagan's initiative and, almost
certainly, the recent developments in the Gulf, and Yugoslavia, both
demand and supply of Greek tourism have been growing rapidly.
Undoubtedly, despite the fact that tourism is a relatively
recent economic sector in Greece (its active development started in
the late 60s to early 70s), its contribution to the economic
development of the country has been an important one (section B of the
present chapter). In the first place, it seems to have fulfilled the
primary function which was expected of it, that is, to relieve the
country's balance of payments constraints and enable increased imports
(especially, of intermediate manufactured goods). Its overall impact
on the balance of current accounts is large and positive, with very
low leakages abroad. Apart from that, tourism's contribution to
employment and income generation is quite important, both in absolute
as well as in relative terms, with tourism growing much faster than
manufacturing, both as a percentage of GDP as well as a percentage of
sectoral output (of the tertiary and secondary sector, respectively).
Despite the fact that demand (in terms of arrivals and
total receipts) for tourist services has been growing rapidly in
Greece, and as indicated in the econometric investigation, depends on
the usual factors referred to in economic theory, with a few
variations, according to specific tourist nationalities, there are,
nevertheless, certain problems which should be considered if the Greek
tourist sector is to increase its competitiveness and efficiency on
the international level, as well as exploit its full potential for
growth.
The first and most important problem which, furthermore,
seems to be structural, is that Greece attracts mainly low to middle
income tourists and any attempt to sustain or increase total tourist
receipts implies a shift to mass tourism, with consequent problems of
congestion, due to the country's small size and development level (in
terms of infrastructure), concentrated (in a very few regions) tourist
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supply and inadequate quality of the services provided. The second
problem, related to the first, is the short average length of stay of
foreign tourists. Seasonality of tourist demand in Greece, is among
the highest in the EC countries (Leontidou, 1988, p. 81, Buckley and
Papadopoulos, 1986, p. 94) and this, obviously, leads to problems of
oversupply, low prices etc, resulting in major losses of revenue for
the tourist industry. If the country decided to shift its attention
from mass low income tourism to selective, higher income tourism, this
would serve both the purpose of sustaining a given level of tourist
receipts (or, even increase it), while the carrying capacity of the
country would be substantially decongested, in the peak summer months.
Naturally, this would necessitate some sort of market segmentation and
regional diversification of the Greek tourist product, so that
different regions would be able to attract different types of
tourists, according to each regions resources, in terms of natural
surroundings, as well as infrastructure and general development level.
Conclusively, one could say, that in spite of the many
difficulties and problems faced by the tourist sector (although it
would be hard to mention any sector in Greece, with no problems), its
most encouraging and promising feature is that it has managed to
evolve in a very important and growth stimulating activity, in spite
of the fact that it was never subject to any kind of consistent
planning and that State intervention where it was concerned, was never
strong enough, competent enough, long term or sufficiently organised,
in terms of targets, means and policy measures.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUDING CHAPTER
SERVICE LED GROWTH AS AN
ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY:
SUGGESTED POLICY MEASURES
A. INTRODUCTION
In the first four chapters of the present thesis, we have
looked, in turn, at the Kaldorian theory of economic growth, the
starting point of the whole analysis; we then, went on to examine the
economic performance of the Greek economy, especially in the period
after World War II; an attempt was made to see whether the three
Kaldorian laws analysed in the first chapter of the thesis, were
applicable, in their original form, to the Greek manufacturing sector,
in comparison to other Mediterranean countries which started out, in
the 1950s-60s, at approximately the same development level as Greece.
Both the econometric investigation and the theoretical
survey of Greece's postwar development indicated that for a variety of
economic, political, social etc factors, which have been mentioned in
previous chapters, the Greek manufacturing sector never played the
role of an "engine of economic growth" or "leading sector" in the
economy of the country. Given these indications, the next step was to
try and trace the economic sector(s) or branch(es), if any, which
could have played such a role in Greece's postwar development. The
service sector which, over the period 1950-1988 was producing, on
average, approximately 50% of the country's GDP and employing
approximately 33% of the total active population, was the next
candidate. However, due to the extreme diversity of activities listed
under "services", some of which have a very low productivity, tourism
was, perhaps a little arbitrarily, chosen (although the choice was
based on numerous indicators and seen in retrospect it seems to have
been a good one) as a service activity where Greece has always had a
strong comparative advantage. In the light of the analysis of the
previous chapters, especially chapters III, IV and V, the Greek
tourist sector could, potentially, be seen as a leading sector both as
far as past as well as future economic development is concerned.
An application of the Kaldorian growth laws to the Greek
tourist sector was rather encouraging and a survey of the evolution of
the tourist sector in Greece gave some insights to the problems and
deficiencies as well as strengths and possibilities of the latter.
However, before one goes on to suggesting that tourism should be
considered as a Kaldorian type engine of economic growth, in the case
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of Greece, given all the direct and indirect information and
indications of the previous chapters which, probably point in such a
direction, there is one fundamental question which must be asked, even
if the answer is far from being obvious, and this will be one of the
main objectives of this chapter. The question is: Is it possible for a
country like Greece (or for any country, for that matter) to shift to
a more "advanced" stage of development (given that in traditional
"stage theory", a country passes from agricultural to industrial to a
service economy, in that order, on its road to "maturity"), before
completing a "less advanced stage"? In simple words, is it possible
for a country to base its further development on one or more service
activities before (or without ever) sufficiently developing its
industrial sector and especially its manufacturing sector? Is it
feasible for a country to successfully become "post-industrial"
without first being "industrial"? The answer to this question was not
to be found in the relevant literature, according to which service or
post-industrial economies are those which, as the name indicates, have
"fully completed" their industrialisation stage and, finally, faced
with declining industrial sectors, shift to the development of
services as a source of employment and as an industry which, at higher
development (and income) levels, is assumed to have a higher
elasticity of demand, in comparison to traditional industrial
products.
Greece, however, can in no case be considered as belonging
to the category of "mature" economies. It represents a rare case of a
country de-industrialising without having successfully industrialised
and in which services have, historically, played a far more important
role than the manufacturing sector. Any possibility of answering the
above question can only lie in the country's own economic history,
present situation and future perspectives. These points will be
briefly examined in the second section of this chapter. The latter
also consists of an effort to sketch the future perspectives of the
Greek economy, apart from referring to its present situation, so that
this can serve as a basis for suggested policy measures (section D),
applicable to the present and future of the economy. Section C will
deal with the major issue of whether it is possible for an economy (at
intermediate stages of development, which is the case of Greece) to
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rely on its service sector for further development, that is, whether,
contrary to traditional economic theory and the Kaldorian theory, in
particular, "service led" growth represents a possible development
strategy. Section D will, finally, examine under what conditions this
could represent an alternative development path, in the particular
case of Greece and will deal, in the light of the previous sections,
with suggested policy measures for the future
B. THE BACKGROUND, THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THE FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
OF THE GREEK ECONOMY
After World War II and the civil war that followed it, the
Greek economy witnessed a period of impressive growth rates. Apart
from GDP, productivity and investment were rising fast, in all three
economic sectors, and labour, plentiful and cheap because of rapid
urbanisation, was easily absorbed in the secondary and tertiary
sectors. Despite the fact that industrialisation was the primary
target set by Greek governments though, the private sector expressed a
marked preference for investment in sectors others than manufacturing,
whose investment share, in relation to that of constructions, housing
and the service sector as a whole, was surprisingly low, for a country
at that stage of development (see Ch. II). This, combined with
increased internal migration towards the cities and with the adoption
of imported, relatively capital (rather than labour) intensive methods
of production, in the manufacturing sector, gradually diminished the
latter's labour adsorptiveness. An indication may be a comparison
between the evolution of the capital/labour ratio in manufacturing and
the latter's employment increase: In 1961, the average capital/labour
ratio in manufacturing was equal to 81,116 (drs) while the growth of
employment in comparison to the previous year was equal to 4.05%. In
1970, these figures equaled 182,824 drs and 2.1%, respectively, while
in 1980 they equaled 327,185 drchs and -1.6, respectively.
The opening of the Greek economy to international trade
(following the 1953 major devaluation of the drachma and the 1961
association agreement with the EC), and the consequent harsh
competition facing the relatively newly established Greek industrial
sector, had the effect to frighten off any potential Greek
entrepreneurs. The latter instead, opted for the relative security of
traditional consumer goods branches, oriented towards the home market,
as well as for the faster and less risky returns of investment in
services, construction and housing.
However, Greece continued to witness very fast, overall,
growth rates, over the period 1960-75 (higher than the other OECD
countries in the same period), while it managed to keep inflation and
unemployment rates quite low (see chapter II, section 0.2). Structural
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changes were also taking place in the economy, as the importance of
agriculture declined, both in output and employment, while that of the
secondary sector rose rapidly. Within the secondary sector, a slight
shift from traditional to more capital intensive branches could be
observed but, unfortunately, this was mainly due to the fact that
foreign investors, encouraged by favourable legislation (see Ch. II,
pp. 60-62) expressed a preference for these branches, while Greek
investors still shied away from the manufacturing sector, or preferred
the traditional consumer goods branches. In fact, a close look at the
rising importance of the secondary sector, indicates that this was
mainly due to constructions, whose share in manufacturing investment
rose from 33.8% in 1960 to 64.1% in 1974 (which, in fact, represents
the period of Greece's "rapid industrialisation"!)
In spite of agonised attempts on the part of the various
Greek governments to induce private domestic (as well as foreign)
investment in the manufacturing sector, under the circumstances
described above, the decision of Greek entrepreneurs to "ignore"
manufacturing, was a rather wise one on the micro level (although it
had negative consequences on the macro one). Largely due to the
premature policy shift in 1953-1961, Greece was unable to fully
pursue, an import substituting (especially of capital goods) policy,
thus, leading to the creation of an intermediate goods industry; it
was also unable to follow a dynamic export led industrialisation, as
long as its main comparative advantage, cheap and abundant labour, was
being lost. Instead, whatever industrialisation was achieved, was
based on massive imports of intermediate capital goods, foreign
investment in dynamic branches and constant "pushing" on the part of
the State.
After 1974, the inefficiencies of Greek industrial
development started to become alarmingly apparent, as foreign direct
investment declined in the economy, thereby reducing overall growth
rates, while labour shortages (especially of skilled labour) pushed
wages upwards, inflation and unemployment rates rose and the problems
of the structural balance of trade deficit were emphasized (Ch. II,
section D.2).
Unlike the case of the industrially developed Western
European countries where the economic recession could be explained in
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terms of the inability of the secondary sector for further expansion,
in the case of Greece, the recession cannot possibly be attributed to
any theory of "Kaldorian Maturity", simply because the country never
really managed to industrialise. It should, rather, be attributed to
the gradual impact of structural factors within the Greek economy, the
main ones being the pattern of development which resulted in the low
labour adsorptiveness of the Greek manufacturing sector, the
dependence of Greek industrialisation from abroad and the particular
structure of consumer demand which led to the adoption of the specific
development pattern (for a more extended analysis, see chapter II).
All through the postwar period, and while Greek
manufacturing was receiving massive (if inefficient) state support, in
the hope of turning it into an "engine of growth" and transform Greece
into an "industrial nation", the service sector was growing in
importance. This was obvious both in terms of output as well as
employment; services with no effective state support whatsoever, were
evolving into a sector of major importance for Greece.
Tourism, in particular, especially after the decline of
other invisible earnings, was expected, mainly by Greek policy makers,
to eliminate the trade balance deficit, caused to a large extent by
the imports of the manufacturing sector, although it was never
considered nor was it ever prepared for anything more than a source of
foreign exchange, which, along with the rest of the economy was
expected to help the manufacturing sector along.
If the definition of "leading sector" should be used to
indicate a sector which manages to grow into one of substantial
importance, in terms of earnings, employment generation, international
competitiveness, backward linkages etc., for a country, then this
title should rather be attributed to tourism, in the case of Greece,
than to manufacturing, as we have seen all through the present thesis
and, especially, in chapters II and III.
The only remaining difficulty is, however, the reluctance of
traditional growth theory to move away from the lure of manufacturing
industry, as a source of growth, and consent to base a development
process on a service activity, especially one which is considered to
be so unstable and volatile as tourism.
The recent developments and the possible perspectives of the
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Greek economy should be examined in the light of a broader framework.
One should try and integrate them in the recent world and European
conjunctures and perspectives which could be summarized in three main
points:
1) The increasing internationalization of the World economy: The
latter is manifested by a worldwide reduction of tariffs, increasing
capital movements among countries and the emergence or the increasing
importance of pre-existing trade organisations such as the E.C.,
E.F.T.A.
2) Radical changes concerning the nature of industry and the new
industrial revolution: The latter is based on a
significant modification of traditional production patterns, seiett-Ne
rather than mass production, extensive use of high technology in all
economic fields and a major shift to services rather than traditional
manufacturing industries. On the basis of this assumption we could,
perhaps, deduce two observations as far as the place and the timing of
this industrial revolution. As far as the place is concerned, contrary
to the first industrial revolution, the central weight moves from the
European continent towards the U.S.A and Japan. This, naturally,
represents a negative evolution for Europe which seems to be lagging
behind in the technological race, as its attempts to catch up with the
U.S.A and Japan seem to become all the more difficult. The second
refers to the expectation that the "new industrial revolution" will be
complete by the end of this century (Yiannitsis, 1984). The above two
observations concerning the recent world and European evolutions lead
to a third one:
3) The new international division of labor: In the same way as heavy
industry was the distinctive feature of the old division of labour, in
the new international division of labor this role will be played by
services and high technology. The appearance of declining industrial
branches such as the steel industry, the car industry or the
shipbuilding industry which, for a long time represented the "jewel of
the crown" for a number of industrially developed economies, means
that the challenge for the economic centres of the old division of
labor may be summarised as follows: One either manages to adapt
oneself to the new facts or one's importance and weight in the new
international division of labor are strongly doubted.
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As far as the position of the Greek economy in these recent
evolutions on the World and European level is concerned, the situation
may be summarized in two main points:
a) Greece in relation to the E.C. Here one must take into account the
progress of economic integration, leading to a single European market,
to be achieved by 1992, which implies the inability to pursue any sort
of protective policies or policies of strong governmental intervention
especially as far the industrial sector is concerned.
b) Greece in relation to the generalised liberalisation of trade and
the possibility for increased cooperation between countries. This is
derived, in the first place, from the fact that an increasing number
of even non-European countries would like to join the E.C. and in the
second place, from the closer economic relations the E.C. is currently
developing with other economic organisations such as E.F.T.A as well
as with the countries of Eastern Europe.
Given the old international division of labour and the
recent evolutions, it is evident that Greece can no longer be
considered a NIC (Newly Industrialising Country), because of its
rising labour cost in relation to them (Tsoukalis, 1981) and naturally
not an industrial country. Assuming that the new international
division of labour will imply a shift of the already developed
industrial economies towards branches of high technology, certain
branches of heavy industry which do not require advanced technology
but, on the other hand, are not labour intensive, will have to move
somewhere.
Assuming that under the New International Division of Labour
three groups of countries will emerge, the first concentrating in high
technology industrial branches, the second in low technology
industrial branches and the third in labor intensive branches, the
question is whether Greece would be able to fit in one of these
groups. It appears that Greece could only possibly fit in the second
group of countries given that it is neither industrially developed nor
a NIC.
It is in fact possible, that branches of heavy industry
which are now considered technologically outdated, would abandon the
centre and move towards countries of the periphery. It is also
possible that, large multinational firms would split their production
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in two parts, the first requiring high technology which they would
keep for themselves, the second being more traditional, which they
could move to technologically less advanced countries. To the extent,
however, that the latter methods are not labour intensive ones, there
would be no incentive to move production to the source of the cheapest
labour available (represented by the third group of countries), but,
possibly, towards countries of the semi-periphery, which might
represent possible markets for the goods produced. The choice of such
countries, on the other hand, would probably be based on certain
criteria that would not include all of them with the same probability
but those which would, in the first place, already posses a promising
existing industrial base. Countries like Spain and Italy could be
promising candidates for such an enterprise. The question is whether
Greece could possibly be included as a candidate as well.
It is true that, after 1985, Greece seems to become, once
again, attractive to foreign capital (Petrochilos, 1989). In fact, it
was mentioned above that in the last few years there have been large
capital inflows to the country. However, the answer to the question
whether this could be considered as a positive indication for the
possibility of production of heavy industrial branches moving towards
it, is probably negative. The reason is that the inflows of foreign
capital in Greece after 1985, mainly concern takeovers of Greek firms
by foreign ones or portfolio investment consisting of the purchase of
already existing shares in the stock market (Fotopoulos, 1991). This
could •be attributed to the fact that the implementation of the
austerity program of 1985 resulted in a 100% profit increase (because
of the effective suppression of production costs), with the result
that many shares which for many years had not been yielding any
returns started doing so. In many cases, this was extended to the
purchase of whole firms (purchase of 100% of their shares). These
evolutions, however, were rarely followed by new investment despite
the fact that a very favourable framework was provided as a result of
increased grants and incentives from the government in order to
encourage private investment in manufacturing, as well as from the
E.C, mostly as part of the Integrated Mediterranean Programs. In fact,
the increase in investment rates never corresponded to the large
increase in industrial profits.
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On the threshold of 1992, a number of large multinationals,
specialising mainly in the branches of processed food and drinks
production, proceeded to another form of integration by buying similar
Greek firms, among the most prosperous ones (e.g. Metaxa brandy
producers). The fact that, thus, foreign currency reserves rise within
a country for which this had always been a problem, is certainly a
positive evolution as far as its balance of payments is concerned.
Under this form, however, it does not represent any perspective for
further development. The whole transaction amounts to a change in the
ownership of profitable and viable Greek firms which managed to
survive the crisis and which could probably survive the strong
competition within the E.C. As long as different ownership of the same
firms does not, normally, give rise to any sort of optimism as far as
industrial development is concerned, this fact does not in the least
change any of the conclusions reached above, although, naturally, the
possibility for marginal changes or improvements should not be ruled
out. However, on the basis of the above observations one would rather
tend to rule out the possibility of any really revolutionary big scale
modifications which could form the potential for any worth mentioning
further industrialisation, particularly when the lag in relation to
the more advanced countries is constantly growing in this respect.
One could, perhaps argue that matters are liable to change
with the achievement of the single European market in 1992, after
which all restrictions concerning capital movements among European
countries will be abolished. However, this only means that any
restrictions preventing foreign investment will be abolished, not that
incentives will be granted to attract it. Given the fact that the
legislative framework concerning foreign capital in Greece is
considered among the most favourable existing ones, such a
liberalisation can only mean one change: That European capital will be
able to enter freely in the branches where access was prohibited for
it in the past. Actually, the transactions in the Athens stock market
suggest that there are only three branches in the Greek economy,
European capital seems to be interested in, namely Banks, Insurance
Companies and Tourism, all of which belong to the service sector. With
the demise of both the agricultural and the industrial sector,
services represent the only economic sector which could still hold any
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growth potential for the economy if Greece decided to concentrate in
its development in such a way as to acquire in time a comparative
advantage in relation to it.
Having analysed the emerging European and international
framework, we can, now, briefly examine the latest developments in the
Greek economy. The growing public debt in recent years (23% of GDP in
1990) represents a pressing problem for Greece (Fotopoulos, 1991).The
conservative government elected, in April 1990, adopted a very strict
restrictive policy, aiming at a reduction of this public debt. These
measures though, did not succeed in sufficiently reducing it and, by
the end of 1990, Greece had to apply for another loan to the E.C.
which was finally granted, in February 1991. The present economic
policy is based on an effort to encourage the development of the
private sector, at the expense of the public one, through deregulation
of the market and privatisation of certain public firms (especially
the "problematic" ones), in a desperate effort to increase public
revenue and reduce their negative impact on the public debt.
What the restrictive policies (or stabilisation programs, as
they are called) of the Socialist government, in 1985, the all party
government and the conservative government had in common, was the lack
of any clear directives on economic development. In all three cases,
austerity programs were said to be followed by
economic restructuring development measures which, in fact, never
came. The new element brought in by the conservative government is the
shrinking of the public sector, both in terms of its economic activity
and its role as a planner. All the perspectives and the hopes for
economic development seem to have been left to the private sector, in
spite of the fact that it was the private sector's
unwillingness and failure to promote economic development, in the
1960s and the 1970s which caused the over expansion of the public
sector.
What remains to be seen, therefore, is whether this option
will be justified by the future performance of the private sector and
the Greek economy, in general.
C. SERVICE LED GROWTH: A POSSIBILITY FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES?
1. Developed Countries and the Prospect of a "Service Economy"
A growing concern on the part of a number of developed
countries has, relatively recently, been the increasing shift of
production and employment towards services rather than manufacturing
activities. Some concern has been expressed that a number of Western
European countries (besides the U.S.A and, more recently, the Eastern
European countries), are following a process of de-industrialisation
and are increasingly transforming themselves from industrial
economies, into "post- industrial" or "service" economies.
The former (industrial economies) are characterised by facts
such as that production, employment and consumption are mainly centred
around goods and where extreme specialisation and division of labour
are major aims in order to raise productivity, capture new markets and
enjoy the benefits of scale economies.
The latter (service economies) are characterised by the
facts that approximately 50% of the labour force is employed in
industries producing services rather than goods, production and
consumption of the latter (or of service-substituting durable goods)
increase their share in the total and that quality (rather than
quantity) considerations and personal contact between producers and
consumers in the market place, accompanied by a rise in
self-employment in relation to paid employment, gradually take the
place of increased mechanisation, division of labour and maximisation
of quantitative productivity measures.1
The main reasons put forward in order to explain this shift
of economic activity toward services in the developed countries, are
the following:
1) As an economy progressively reaches higher levels of development
and per capita income, demand elasticity for services increases in
1
For the transformation of an industrial economy into a "service"
economy and the differences implied, see among others, Gershuny 1983,
p. 118, Fuchs 1968, Petit 1966, p. 6)
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relation to goods, resulting in an increasing output share of
services. This explanation, however, is somewhat invalidated by the
empirical observation that, in constant prices, the output share of
services remains more or less stable over time, while the employment
share of services is the one to witness more impressive increases
(Fuchs, 1968, Gershuny, 1983). This observation accounts for the fact
that the following reason is considered to be more plausible:
2) According to this explanation, productivity in the service sector
rises much more slowly than in manufacturing because of the (assumed)
high labour intensity of services and their relative inability to
exploit economies of scale and technological, productivity raising
innovations. As a result, services become progressively more expensive
in relation to manufactured goods and this, combined with the fact of
relatively higher demand elasticity for services at higher income
levels, accounts for the fact that a proportionately larger share of
consumer income will have to be spent on services. The
assumed lower productivity of services, and their limited ability to
substitute labour for capital, is believed to account for the fact
that in order to increase output, the service sector must absorb
increasing amounts of labour (Gershuny, 1983, p. 119).
The concern expressed by the advanced countries, in view of
these evolutions, are understandable if one takes into account certain
common prejudices concerning the growth of services. Economic policies
followed in the old industrial countries, seem to be biased against
service expansion because it is believed that the low productivity and
high labour intensity of services undermines rapid economic growth;
the increasing shift to services is considered to be one of the main
reasons for the slow growth and relative stagnation they have been
suffering during the last decade, in comparison to the impressive
growth they enjoyed during the rapid growth of their manufacturing
sectors (Riddle 1986, p. 2). In the light of their own past
experience, industrial countries have virtually come to equate rapid
economic development to the growth of manufacturing, which they
consider to be the key to development. Their view that service
development somehow competes with manufacturing development, (i.e, in
terms of labour availability) and the relative decline of the
manufacturing sector, does a lot to enhance this bias.
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2. Stages of Growth and Less Developed Countries 
Stage theories of economic growth have mainly been developed
by economists originating in the "old industrial countries" (eg.
Rostow) and consist of a set of general "rules", a "guide to
development" for the newly industrialising countries, based, for the
most part, on the history of economic development of today's advanced
economies. The fact that these past experiences have been generalised
in a sort of universal development pattern, as a series of well
defined consecutive steps in time, which all counties would have to
pass, in the same order, sooner or later, once they entered the
development process, explains, to a great extent, m'n manulacturing
was traditionally seen as the engine of economic growth, while the
role of services was virtually ignored in economic development. In
fact, the expansion of services is believed to be a characteristic of
post-industrial societies and of little interest for developing
countries. The relevant terminology (post-industrial, service economy,
de-industrialisation etc), seems to suggest that services are not
important in their own right, but only in relation to manufacturing.
Under the assumption that all countries follow (or should follow) the
development pattern of the Western European countries (and the U.S.A),
it is clear that services are expected to expand only after
industrialisation, in order to facilitate industrial development as
well as provide jobs for the part of the labour force which
manufacturing cannot accommodate (Riddle, 1986). Services, therefore,
have traditionally been seen as "residual" in relation to
manufacturing, relatively unproductive and unemployment or
underemployment concealing. The fact that most of the countries which
entered the development process with a short or longer time lag in
relation to the "first comers" to development, found themselves
dependent on the latter in all sorts of ways, including a "helping
hand" (both material as well as theoretical) as to how they should
proceed in order to, eventually, catch up with the "leaders", resulted
in that advanced country notions about development stages were
transferred to the "second" and "third" comers to development.
Consequently, the political leaders of the latter proceeded to take
them through the same steps, emphasising the importance of the same
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"key sectors", on the way.
As a consequence of this, governmental policies inspired by
the development patterns of advanced countries, may bias productivity
growth in favour of manufacturing, in many less developed countries
(LDC's), either by channeling investment into manufacturing while
starving services of capital and enabling faster productivity growth
in manufacturing or by encouraging large scale production in
manufacturing while allowing small-scale production to remain in the
service sector (Gemell, 1982, p.124). In some LDC's, inefficient and
low productivity manufacturing sectors are supported by governmental
subsidies etc, mainly because manufacturing is seen as central to
economic development.
However, while traditional stage theories of economic
development proved to be very useful as a simple and rather
mechanistic method of summarising the common features and steps taken
by today's advanced economies, in the past, and integrating them into
a common development path, they do not seem to be as useful in
explaining some of the characteristics to be found in less developed
countries, today, or in predicting short or medium term growth
patterns (Petit, 1986, p. 22).
In fact, several developing countries today, appear to have
most of the characteristics of "service economies", while still being
at lower stages of development, or even at the pre-industrial stage,
something which traditional stage theories would find rather hard to
explain. Numerous empirical studies seem to imply that, surprising as
it may seem for traditional thinking, a number of LDC's today, follow
a very different path and present very different characteristics from
today's developed countries in the past.
3. "Service Economy " Features in Today's LDC's 
Traditional theories of economic growth and the experiences
of developed countries, imply, among other things that, during the
first and intermediate stages of development, surplus labour from
agriculture (as well as from low productivity personal services, which
are quite important at the early stages of development) is absorbed at
increasing rates by the expanding industrial sector. As the
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manufacturing sector rises in importance and increases its share in
both GDP and employment, the traditional, low productivity service
sector declines in importance. At later stages, either when capital is
increasingly substituted for labour in manufacturing or, when the
latter starts on a process of relative decline, the expanding service
sector, now consisting not so much of low productivity personal
services but rather of information or skill intensive ones, takes over
as far as absorbing labour shed from manufacturing (Park and Chan,
1989, pp. 200-1). In fact, it would be possible to say that, according
to traditional growth theories, the manufacturing and service sectors
follow similar but inverse U shaped development curves, through time;
manufacturing starts from a very low starting point, rises in the
intermediate development stages and then declines, while services
start from a rather high share in GDP and employment, decline in the
intermediate stages when the manufacturing sector increases its share
and then rise in importance again, when the manufacturing sector
starts declining but having now transformed themselves into (or
increasingly including) "new" activities, in terms of productivity,
capital/technology/skill intensiveness, exploitation of scale
economies and organisation.
In fact, in developed countries, the growth of employment in
manufacturing was shown to be negatively correlated to the growth of
employment in services, implying some sort of competitive relation
between the two sectors. This, however, only seems to be true for the
developed Western European countries. In most other cases, labour
seems to shift from agriculture into manufacturing and services,
simultaneously, and the growth of manufacturing and service employment
are positively correlated (Riddle 1986, p. 43). Furthermore, while the
role of agriculture rather seems to conform to traditional economic
theory, being negatively correlated with other economic growth
variables and does not appear to promote growth at any level of
development, the role of the manufacturing sector appears to be rather
mixed (op. cit., p. 64-72). Empirical studies seem to suggest that, in
a large number of less developed countries, increased proportions of
manufacturing GDP were not significantly associated with economic
growth. On the other hand, service GDP was significantly associated
with economic growth factors in low income countries while service
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exports were positively associated with growth in lower middle and
upper middle income countries (the latter grouping includes Greece).
Furthermore, changes in per capita GNP are positively associated with
the growth of the manufacturing sector only in the lower middle income
countries. In all the other cases examined, rising per capita GNP
levels were positively associated with service GDP. Most importantly,
while a significant positive correlation between the growth of
manufacturing GDP and total GDP growth which is essential if one is to
argue that manufacturing represents the economic growth engine, is
mainly present in developed industrial countries, while more rapid
growth in the service sector rather that in manufacturing (as
suggested in the Kaldorian theory), is found to be what makes the
difference between low growth and high growth countries.
In a number of LDC's the output share of services is as high
as 60% (in Greece it was 51% in 1960 and rose to 57% in 1988, in
constant prices, corresponding to 23.1% and 19.3% in manufacturing,
for the same years), while their service share of employment is
compatible with the definition of a service economy (in Greece it was
26% in 1960, and 47% in 1988, corresponding to 13.8% and 18.8% in
manufacturing, for the same years). In any case, the dispersion of the
share of services as far as both employment and output are concerned,
between developed and less developed countries, is far less than in
the case of the other two sectors (Katouzian, 1970, p. 364).
Irrespectively of the doubts one may have concerning the
interpretation of the above points, one cannot deny that the early
role of services in many developing economies today, is far more
important than in today's developed economies, in the early and
intermediate stages of their development (Gemell, 1982, p. 181). The
mere existence of a group of developed countries in an increasingly
international world economy exhibiting a whole network of
inter-relations and inter-dependencies among countries at different
levels of development, is probably sufficient to explain the emergence
of a variety of factors in today's LDC's which may lead to the early
development and increased economic importance of their service
sectors. One should keep in mind, however, that the causes resulting
in this situation, are very different in the developing countries in
relation to those prevailing in the advanced, de-industrialising
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countries.
The most obvious factor explaining this evolution, is
probably the demonstration and imitation effect which the existence of
a group of developed countries triggers off in the less developed
ones; the latter see no reason not to enjoy certain services existing
in the advanced countries, which however, were unheard of, (or in any
case, very underdeveloped) in the latter, when they were at the
development levels of today's LDC's. This is enhanced by the, usually,
very unequal pattern of income distribution to be found in developing
countries, which enhances the aforementioned imitation effect and an
increased consumption of services (Katouzian, 1970, p. 373).
Another reason for the high importance of services as a
share in both output and employment in today's LDC's could be
expressed as a result of "negative de-industrialisation" (versus
positive de-industrialisation, in the case of successful industrially
developed countries, see Rowthorn and Wells, 1988), in the sense that
an inefficient and non-competitive manufacturing sector may induce a
shift to services as a choice of necessity.
The openness of today's economies and increasing economic
relations among countries, imply that, in order to be competitive in
world markets, LDC's must promote their most competitive sectors in
the most efficient manner; one way of doing this is for them to make
use of the best services available (Shelp, 1989, p. 7).
Still another argument concerning the impressive growth of
service activities in contemporary developing countries concerns the
observation that developing countries, today, probably have a greater
incentive to trade than countries developing in the past, because
this, historically, was the main activity of their middle classes,
apart from the fact that incentives and opportunities to trade are
more numerous in our increasingly international world economy, than in
the past.
The role of the State and the size of the public sector in
developing countries in the last two decades, which is quite different
and probably more important than it was in the past, is another reason
for the early expansion of services in the LDC's. It is generally
accepted that the public sector increased both in size and importance,
on the international level, after World War II. This phenomenon is
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even more marked for the less developed countries than for the
developed ones, as long as, for a variety of reasons (related to the
economic dependence, economic structure, development patterns adopted
by these countries etc), the former seem to rely less on the
interaction of market forces and more on State intervention than the
latter. Considering that the growth of the public sector implies a
corresponding growth of service activities, since the main part of
governmental organisations consist of services, this is still another
explanation for the important role of the service sector in today's
LDCs.
Yet another reason which explains the early shift of some
developing countries to services is a notion which, only relatively
recently has come to be applied to anything else apart from
merchandise trade, that of a comparative advantage in services. The
fact that Greece and other Mediterranean countries have specialised in
tourism which represents for them a major export, could be attributed
to a comparative advantage these countries have in the provision of
tourist services. One way of revealing any such autonomous
developments in the trade of services, is to look at the ratio of a
country's exports of services to exports of goods (xs/xg). An increase
in this ratio is, usually, evidence of increased specialisation
toward trade in services.
It is argued that these trade orientations could be
explained by comparative advantage considerations (Petit, 1986, p.
96). It is also argued, however, that the gearing of these countries
to tourism (Katouzian, 1970, p. 382) is not only attributable to
comparative advantage, but most importantly, to the rising demand for
leisure and recreational services on the part of the developed
countries, which pushes the former to specialise in tourism, the
demand for which is an increasing function of per capita incomes and
leisure in advanced economies.
All of the above reasons, could probably contribute, among
others to explain to some extent, the fact that a number of developing
countries seem to "have skipped" the industrial stage, partly or
entirely and to become service economies before they were fully
fledged industrial economies (Shelp, 1989, p. 7). However, despite the
evidence that service activities are far more important to the
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economies of developing countries than one would have thought likely,
on the basis of the past experience of the developed world, at early
stages of its development, today's LDC's are still trapped in the
traditional "manufacturing driven" models of economic growth imported
from the developed countries. Their policy makers, even in case they
had the insight to realise the possibility of a growth path based on a
comparative advantage in services, rather than goods, would probably
find it very hard to implement such a process, since there is hardly
any theoretical literature in dynamic service led growth to guide
them.
Before one accepts the alternative of service led growth for
developing countries, however, it is necessary to tackle the main
argument used against excessive growth of services on the part of
developed countries. As we mentioned in the beginning of this section
the main reason why economic policy in advanced countries seems to be
biased against service growth is the belief that, in relation to
manufacturing, services are less productive, less liable to exploit
scale economies and technical innovations and, because they are
considered to be labour intensive they are believed to promote
underemployment and disguised unemployment.
If this view of services is correct, then, obviously, the
growth of services as well as any service led development pattern
should probably be discouraged, as long as the low productivity and
high labour intensity of services would imply that the latter would
become increasingly more expensive, in relative terms, and therefore
detrimental in terms of the main macroeconomic policy objectives. If,
however, it could be shown, somehow, that services are not,
necessarily, less productive or more labour intensive than other
economic activities, nor necessarily backward in their ability to make
use of new technologies, then, perhaps, some of the analysis against
service development would be invalidated (Stanback, 1979, p. 14).
Before proceeding with this sort of analysis, it would,
perhaps, be wise to open some sort of "parenthesis" in order to tackle
the question of "What is so special about manufacturing that it is
considered inconceivable for a country to skip the relevant stage?
Does the development of the manufacturing sector transform the economy
in question or its people, in a way indispensable for any sort of
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future self-sustained economic growth? And finally, is the
manufacturing sector the only sector to posses these characteristics?"
According to the Kaldorian theory, the manufacturing sector is central
to the development process and the only sector suited to perform as an
engine of growth, mainly because of its ability to exploit dynamic
economies of scale and adopt technological innovations which will help
to raise productivity and lower costs; also, because of the high
income elasticity of demand for manufactured products (coupled with
high elasticity of supply); increased division of labour and learning
by doing in extended markets; changing attitudes towards work (from
agricultural home/family based underemployment to paid productive
employment) and strong backward and forward linkages running from
manufacturing to other sectors of economic activity, all of which
contribute to form a virtuous cycle of development which will throw
the economy into rapid self-sustained growth. In traditional thinking,
services do not posses these crucial attributes, they are labour
intensive, relatively unable to substitute labour for capital or
exploit new technology, they are backward looking, relatively
unproductive and induce underemployment. The main problem here,
probably, lies in the (implicit) assumption that the service sector is
homogeneous and consists only of activities which all share the above
characteristics. Furthermore, the assumed homogeneity of the service
sector is frequently identified with its traditional, relatively
unproductive part, i.e. the part of the service sector that usually
develops before industrial take-off and consists mainly of personal
services such as shoe-shine boys, street sellers, domestic servants,
wind-screen wipers etc, which do employ labour best employed
elsewhere, leading to the view of the service sector as an additional
pool of surplus labour available for manufacturing.
However, the service sector also includes a group of
activities for the product of which demand grows rapidly, is highly
income elastic (supply being also price elastic) and is expected to
follow the same trend in the future (eg. financial services,
international tourism etc). Furthermore, this group of activities can
be a very heavy user of new technologies (especially
information/computer technology), is also quite capable of exploiting
economies of scale and, in fact, it could be argued that, this group
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of service activities is no different from manufacturing save that the
former produces services while the latter produces tangible goods. One
could say, that for a variety of reasons, some of which were mentioned
above, these services which only started to increase in importance
after the decline of the manufacturing sector, in the advanced
industrial countries, develop much earlier, simultaneously or even
before manufacturing, in some of today's LDC's. In this respect and if
one views the service sector as comprising two distinct groups of
activities, one which represents old-fashioned, low productivity,
labour intensive services and one which involves dynamic
skill/information intensive, highly demand elastic services, there is
no reason why a country deciding to specialise in the latter group
should be less competitive, on the international level than a country
which follows the traditional route and concentrates on developing its
manufacturing sector. This should be true irrespectively of whether
the decision is a voluntary choice based on comparative advantage
considerations or one of necessity based on the failure of
manufacturing to evolve into a competitive sector.
It has been widely recognised that productivity in services
is extremely hard to assess and measure. While in manufacturing
industries, productivity is a quantitative measure of output per
worker, in services, such a definition would lead to an
underestimation of productivity because one has to consider quality as
well as quantity measures of output. An important characteristic of
most services, the interaction and personal contact involved between
producers and consumers, who, in some cases, have to cooperate in
producing the final service together, implies that, perhaps, the high
labour content of services contributes to higher qualitative (rather
than quantitative) effectiveness. In fact, instead of defining and
measuring service productivity as output per man hour, perhaps a more
appropriate definition would be "maximising output of acceptable
quality while minimising costs of the production process" (Holmstrom,
1985, p. 103, Riddle, 1986, p. 68-72). According to this view and
because of the interaction involved, between producers and consumers
which makes it harder to substitute labour for capital in services to
the same extent as it is possible in manufacturing, as service output
grows, so must inevitably employment grow, without necessarily
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inducing underemployment or lower productivity, provided that
employment is demand induced and not residual (Baer and Samuelson,
1981, p. 508, Bhalla 1970, p. 521).
Empirical investigations concerning the estimation of
productivity in the service sector, in comparison to the other two
sectors (Riddle, 1986, p. 73), have come up with the following
results:
-When traditional static measures of productivity are used (output per
labour input), productivity is lower in the service sector only in the
case of the developed industrial countries and only for 1981 in the
period 1977-1981. While the productivity growth of the service sector
is shown to decline with rising GNP, it nevertheless remains higher
than in the other two sectors (agriculture and manufacturing) in all
other cases. For developing countries, in particular, the service
sector is shown to be more productive than the other two sectors,
implying that, given the labour concentration in agriculture, every
worker who moves out of it, is most productive if employed in the
service sector.
-When output per capital input is used as a static measure of
productivity, while services are, on the whole, not as productive as
the other sectors, the difference in productivity is not so
significant to justify the terms of "non productive", "parasitic" etc,
often attributed to services.
-When dynamic measures of productivity are used (changes over time
rather than levels), the following results are derived: When changes
in output per labour input is used, as a productivity measure, as
workers move from other sectors into the service sector, rather than
into manufacturing, they produce a proportionately higher percentage
of GDP.
-When changes of output per capital input is used as a productivity
measure, increased capital investment in manufacturing is shown to be
most productive, in relation to other sectors, only for the developed
industrial countries, while it is most productive in the extractive
sector in the lower, lower middle and upper middle income countries.
The most common argument concerning the lower productivity
of services lies in the argument that the latter are highly labour
intensive (which is the reason put forward for the fact that services
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are cheaper in the poor countries (Bhagwati, 1985)) and have a very
limited capacity for introducing technological innovations. A
counter-argument for the latter observation is that technological
innovations were rarely meant to be applicable to the service sector.
Since the industrial revolution, most of the engineering and
scientific advances have raised productivity in the goods producing
sector (Stanback, 1979, p. 32). However, the service sector becomes
more and more dependent on information technology and capital or human
capital (skilled labour), which, in the first place, contribute to
increase the efficiency and improve the quality of "old" (traditional)
services2 and later on, to create improved or totally transformed
services (Poon, 1989, Riddle, 1986, Stanback, 1979).
The argument that all services are labour intensive and make
poor use of capital is rather misleading, as long as a number of
services (including tourism and finance) can be produced in a very
capital or information intensive way but also (and quite
competitively) in a much more traditional, labour intensive way. This,
in fact, is what makes certain services suitable to countries of
different development levels and endowments. The fact that the span of
capital/labour ratios adequate to produce a given service is much
broader than in the case of goods, allows a developing country with a
comparative advantage in a particular service activity, to specialise
in the production of that service: First in a way requiring low
capital, human capital or information input; then, as the country's
capital/labour ratio increases or as the labour force acquires
additional skills and knowledge, rather than switch to another more
capital or information intensive type of service specialisation, as it
would have to do with the production of goods, simply produce the same
service, in a more capital, information or skill intensive way
(Lanvin, 1989, p. 112).
The analysis of this section, so far, has indicated the
2
For a distinction of services into old, new and complementary, see
Katouzian (1970).
general need for an updated theoretical framework on economic
development and it's stages, which would incorporate the relatively
recent phenomena of "de-industrialisation after industrialisation" for
the developed countries and "de-industrialisation before
industrialisation" for countries such as Greece. It would be very
optimistic and, in fact, beyond the scope of this thesis to fill such
a gap. What the findings of the analysis so far could be interpreted
as, is that economic theory and, especially the rather recent
contributions, is not as "dogmatic" as it seems at first sight, on the
sequence economic development can follow in terms of passing from one
stage to the other.
In particular, the analysis indicated that there is scope
for services to play a decisive role in development, especially for
countries presenting characteristics such as those of the Greek
economy. In the following sections of this chapter therefore, an
effort will be made to exploit this "allowance" of the theory as far
as the particular case of Greece is concerned.
D. TOURISM AS AN ENGINE OF GROWTH IN GREECE: PRECONDITIONS AND
SUGGESTED POLICY MEASURES
The main objective of the previous section was to provide a
theoretical basis for the argument that, under certain circumstances,
it is possible for a developing country to skip, partly or completely,
either as a result of a conscious choice or as a matter of necessity,
the stage of industrialisation which has been considered as the "key"
stage in most patterns of economic development.
It was suggested that not all forms of service activities
are, necessarily, worse than manufacturing, in terms of productivity,
labour/capital/skill intensity, exploitation of new technologies and
scale economies etc. Consequently, there is no valid reason to reject
the possibility that a country possessing (or developing) a
comparative advantage in one or more service activities (preferably
belonging to the group of "dynamic" service activities rather than
those which represent the traditional view of services as
unproductive, labour intensive, unemployment concealing etc), would be
worse off, internationally, in terms of growth rates or
competitiveness than if it had stuck to the development of an
inefficient and sluggish manufacturing sector.
Furthermore, it has been argued, all through the present
thesis, that the manufacturing sector, in Greece, was never what it
was expected to be (by policy makers and the people, alike), despite
considerable (although rather misdirected) efforts, on the part of the
various Greek governments during the post-war years. It would probably
be possible to argue that, given a different set of policy measures
and directives, the Greek manufacturing sector could (or should) be
given still another chance to play its expected role as an engine of
economic growth. The result would be rather doubtful, given
international developments and, especially, Greece's membership in the
EC, which, obviously, considerably limits any individual policy
measures which might have been considered necessary. In any case, the
question whether the Greek manufacturing sector could still be able to
"make it" or not, under what circumstances and whether any such
attempt would be still worth while, is not the primary objective of
the present thesis and of this chapter, in particular, given the
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limited length of both. The main idea is to argue that, if all else
fails, there would still be the alternative for Greece to pursue the
development of its tourist sector, in a rather more organised and
planned way than in the past with the possibility of holding a
competitive position in the new international division of labour.
The general conclusion that one derives from chapter IV of
the present thesis is that, tourism, since its early development
stages, in the 1960s, represents, in all respects, a very important
sector in the Greek economy. Despite its impressive achievements and
fast growth, however, the Greek tourist sector is not as efficient or
as competitive as it might have been. The main reason behind the
numerous problems and deficiencies of the sector in question which
have been extensively described in Chapter IV of the thesis, is that
tourism was always regarded as a residual activity in Greece, serving
mainly short-term goals, such as relieving balance of payment
constraints and operating as a handy source of foreign exchange.
Consequently, its development was never really integrated in a
comprehensive development plan of the Greek economy as a whole but
evolved in a rather piecemeal way, and was largely left to the
initiative of the private sector with no real effort on the part of
the State to coordinate and organize the activities of the latter,
into a complete tourist package. However, despite the various
difficulties mentioned, it has been suggested that if Greece finally
decides to come to terms with the inability of its manufacturing
sector for self-sustained growth, in the future and finds itself in a
position of looking for an alternative engine of growth, then tourism
would be a rather promising candidate.
The first step, therefore, for tourism to start playing an
active part as an engine of economic growth would have to be a true
acceptance of the possibility that the future growth potential of the
manufacturing sector could be rather limited and the consequent
consideration of tourism as a strategic, "key" growth sector. The
second condition that would enable tourism to play its new role better
than in the past, would certainly have to be the pinpointing and
understanding of the problems and difficulties facing the sector as
well as the drafting of possible solutions, according to the target
outcome, in each case.
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The problems facing the Greek tourist sector could be placed
in two groups, the first one including those that were, in a sense,
caused or emphasized by governmental actions and policy measures, the
second one comprising those that are inherent to the nature of tourism
and are faced by all or most countries that decide to develop tourism
as a major economic activity. Factors which can be listed under the
first group are the following:
1.The existing system of grants and loans for tourist investment. This
resulted in numerous large scale projects, relative oversupply and
congestion in certain regions which did not posses the necessary
infrastructure, while not enough incentives were given for the gradual
preparation of new tourist centres to succeed the first.
2. The extremely high percentage of undeclared accommodation units and
hidden economy, in general, which undermines any quality standards of
the services provided, as well as any attempt to organise and control
the tourist sector.
3. The fact that, for a variety of reasons, among which one could also
mention the poor quality of the services provided, Greece attracts,
mainly, low to middle income tourists with a shorter length of stay
and lower per capita expenditure than most other European and
Mediterranean tourist countries, a fact which also contributes to the
over-congestion of tourist regions during the summer months, as long
as the country needs to attract ever increasing numbers of tourists in
order to earn a stable, more or less, amount of foreign exchange.
4. The considerable lack of skilled labour force (including managerial
staff) trained specifically to meet the needs of the tourist sector,
resulting probably, among other reasons, from the fact that employment
in the tourist sector is considered as a residual activity, even by
those employed in it, with a large part of the labour force being
unskilled workers, students, foreigners, farmers, housewives etc,
working on a part-time, second-job basis.
Factors under the second group, most of which have been
analysed in Chapter IV, could include the following:
1. Seasonality in the demand for tourism, which was dealt with
extensively in Chapter IV of the thesis, and constitutes, as we saw, a
particular problem for Greece which has not invested as much as other
tourist countries in developing other forms of tourist apart from
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traditional sun-and-sea holiday tourism.
2. Low occupation rates in many hotels, which are the result of
relative oversupply, too large units in regions that do not have the
carrying capacity for them, as well as of the large number of
undeclared rooms which, usually, offer lower prices.
3. Overdependence of the national tourist sector on large
tour-operators abroad, resulting in a substantial restriction of the
policy measures available for the re-organisation of the sector (i.e.
price determination etc).
4. Very incomplete communication and feedback between the private and
the public sector involved in tourism. Given the nature of the tourist
sector, the fact that the final tourist package offered to the
tourists is comprised of numerous different activities, most of which
are provided by the private sector, which, however, needs to be
controlled, organized and guided by a central authority in order to
achieve the best and most efficient results possible, this is of
paramount importance.
The main objectives of a consistent policy towards tourism,
given the problems and inefficiencies of the sector in question,
should be, in the first place, to increase the competitiveness of the
sector, on the international level and to integrate its development
within a complete, long term development plan of the country as a
whole, taking into account the characteristics, needs and growth
potential of different regions. Given that tourism is an activity
which is carried out, for the most part, by the private sector but
which necessitates very close cooperation between the latter and the
public sector, most of the policy measures adopted would, probably,
have to be part of a scheme of indicative planning, consisting,
mainly, of incentives/ disincentives towards the private sector. A
considerable part of the necessary measures to bring the performance
of the Greek tourist sector closer to the desired one, however, would
have to be undertaken by the State (this also being the case for the
manufacturing sector to be successful), due to the global and large
scale character of these measures.
1. In the first place, the country should be divided into a number of
regions of primary and secondary tourist importance. The main criteria
for this distinction should be the development level of the region,
240
the degree of congestion, available resources, existing infrastructure
and whether there are any other alternatives for its development.
Industrially developed regions, regions where infrastructure is unable
to support the existing level of tourist development and which have
already reached or are about to reach saturation point should be
included in the second category and further tourist expansion should
be strongly discouraged; at the same time, necessary measures should
be taken in order to upgrade the existing infrastructure and,
consequently, the quality of the services provided. On the other hand,
underdeveloped regions, especially declining agricultural ones or
mountainous and island regions with little or no alternative uses
should be included in the first group and new integrated investment
projects for tourist development there should be encouraged.
2. On the basis of the above division of the country into regions of
primary and secondary tourist importance, supply of tourist services
and the scale of new tourist projects should be carefully planned
accordingly. For example, large scale holiday centres would be a
mistake in a small traditional region which can only support a limited
number of visitors without becoming congested and totally lose its
initial character. This observation would suggest, on one hand, the
existence of general limits on the possibility of using tourism as the
only engine of growth and, on the other hand, emphasises the need for
an efficient and well planned regional policy which would help to
spread out tourist development over the country, in the best possible
way.
3. Again on the basis of the above distinction, a careful analysis of
the characteristics of each region should be made, followed by an
assessment as to what type of tourism each region is best suited to
attract, eg. holiday versus conference tourism, winter tourism versus
summer tourism, limited high income tourism or mass low-middle income
tourism etc.
4. Having specified the regional elements of the suggested tourism
policy, we further discuss the strategy to be followed. Generally
speaking, regional development in the past was pursued in most
countries in a "growth pole" context. The "growth pole" approach of
regional development was introduced by F. Perroux (see Peroux, 1955).
The basic point of this approach was that regional development could
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be pursued by an individual investment project in a backward region,
which could operate as a growth pole, in the sense that it would
induce further investment and economic activity. For a number of years
this approach seems to have dominated in the policies of many
countries, and especially in the E.C. regional policy. This policy
however did not prove to be successful, at least relatively to what
was expected of it, mainly because it was based on an individual
project rather than a more comprehensive and general plan for action.
The integrated programs for regional development (the most recent E.C.
policy) seem to serve this purpose better. The idea behind integrated
programs, which should be extended and applied to the Greek tourism
regional policy, is that for the development of a certain region, a
series of investment projects (including infrastructure and specific
economic activities), integrated into a comprehensive plan is
required.
5. Improving the quality of the services provided is a matter of
primary importance if the Greek tourist sector is to increase its
competitiveness and efficiency on the international level. Apart from
an organised attempt to control and suppress the large hidden economy
of the sector and to list all of the existing accommodation and
recreation units according to a standard system such as the star, so
as to provide some sort of warranty of service quality in relation to
price, the state should also initiate an educational and training
scheme specifically for employees in the tourist sector. The lack of
suitably skilled labour force, in most regions, the short-term,
residual nature of employment in tourism represents a major setback to
quality and efficiency, particularly given the fact that personal
contact between the buyers and the sellers of the tourist product is a
most important element of the final tourist package.
6. A carefully planned, well organised advertising campaign,
especially abroad but also within the country, is a must for an even
remotely successful tourist sector. A crucial point here is that the
Greek tourist product should be diversified from that of competing
Mediterranean countries. The advertising campaign should have to move
away from the traditional sun-and-sea holiday element, which is
attractive, obviously, but can be found more or less the same in any
Mediterranean country. It would have to be enriched with other
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elements particular to the country and Greece is a sufficiently
diversified country to be able to attract many different forms of
tourism. With the new information technology now available, it should
be possible, through video tapes, computerised information etc, to
reach out to the different segments of the international tourist
market, thus fighting seasonality as well as promoting the development
of regions which posses different features. In fact, while Greece is
rather backward in this field, a number of its competitors, i.e
Turkey, Yugoslavia, Spain, etc, seem to attribute a great deal of
importance to efficient advertising of their tourist product.
7. Increased regional decentralisation of the activities of the
National Tourist Board should be advocated and a stronger feedback
relationship between the private sector and the public authorities in
each region should be encouraged as far as tourist related issues are
concerned.
As far as specific measures of indicative planning are
concerned, one could suggest, among others, the following:
1. The radical modification of the existing system of grants and loans
which, up to now, has only succeeded in promoting development in
already congested regions while doing very little as far as promoting
investment (and moreover, the right sort of investment, suited to the
particular nature of each region) in under-endowed areas.
2. Provision of incentives that would encourage the private sector to
invest in projects in accordance with the development plan (integrated
program) of a certain region while the launching of tourist projects
which dot fit in with the latter (i.e. low quality services or large
scale investment in congested regions) should be strongly discouraged
or even prohibited.
3. Improved access to financial assistance, which would have to be
somewhat restructured so as not to encourage solely large scale
projects (on the grounds of viability), but small family type units,
which would be able, perhaps, to ensure higher occupation rates
over time. The establishment of a special "Tourism Bank", which would
grant loans on the basis of other criteria apart viability of the
project (such as the specific needs of a certain region), could be a
step in this direction.
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IN
EPILOGUE
Although the present thesis touches on a number of
economic fields, it should not be considered as a study on
development, industrial or post-industrial economics or on the
economics of tourism, since it was not meant to (and does not) provide
a complete, into depth analysis of either one of them.
The main objective of the present thesis, however, was
rather ambitious, as it consisted, mainly, of a hope and a wish to
contribute into shaking and modifying a way of thinking that has been
deeply rooted in the mentality of Greeks.
Since the creation of the modern Greek state (1830s) and
especially for more than forty years now, since the early 1950s when
the Greek economy entered the process of development, until today, the
majority of the Greek people, from simple workers to high ranking
policy makers, have fostered a vision of Greece, someday becoming a
strong industrial power. During the last decade, however, it has
become more and more obvious, to a wide range of people, that Greece
is as far away from achieving such a goal as it ever was and that,
more likely than not, this vision has reached its limits. Old
fashioned industrial structures; production of, mainly, traditional,
low value added goods; lack of an intermediate goods industry; low
propensity to invest and high propensity to import in manufacturing;
the structure of demand which, even despite recent policy measures
discriminates against domestically produced goods; these, combined
with external factors, such as growing international economic
integration, changing international division of labour, elasticity of
demand for exports etc, all of these, more extensively discussed in
Chapter II of the present thesis, contribute to the gradual
realisation that Greece is not about to wake up, shortly, as an
internationally competitive industrial power.
The implication, however, of trying to move, for so long,
towards a specific goal which was paramount in the minds of all the
parties involved in Greek economic development is that, once it starts
to become obvious that this goal is not about to be achieved, things,
naturally, come to a standstill, as long as there are no other obvious
alternatives for growth.
This is what the main contribution of this thesis is all
about. Not only to suggest an alternative to industrial development,
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in case the failure of the latter becomes even more obvious than it
already has, but also, to provide a theoretical and empirical economic
basis to justify the choice of this alternative, in case it proves
necessary to consider it seriously in he future.
The possibillity of having to turn to tourism, in order to
pursue economic development, has been suggested, from time to time, in
Greece, given that its role as a source of income was always obvious
enough. These suggestions, however, usually, made this alternative to
sound as the result of a frightful failure, raised rather demoralising
visions of Greece acting as the domesting servant of the developed
world and, more often than not, served as an incentive to multiply the
efforts towards industrial development, if failure to do so meant
having to accept such a dismal alternative.
The message of the present thesis is that the suggested
alternative might not be so dismal, after all; that it will not,
necessarily cast Greece into the role of servant to the developed
world, for given a new international division of labour among
countries, this could be seen as country A (Greece, in this case),
providing a specific service or group of services for which country B
has a high elasticity of demand, in exchange for goods or services
provided by country B and demanded by country A. This thesis also
tries to argue that shifting productive resources to the tourist
sector does not, necessarilly, mean that the country is condemned to
underdevelopment and stagnation; on the contrary, according to the
development level of the country and of the tourist sector, in
particular, and also, according to the type of available resources
(manpower and know-how included), tourism could be pursued, either in
the more traditional, labour intensive way which is actually followed
in Greece, or in a more skill-intensive, high-technology way which,
through higher productivity growth, economies of scale and greater
efficiency, could contribute to give the country a new dynamism and
impetus for growth. This point is strengthened by the assumption that
international demand for tourism is expected to continue its rapid
growth, in the future, while demand for traditional industrial goods
similar to those produced in Greece, is more likely to remain stagnant
or even decline.
The role that tourism is capable of playing in economic
development was investigated, both generally and specifically for
Greece, in Chapter IV and V of the thesis. In chapter VI, I attempted
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to take the theoretical issues surveyed in chapter I and tested in
chapter III, a step further by discussing, among other things, the
conditions under which it would be possible for tourism to act as an
alternative engine of economic growth, in Greece; some, rather
general policy measures were suggested, which would enable tourism to
play this role in a more efficient and competitive manner. Given that
the originality and the main concern of the thesis lies in the
formulation
	 of	 the	 idea	 of	 tourism	 as	 an	 alternative
(or complementary to manufacturing) engine of growth, in the case of
Greece, and moreover, given the limitations of the thesis, a
comprehensive development plan for tourism as a leading sector in
Greek economic development was not taken any further. Having launched
the idea, I will leave this task to others, or to myself, if in the
future of the Greek economy proves to necessitate such a radical
shift.
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
TABLE I: CAUSALITY TEST RESULTS
al DGDPM1 DGDPM2 DGDP1 DGDP2 DGDPA1 DGDPA2 R2 F	 F'
Dep. vbl.
DGDPM -1.41	 -1.86	 -0.77 2.1 0.96
	 0.81 15.28 0.16
(1.77)	 (5.89)	 (1.9) (4.55)(1.38)
	 (0.85)
DGDP	 -0.62	 -0.66	 -0.10 0.56 0.04
	 0.66 6.88 0.01
(1.13)	 (3.05)	 (0.36) (1.71)(0.08)
	 (0.99)
	
DGDPM -1.44	 -0.82	 -0.54
	 0.11 -0.03 0.58 4.86 0.48
	
(1.23)	 (3.75)	 (2.61)
	 (0.67) (0.19)	 (0.5)
DGDPA 0.23	 -0.15	 0.18	 -0.77 -0.18 0.53 4.09 17.11
	
(0.12)	 (0.45) (0.55)
	 (2.98)	 (0.71)	 (0.00)
al DGDPM1 DGDPM2 DGDPS1 DGDPS2 DGDPT1 DGDPT2 R2 F	 F'
Dep.vb1.
	
DGDPM -1.12	 -1.58 -0.46	 3.00	 -0.49
	 0.69 8.12 0.01
	
(1.12)	 (4.48)(1.13)	 (2.68)	 (-0.38)
	 (0.92)
	
DGDPS -0.38	 -0.36 -0.06	 0.68	 -0.35	 0.56 4.47 0.12
	
(1.1)	 (2.97)(0.44)	 (1.76)	 (0.8)	 (0.88)
DGDPM -2.00	 -1.08 -0.85
	 0.05	 0.12	 0.66 7.03 0.09
(1.87)	 (4.99)(3.78)	 (1.08) (2.32)	 (0.76)
	
DGDPT -2.05	 -1.66 -0.12	 -0.20	 -0.05	 0.30 1.54 0.48
	
(0.35)	 (1.41)(0.09)	 (0.75)	 (0.20)	 (0.5)
al DGDPM1 DGDPM2 DTC1 DTC2 DTradel Dtrade2 R2 F	 F'
Dep.vb1
	
DGDPM -1.29	 -1.19 -0.88	 0.57 -0.58
	 0.63 6.13 0.19
	
(1.16)	 (4.47) (3.23) (1.35)(1.55)
	 (0.66)
DTC	 -0.61	 -0.4	 -0.11	 0.24 -0.42
	 0.56 4.5 1.24
	
(0.9)	 (2.46)	 (0.66) (0.92)(1.88)
	 (0.28)
DGDPM -1.25	 -0.92 -0.17	 0.28	 -0.57 0.61 5.62 0.05
(1.1)	 (2.77) (0.48)
	 (0.66)	 (1.3)	 (0.82)
DTrade -0.65	 -0.27 0.24	 -0.21	 -0.76 0.53 4.01 0.85
	
(0.74) (1.04) (0.88)	 (0.65)	 (2.21)	 (0.37)
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al DGDPM1 DGDPM2 DBnks1 DBnks2 DDwell DDwel2 R
2 
F	 F'
Dep.vb1.
DGDPM -1.01 -0.76 -0.46	 0.3 0.48 0.68 7.67 0.5
(0.61) (0.29) (0.37)(0.6) (0.35) (0.49)
DBnks -0.51 -0.15 -0.19 -0.89 -0.49 0.47 3.16 8.17
(0.26) (0.44) (1.56)(3.37) (1.35) (0.01)
DGDPM -1.71 -1.12 -0.68 2.48 -2.25 0.7 8.17 0.01
(1.7) (5.35) (3.41) (2.14) (2.18) (0.9)
DDwel -0.44 -0.04 0.04 0.77 -0.48 0.39 2.25 2.85
(1.4) (1.05) (1.01) (2.05) (2.34) (0.11)
al DGDPM1 DGDPM2 DPubAdl DPubAd2 DHth-edl DHth-ed2 R2 F F'
Dep.vb1.
DGDPM -1.42 -0.85 -0.61 0.12 	 0.00
	 0.53 4.0 0.15
(1.09)(3.54)(2.32)	 (0.19)	 (0.00)
	 (0.7)
	
DPubAd -0.49 0.11 -0.11 -0.39	 -0.5	 0.57 4.83 0.65
(1.0)(1.22)	 (1.15) (1.64)	 (2.2)	 (0.43)
DGDPM -1.33 -0.79 -0.47
	 0.57	 0.06 0.6 5.28 0.00
(1.16)	 (3.5)(2.1)
	
(1.44)
	
(0.13)	 (0.97)
DHthEd 0.26	 0.05 0.05	 -0.34	 -0.88 0.59 5.11 0.22
(0.49)	 (0.52) (0.52)
	 (1.8)
	 (3.79)	 (0.64)
al DGDPM1 DGDPM2 DOthserl DOthser2 	 R2 F	 F'
Dep..vb1
DGDPM	 -1.71 -1.19 -0.35 	 78.5	 -0.55
	 0.73	 9.91 0.00
(1.77)	 (6.16) (1.76) (2.75)	 (1.43)
	 (0.97)
DOthser -0.01 -0.008 -0.001 -0.23	 -0.00
	
0.71	 8.67 0.01
(1.68)	 (5.13) (0.86)	 (1.01)	 (2.65)
	 (0.65)
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at
Dep.vb1.
DGDPT1	 DGDPT2 DGDP1 DGDP2 DGDPA1 DGDPA2 R2 F F'
DGDPT	 -2.03 -0.27	 0.07 -2.09 -1.89 0.23 1.06 0.17
(0.33) (0.84)	 (0.21) (0.82)(0.76) (0.68)
DGDP	 -0.89 0.04	 0.08 -0.85 -0.83 0.49 3.37 0.00
(1.31) (1.3)	 (2.22) (3.02)(3.03) (0.95)
DGDPT	 -0.66 -0.58	 -0.2 1.32 0.91 0.31 1.61 0.01
(0.12) (2.31)(0.83) (1.63) (1.13) (0.93)
DGDPA	 0.45 0.02	 -0.08 -0.81 -0.21 0.54 4.11 2.07
(0.25) (0.32)	 (1.02) (3.07) (0.79) (0.17)
al DGDPT1	 DGDPT2 DGDPS1 DGDPS2 DTC1 DTC2 R2 F F'
Dep.vb1.
	
DGDPT -2.32 -0.33	 0.01	 -3.8 -1.83	 0.24 1.12	 0.1
	
(0.38)(1.17) (0.06) 	 (1.00) (0.51)
	 (0.75)
	
DGDPS -0.59	 0.02	 0.03	 -0.6 -0.59	 0.4 2.42	 0.02
	
(1.4)	 (1.2)	 (1.8)	 (2.3) (2.4)
	 (0.9)
	
DGDPT -3.05	 -0.24 0.02	 -2.66	 -0.81 0.28 1.4	 0.2
	
(0.5)	 (0.84)(0.07)
	 (1.37)	 (0.53)	 (0.66)
DTC	 -0.74	 0.0	 0.03	 -0.26	 -0.62 0.4 2.36	 0.52
(0.93) (0.11) (0.92)
	
(0.99)	 (2.99)	 (0.48)
al DGDPT1 DGDPT2 DTradel DTrade2 DBnks1 DBnks2 R2 F	 F'
Dep.vb1.
	
DGDPT -1.43 -0.41 -0.04 -1.96	 -1.31
	
(0.25)(1.69) (0.19) (1.5) 	 (0.99)
DTrade -0.89	 0.03 0.08 -0.7	 -0.59
	
(-1.07)(1.06)(2.26)(3.6) 	 (-3.06)
	
DGDPT 0.13	 -0.43 -0.09
	
(0.02)	 (1.67)(0.38)
0.3 1.55 0.00
(0.95)
0.57 4.74 0.41
(0.53)
1.18	 1.38 0.31 1.58 0.21
(1.53) (1.19)	 (0.65)
DBnks -0.23	 0.01 -0.07	 -0.86 -0.56 0.49 3.47 4.71
(-0.12) (0.13)(0.93) 	 (3.4) (1.48)	 (0.04)
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2
F'Fal DGDPT1 DGDPT2 DHth-edl DHth-ed2 DOthSerl DOthSer2 R
Dep.vb1
DGDPT	 -0.7 -0.39 -0.18	 0.68 1.4 0.2 0.89 0.1
(0.1)	 (1.5)(0.7)	 (0.34) (0.62) (0.89)
DHthed 0.08	 0.02	 0.05 -0.31 -0.86 0.7 9.33 0.04
(0.18)(1.1)	 (2.71)(2.18) (4.9) (0.84)
DGDPT	 -1.1 -0.63 -0.21 90.6 -1.8 0.2 1.01	 1.69
(0.18)(1.79)(0.79)	 ( (0.58) (0.71) (0.2)
DOthS -0.005 0.00 -0.00 -0.32 -0.006 0.2 0.9	 2.18
(0.45)(0.01)(0.68) (1.00) (1.13) (0.16)
al DGDPT1 DGDPT2 DDwell DDwel2 DPubAdl DPubAd2
Dep.vb1
R2 F	 F'
DGDPT -1.6	 -0.37 -0.02 -9.4 3.13 0.3 1.56 0.97
(0.29)(1.46) (0.09) (1.59) (0.51) (0.34)
DDwel -0.27 0.01 0.01 0.23 -0.34 0.43 2.72 0.02
(1.43)(1.44) (1.29) (1.15) (1.66) (0.89)
DGDPT 1.91	 -0.36 0.03 3.03 5.65 0.41 2.44 0.25
(0.36)(1.55) (0.15) (1.24) (2.29) (0.62)
DPubAd -0.55 -0.005 -0.05 -0.66 -0.75 0.63 6.19 0.2
(1.28)(0.27) (2.8) (3.3) (3.71) (0.66)
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GRAPH I
Source: Komilis, 1986.
Monthly Fluctuations in Hotel Employment, 1969-1978
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Graph II
Regional Distribution of Hotel Beds, 1963-73
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GRAPH III
Regional Concentration of Overnight Stays in Greece, 1963-73
1981-86
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